Today is a unique day in the sports world; quite literally, two of the highest watched sporting events are being played today. First, there was the men's final of the Australian Open tennis (one of the most watched events worldwide and in Austrailia). Then, the Superbowl (THE most watched sporting event in the United States).
A few do not like sports at all. Others are completely indifferent to sports - take 'em or leave 'em. Some are postively fanatical about sports. Personally, I am indifferent to many sports like basketball, cycling, cricket, and (to my fiancee's chagrin) volleyball. I do, however, love to watch football and follow men's (and to a lesser degree, women's) tennis with a passion.
So what is so exciting about sports? Why do I gladly sit for five hours at a stretch just to watch 2 competitors hit a ball back and forth across a court? In an obvious sense, different people like, or love, sports for different reason. Some, generally athletes or the athletically inclined, like watching sports to admire the physical excellence that it entails. This is why many tennis fans love watching the excellent Roger Federer glide a backhand winner, and why football fans thrill to see Troy Polumalu make dazzling defensive plays. Like admierers of a musician's technical proficiency, some sports fans enjoyment comes from being able to marvel at athletes' abilities.
Of course, while some listen to music to admire its technical beauty, others listen to admire its emotional beauty. That is why I, a non-athlete for sure, watch sports. LIke any good reality show, sports provide unscripted drama. A close tennis match has an incomparable power to make my heart pound and keep me glued to the television (no matter how much work I really should be doing instead).
Pick a person or team to root for, though, and the intensity increases. I can certainly be entertained by a football game with teams I care nothing about, but it is nothing compared to the excited feeling of watching a New England Patriots or Baltimore Ravens game. (While I will watch the Superbowl this year, it will be nowhere near as exciting as when the Patriots were in last year's.)
The other thrill that sports provides but regular television does not (with the exception of reality shows) is the thrill of watching a yet-to-be-determined game become determined. Once we have a team or player to root for, the excitement comes from the very idea that their win is not assured, but can only be made (or lost) moment-by-moment. Every sports fan knkows that it is simply no real fun to watch a match/game the outcome of which is already known. How many times have we heard the horror story of the football fan who taped the game in his absence, made it home to watch the game, only to accidentally see the final score on the news. He can still watch the game - and it is the same game whether he knows the outcome or not - but the excitement of doing so will be all but dead.
Another often ignored reason that some watch sports is that it provides a non-burdensome outlet to channel aggression. I had to explain this last night when explaining to my fiancee why I sometimes like to watch the Ultimate Fighting Championships . While one can pretend that the reason we (guys WAY more than girls) watch "violent" sports is because of its artistry or technical excellence, these two things can just as easily be seen in ice-skating and freestyle gymnastics. We really watch UFC, boxing, kickboxing, and Australian-rules football for the thrill of watching guys get pummelled, bloodied, and beaten into submisison; we watch these because it gives a release to aggression (Wililam James's "Moral Equivalent to War" maybe?)
Whyever we watch sports, sports have been a part of our human nature, seemingly, since as far back as recorded history will go. For my sake and for the sake of millions of other sports lovers, I hope this trend continues.
Sunday, February 1, 2009
Saturday, January 31, 2009
Thoughts About Memes, or Memes About Thoughts
I just wanted to share an interesting e-mail exchange that I am currently having with a fellow amazon.com reviewer. It is on the topic of memes (the thought that just as genes are the building block of phenotypes, the meme is the basic unit of our mental life).
This was the e-mail sent to me:
Here was my response:
I am always amazed that the idea of memes has any credence at all. It seems that the only thing it really has going for it is that it is materialistic in nature (thus appealing to very hardcore materialists), and that it makes sense out of the phenomenon we sometimes have about thoughts "popping into" our heads without us willing them to.
When discussing memes with others, I am always amazed that defenders of memetics naturally assume that I am not a materialist, and must be a mind/body dualist, because of my rejection of memes. It just seeems quite natural to me that while the material brain gives rise to our inner life, it does not need "mind viruses" to infect it from the outside, but creates thoughts solely from the inside.
I guess time will tell if this idea has any staying power. My guess is that it will be gone within a decade as neuroscience gets a bit older.
This was the e-mail sent to me:
I really liked your review [of Denis Dutton's "Art Instinct"] and it was so convincing I decided not to buy the book, even as I was poised to do so. However the book's title alone sparked a cascade of useful thoughts.
Since you're familiar with Stephen Pinker and ideas about evolution, I guess you must also be familiar with Richard Dawkins. But maybe you don't know about a wonderful book inspired by Dawkins: "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore, with an introduction by Dawkins. Dr. Blackmore takes Dawkins' meme concept and runs with it. I found it to be a novel and delightfully argued theory of how ideas (including commercial jingles, fashion styles, catch phrases and religions) spread and evolve in a Darwinian manner. There are other books and articles about the meme concept, but hers is the only one I found convincing and revelatory.
Here was my response:
Thanks very much for the very kind words about my review. In honesty, it is an interesting book even though I find its ideas a bit rough. While I don't reccomend its ideas, the book is quite an interesting read.
Yes, I am definitely familiar with Pinker, Dawkins and Blackmore. To be honest, I am not very attracted to the idea of the meme (or the meme of the meme?). The reason is that it doesn't "explain" much of anything. Anything that the invocation of a meme can explain - why songs are catchy, why we can't stop thinking about that movie line, etc - can be juust as easily, and less problematically, explained by invoking the concept of "ideas." Yes, the meme is much more materialistic and therefore scientific seeming, but it doesn't expain much at all.
I am not sure we know nearly enough about neuroscience to explain ideas, their origin, and why sometimes they "pop up" without us wanting them to, but my suspicion is that we will find that the reality is much more pedestrian than the meme: ideas occur because of certain combinations of neurons firing between synapses, and sometimes, these firings occur without conscious will on our part.
My biggest problem with the idea of "memes" is that they do not make sense in several ways. (a) They don't really account for creativity and novelty; (b) they don't make sense given our strong intutions that we control our thoughts (rather than thoughts just "happening" to our passive brains; and (c) for such a physicalistic theory, the meme does not appear to have any physical nature as a thing (like the gene).
I am always amazed that the idea of memes has any credence at all. It seems that the only thing it really has going for it is that it is materialistic in nature (thus appealing to very hardcore materialists), and that it makes sense out of the phenomenon we sometimes have about thoughts "popping into" our heads without us willing them to.
When discussing memes with others, I am always amazed that defenders of memetics naturally assume that I am not a materialist, and must be a mind/body dualist, because of my rejection of memes. It just seeems quite natural to me that while the material brain gives rise to our inner life, it does not need "mind viruses" to infect it from the outside, but creates thoughts solely from the inside.
I guess time will tell if this idea has any staying power. My guess is that it will be gone within a decade as neuroscience gets a bit older.
Special Ed Students Immune From Failure?
Yesteday, I took part in an IEP (Individualized Education Program) meeting for an autistic student on my case load. The goal of the meeting was to evaluate whether the student is progressing academically with the strategies we have put in place for him.
And, out of the blue, there it was. One participant, a "resource teacher" specializing in autism, said, "Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing."
I worked hard to keep my jaw from dropping. A few months ago, I would have said something to follow up such a comment - something to the effect of, "Special education students can fail, if they are not doing the work required desipte our best efforts." I would have said something like this but have learned to keep my mouth shut so as to avoid an "everyone against Kevin," scenario. Sadly, the view that kids recieving special ed services should not fail is commonplace.
To clarify, I do not accuse those holding this view of suggesting that students should pass simply because they recieve special education services. Their view is more nuanced: if a student receiving special education services is failing, then it must be because their work is not appropriately tailored to suit their abilities or strengths. This was what the participant at Friday's meeting was saying: as the student is failing classes, it must be because we special and general educators are not meeting his/her needs.
IF there is one over-arching problem with special education as administered in public schools (particularly high schools), it is this: special education inadvertently ends up shielding students from accountability. Special educators will pay lip-services to the idea that students must "meet teachers halfway," but these words collapse each time we introduce new services for a child in proportion to how badly they are failing. The worst part is that, by high school, students often know this and use it to their advantage. (I can't tell you how many times, for instance, I have seen kids recieve new services only to become lazier, thereby recieving new services, etc.)
The situation gets particularly delicate when we realize that, fairly often, a student is placed into special education because they are coming in far below the grade level required of the actual grade they are in (10th graders reading on a 3rd grade level, for instance.) Thus, when we talk about what "modificaitons" we need to make to their work, it often consists of reading things for them, scaling down the reading level of readings we give them, and, in a nutshell, making "10th grade english" into "3rd grade english that carries a 10th grade credit." This obliterates the entire idea of a "standards based" education by allowing some students to pass the same class as their peers, while having to master far less content in order to do so.
"Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing." There has simply got to be a better way.
And, out of the blue, there it was. One participant, a "resource teacher" specializing in autism, said, "Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing."
I worked hard to keep my jaw from dropping. A few months ago, I would have said something to follow up such a comment - something to the effect of, "Special education students can fail, if they are not doing the work required desipte our best efforts." I would have said something like this but have learned to keep my mouth shut so as to avoid an "everyone against Kevin," scenario. Sadly, the view that kids recieving special ed services should not fail is commonplace.
To clarify, I do not accuse those holding this view of suggesting that students should pass simply because they recieve special education services. Their view is more nuanced: if a student receiving special education services is failing, then it must be because their work is not appropriately tailored to suit their abilities or strengths. This was what the participant at Friday's meeting was saying: as the student is failing classes, it must be because we special and general educators are not meeting his/her needs.
IF there is one over-arching problem with special education as administered in public schools (particularly high schools), it is this: special education inadvertently ends up shielding students from accountability. Special educators will pay lip-services to the idea that students must "meet teachers halfway," but these words collapse each time we introduce new services for a child in proportion to how badly they are failing. The worst part is that, by high school, students often know this and use it to their advantage. (I can't tell you how many times, for instance, I have seen kids recieve new services only to become lazier, thereby recieving new services, etc.)
The situation gets particularly delicate when we realize that, fairly often, a student is placed into special education because they are coming in far below the grade level required of the actual grade they are in (10th graders reading on a 3rd grade level, for instance.) Thus, when we talk about what "modificaitons" we need to make to their work, it often consists of reading things for them, scaling down the reading level of readings we give them, and, in a nutshell, making "10th grade english" into "3rd grade english that carries a 10th grade credit." This obliterates the entire idea of a "standards based" education by allowing some students to pass the same class as their peers, while having to master far less content in order to do so.
"Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing." There has simply got to be a better way.
Progressive Education: A Bridge Too Far,
On another blog, there is an intersting post questioning America's over-reliance on standardized test scores, and test scores in general. As an educator, I share the blogger's concern that American schools are cranking out students that are ill-able to think well.
The problem is that much of this criticism of the current educational approach comes from the vantege point of (what is loosely termed) progressive education. Influenced by in large by John Dewey, Maria Montessori, Edward Thorndike, etc, these educators tend to take the approach of "whole child education" where schools focus less on instilling disciplinary knowledge and more on educating students to participate in social democracy. Less about reading and math, and more about "critical thinking" and social-mindedness.
In this blogger's post, was the example of the Eight Year Study, which allegedly found that progressive schools turn out more "well rounded" and competent students than do "traditional" schools.
What bothers me about the study is not that it shows progresssive schools to turn out more self- and socially-attuned individuals (this is of little suprise considering that progressive schools offer explicit instruction in these areas). My big problem is the ASSUMPTION made in the study that the proper school is one that teachers particular social values.
Here is an example from the study of some objectives of things the study's progressive schools wish to instill in students:
While siome of these - cultivation of work habits and study skills, acquisition of important information - are relatively uncontroversial, some cause me concern: to see schools as "inculcat[ors] of social attitudes," or facilitators in the development of "consistent philosoph[ies] of life," skirt dangerously close to the idea of schools as value-pushers and teachers as opiners.
It seems to me that schools in any kind of pluralistic society should stay as neutral towards any non-academic value as possible, and seeing teachers' role as helping students develop philosophies of life open the floodgates for value-pushing. Teaching english is not value pushing (and is necessasry for academic function). Teaching a philosophy of life is, if anything, the job of parent, pastor, community, or anyone except a public school teacher.
Second, schools have enough on their plates in teaching academic subjects, which we do not do well anyway. Why place a role onto schools which can be best achieved by private entitites like churches, clubs, families, and communities? If focusing on one job is proving to be difficult, why add the additional job of curing social ills as well?
The two foremost problems with "whole child education" is that (a) it forces schoools to play a role that are better played by families, pastors, community, and parties more interested than the school board; and (b) it opens up the potentially dangerous idea that schools become value-pushers, people-molders, and anything but academic-knowledge-conveyers.
While there are many other flaws in the progressive education vision (abolishing letter grades in favor of more "holistic" grades, lack of academic rigor) the two I mentione in the paragraph above are the most concerning to me. I do not want to see a day when schools devote a piece of each school day to "inculcat[ing] social attitudes," and helping students "develop... a philosophy of life."
If we are having enough truouble teaching facts, then why open schools up to teach values?
The problem is that much of this criticism of the current educational approach comes from the vantege point of (what is loosely termed) progressive education. Influenced by in large by John Dewey, Maria Montessori, Edward Thorndike, etc, these educators tend to take the approach of "whole child education" where schools focus less on instilling disciplinary knowledge and more on educating students to participate in social democracy. Less about reading and math, and more about "critical thinking" and social-mindedness.
In this blogger's post, was the example of the Eight Year Study, which allegedly found that progressive schools turn out more "well rounded" and competent students than do "traditional" schools.
What bothers me about the study is not that it shows progresssive schools to turn out more self- and socially-attuned individuals (this is of little suprise considering that progressive schools offer explicit instruction in these areas). My big problem is the ASSUMPTION made in the study that the proper school is one that teachers particular social values.
Here is an example from the study of some objectives of things the study's progressive schools wish to instill in students:
The development of effective methods of thinking
The cultivation of useful work habits and study skills
The inculcation of social attitudes
The acquisition of a wide range of significant interests
The development of increased appreciation of music, art, literature, and other aesthetic experiences
The development of social sensitivity
The development of better personal-social adjustment
he acquisition of important information
The development of physical health
The development of a consistent philosophy of life
While siome of these - cultivation of work habits and study skills, acquisition of important information - are relatively uncontroversial, some cause me concern: to see schools as "inculcat[ors] of social attitudes," or facilitators in the development of "consistent philosoph[ies] of life," skirt dangerously close to the idea of schools as value-pushers and teachers as opiners.
It seems to me that schools in any kind of pluralistic society should stay as neutral towards any non-academic value as possible, and seeing teachers' role as helping students develop philosophies of life open the floodgates for value-pushing. Teaching english is not value pushing (and is necessasry for academic function). Teaching a philosophy of life is, if anything, the job of parent, pastor, community, or anyone except a public school teacher.
Second, schools have enough on their plates in teaching academic subjects, which we do not do well anyway. Why place a role onto schools which can be best achieved by private entitites like churches, clubs, families, and communities? If focusing on one job is proving to be difficult, why add the additional job of curing social ills as well?
The two foremost problems with "whole child education" is that (a) it forces schoools to play a role that are better played by families, pastors, community, and parties more interested than the school board; and (b) it opens up the potentially dangerous idea that schools become value-pushers, people-molders, and anything but academic-knowledge-conveyers.
While there are many other flaws in the progressive education vision (abolishing letter grades in favor of more "holistic" grades, lack of academic rigor) the two I mentione in the paragraph above are the most concerning to me. I do not want to see a day when schools devote a piece of each school day to "inculcat[ing] social attitudes," and helping students "develop... a philosophy of life."
If we are having enough truouble teaching facts, then why open schools up to teach values?
Libertarianism and Why It is Superior to Randian Objectivism
By almost coincidence, I have been thinking about the philosophy of Ayn Rand lately. Not only is one of the blogs I've been following been having some interesting discussions on the merits of Rand as philosopher, but I am reading a book about education using Rand's principles of free market capitalism. In addition, I have received several comments on my posts from Atlas Fan, a blogger with Objecitivst sympathies. All of this has put Ayn Rand's philosophy back into the forefront of my brain. As will be clear, I am not very sympathetic with it.
Before going on to a look at why libertarianism is superior to Objectivist justifications for a minimal state, I want to briefly outline my history with objectivism. In the years 2000 and 2001, I was an objectivist of the ARI variety. I was very convinced that Rand's Objectivism was a viable, fully developed, closed system of philosophy. Gradually, I noticed what I thought were some serious flaws in some of Rand's argument - her ethical philosophy was insufficiently thin, her view of what constituted "reason" was too monolithic, etc. - and fell out of love with Objectivism.
Since then, the one sympathy I truly share with Rand is a belief in liberty, a minimal state, and the use of coercive force as suspect. That said, I think libertarian belief without Randian justification is much stronger than it is with.
First, one of Objectivists key complaints against non-Randian libertarianism is that "Although some call libertarianism a "philosophy," in fact it is just a relatively broad political position..." whereas Rand's defense of freedom "is a systematic philosophy: it starts with a theory of reality and a theory of knowledge, then develops a moral view using conclusions from the previous two fields, and all those conclusions provide the basis for its politics. (1)
Guilty as charged! There is a plurality of possible justifications for libertarianism: thinkers have argued that libertarianism is justified on utilitarian grounds, via natural rights, on religious grounds, or in a plurality of other ways. If libertarianism is to leave people free, though, I could not see that a "one justification system fits all," (like Rand's) as fitting a libertarian community.
In fact, if one suggests that there is only one very specific way to justify liberty (as Rand does) then you run a serious risk of restricting yourself into a minority view. As Rand views hers as a deductive system (it is actually inductive, but that is no matter), then she is saying, "If you don't share my views on epistemology or metaphysics, you can not possibly be a true defender of liberty. Check your premises!" With this very restrictive view, you will win only a handful of adherents (as witnessed by the relatively small number of people who actually consider themselves objectivists).
I have long been an advocate of having a plurality of justifications for any moral or political action. The more ways you can justify x (x is justified on utilitarian, natural rights, pragmatic, grounds) then the more chance you have of being able to justify x to a wide variety of audiences. As I take it a free society will likely have a variety of moral codes for people to subscribe to, it seems obvious that the more traditions one can appeal to in justification of a moral act, the better one will be. Rand's "one size fits all" practice of making a proper defense of liberty contingent on literal adherence to a very particular philosophic code means that you are dooming yourself to appealing to the few, rather than to the many.
More troubling still, whenever I read Rand (or an Objectivist's) denunciation of libertarianism, I can't help but think that they are not defending freedom so much as "freedom to be an Objectivist." In other words, Objectivists' insistence that "rational" people will agree on just about everything (i.e., they will follow Rand to the letter) reminds me of the type of "free society" that exists in Mormon Utan, where everyone is free to act as they choose (with the understanding that if one makes a wrong move, one will be excommunicated or cackled into submission.)
Take the following invective from Peter Schwartz:
First, this is a bad oversimplification. No libertarian that I have ever been in contact with has ever advocated an "eliminat[tion of] all restraints on human behavior." Libertarians certainly draw the line at the Millian (yes, it was around before Rand) "no harm" principle - the principle that, while certain acts are permissible, government is justified in "stepping in" as soon as one person or ground engages in coercive harm to another. In other words, libertarians are far from the hedonists Schwartz describes, but agree fully with Rand (and Locke) that the purpose of government is to protect the individual.
To libertarians, it seems obvious that no free society would endorse one moral system - particularly a horribly restrictive one - as Schwartz seems to want for his "free society" (Galt's gulch, perhaps, where everyone is completely like-minded?). To libertarians, it is obvious that when you leave people RELATIVELY free to live their own lives, a plurality of value systems and ways of life will emerge; people don't think the same, and generally, a society of people that thinks the same is indicative of coercion.) If Galt's gulch or an Objectivist village is teh model of a free society, then it is either indicative that coercion or threat is involved, or is a "membership only" society that restricts membership to those subscribing to a certain view. Neither is consistent with any real libertarianism.
Would an Randian "free society" look like the Ayn Rand Society, where those championing liberty exercise banishment from their group at fast rates? (The David Kelley incident is instructive here, as it led to several 'banishments' from the club, holding no idea of academic freedom. Another great example of such childish and collectivistic behavior can be seen here.)
Objectivists like Schwartz and Peikoff hold an interesting admixture of zeal for individual rights but absolute scorn for those who would exercise it in any way of which they disapprove. Of course, intolerant individuals can certainly function within a free society, and a free society is one in which they would not be barred or coerced unless they did real harm to others. But I shudder to think of how quickly a free society consisting only of those individuals would erect into a statist one where the state monitors behavior to ensure that it is compatible with "reason." Or such a society of like-minded intolerant individuals may quickly become "free" in the way Mormons are in Utah: individuals are free to act in accord with the restrictive ethical code that binds them under threat of banishment or ostricization.
What really concerns me, though, is Objectivism's negativity towrads objectivism's inability to provide strong moral sanction:
Why is Schwartz concerned that libertarianism cannot stop the "gay-rights activist" or "overt anarchist" from exercising his liberties? (Surely, libertarians are justified in penalizing the criminal, via the "no harm" principle). My fear is that, in Schwartz's "free society," the gay-rights activist would be censored or censured for doing nothing other than adcovating for the rights of gays to have relationships and marry. (Rand is incapable of justifying, on Objectivist principles, why gays should not be able to marry.) Schwartz also seems desirous of being able to stop "overt anarchists" from expressing their obviously non-Objectivist views.
Schwartz really does seem to want a society where all views other than Objectivism meet with strong reprobation. This is not defense of freedom, but defense of freedom to follow a restrictive code or be censured (a Mormon-esque freedom with Uncle Warren's role being replaced by Aunt Ayn).
This is why I think libertarianism of a plural variety (and with plural justificaitons) leads to a safer liberty than Rand's very restrictive Objectivist view of freedom. It is more inclusive by allowing for a plurality of justifications (appealing to a wider and more diverse audience), and it is certainly more free in that it would allow various groups with various beliefs and codes to live with the maximum freedom possible (as consistent with a "no harm" or similar principle.
(For anyone curious, the libertarianism that I am in favor of looks much like that written about in the works of William Galston, particularly the book Liberal Pluralism..)
Before going on to a look at why libertarianism is superior to Objectivist justifications for a minimal state, I want to briefly outline my history with objectivism. In the years 2000 and 2001, I was an objectivist of the ARI variety. I was very convinced that Rand's Objectivism was a viable, fully developed, closed system of philosophy. Gradually, I noticed what I thought were some serious flaws in some of Rand's argument - her ethical philosophy was insufficiently thin, her view of what constituted "reason" was too monolithic, etc. - and fell out of love with Objectivism.
Since then, the one sympathy I truly share with Rand is a belief in liberty, a minimal state, and the use of coercive force as suspect. That said, I think libertarian belief without Randian justification is much stronger than it is with.
First, one of Objectivists key complaints against non-Randian libertarianism is that "Although some call libertarianism a "philosophy," in fact it is just a relatively broad political position..." whereas Rand's defense of freedom "is a systematic philosophy: it starts with a theory of reality and a theory of knowledge, then develops a moral view using conclusions from the previous two fields, and all those conclusions provide the basis for its politics. (1)
Guilty as charged! There is a plurality of possible justifications for libertarianism: thinkers have argued that libertarianism is justified on utilitarian grounds, via natural rights, on religious grounds, or in a plurality of other ways. If libertarianism is to leave people free, though, I could not see that a "one justification system fits all," (like Rand's) as fitting a libertarian community.
In fact, if one suggests that there is only one very specific way to justify liberty (as Rand does) then you run a serious risk of restricting yourself into a minority view. As Rand views hers as a deductive system (it is actually inductive, but that is no matter), then she is saying, "If you don't share my views on epistemology or metaphysics, you can not possibly be a true defender of liberty. Check your premises!" With this very restrictive view, you will win only a handful of adherents (as witnessed by the relatively small number of people who actually consider themselves objectivists).
I have long been an advocate of having a plurality of justifications for any moral or political action. The more ways you can justify x (x is justified on utilitarian, natural rights, pragmatic, grounds) then the more chance you have of being able to justify x to a wide variety of audiences. As I take it a free society will likely have a variety of moral codes for people to subscribe to, it seems obvious that the more traditions one can appeal to in justification of a moral act, the better one will be. Rand's "one size fits all" practice of making a proper defense of liberty contingent on literal adherence to a very particular philosophic code means that you are dooming yourself to appealing to the few, rather than to the many.
More troubling still, whenever I read Rand (or an Objectivist's) denunciation of libertarianism, I can't help but think that they are not defending freedom so much as "freedom to be an Objectivist." In other words, Objectivists' insistence that "rational" people will agree on just about everything (i.e., they will follow Rand to the letter) reminds me of the type of "free society" that exists in Mormon Utan, where everyone is free to act as they choose (with the understanding that if one makes a wrong move, one will be excommunicated or cackled into submission.)
Take the following invective from Peter Schwartz:
"Subjectivism, amoralism and anarchism are not merely present in certain “wings” of the Libertarian movement; they are integral to it. In the absence of any intellectual framework, the zealous advocacy of “liberty” can represent only the mindless quest to eliminate all restraints on human behavior—political, moral, metaphysical." (2)
First, this is a bad oversimplification. No libertarian that I have ever been in contact with has ever advocated an "eliminat[tion of] all restraints on human behavior." Libertarians certainly draw the line at the Millian (yes, it was around before Rand) "no harm" principle - the principle that, while certain acts are permissible, government is justified in "stepping in" as soon as one person or ground engages in coercive harm to another. In other words, libertarians are far from the hedonists Schwartz describes, but agree fully with Rand (and Locke) that the purpose of government is to protect the individual.
To libertarians, it seems obvious that no free society would endorse one moral system - particularly a horribly restrictive one - as Schwartz seems to want for his "free society" (Galt's gulch, perhaps, where everyone is completely like-minded?). To libertarians, it is obvious that when you leave people RELATIVELY free to live their own lives, a plurality of value systems and ways of life will emerge; people don't think the same, and generally, a society of people that thinks the same is indicative of coercion.) If Galt's gulch or an Objectivist village is teh model of a free society, then it is either indicative that coercion or threat is involved, or is a "membership only" society that restricts membership to those subscribing to a certain view. Neither is consistent with any real libertarianism.
Would an Randian "free society" look like the Ayn Rand Society, where those championing liberty exercise banishment from their group at fast rates? (The David Kelley incident is instructive here, as it led to several 'banishments' from the club, holding no idea of academic freedom. Another great example of such childish and collectivistic behavior can be seen here.)
Objectivists like Schwartz and Peikoff hold an interesting admixture of zeal for individual rights but absolute scorn for those who would exercise it in any way of which they disapprove. Of course, intolerant individuals can certainly function within a free society, and a free society is one in which they would not be barred or coerced unless they did real harm to others. But I shudder to think of how quickly a free society consisting only of those individuals would erect into a statist one where the state monitors behavior to ensure that it is compatible with "reason." Or such a society of like-minded intolerant individuals may quickly become "free" in the way Mormons are in Utah: individuals are free to act in accord with the restrictive ethical code that binds them under threat of banishment or ostricization.
What really concerns me, though, is Objectivism's negativity towrads objectivism's inability to provide strong moral sanction:
Anyone from a gay-rights activist to a criminal counterfeiter to an overt anarchist can declare that he is merely asserting his “liberty” (3)
Why is Schwartz concerned that libertarianism cannot stop the "gay-rights activist" or "overt anarchist" from exercising his liberties? (Surely, libertarians are justified in penalizing the criminal, via the "no harm" principle). My fear is that, in Schwartz's "free society," the gay-rights activist would be censored or censured for doing nothing other than adcovating for the rights of gays to have relationships and marry. (Rand is incapable of justifying, on Objectivist principles, why gays should not be able to marry.) Schwartz also seems desirous of being able to stop "overt anarchists" from expressing their obviously non-Objectivist views.
Schwartz really does seem to want a society where all views other than Objectivism meet with strong reprobation. This is not defense of freedom, but defense of freedom to follow a restrictive code or be censured (a Mormon-esque freedom with Uncle Warren's role being replaced by Aunt Ayn).
This is why I think libertarianism of a plural variety (and with plural justificaitons) leads to a safer liberty than Rand's very restrictive Objectivist view of freedom. It is more inclusive by allowing for a plurality of justifications (appealing to a wider and more diverse audience), and it is certainly more free in that it would allow various groups with various beliefs and codes to live with the maximum freedom possible (as consistent with a "no harm" or similar principle.
(For anyone curious, the libertarianism that I am in favor of looks much like that written about in the works of William Galston, particularly the book Liberal Pluralism..)
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Review of Stout's "Feel Good Curriculum"
Here is a review I recently wrote about another highly reccomended book, Maureen Stout's "Feel-Good Curriculum." It is a very good indictment of an overly progressive education, a la ED Hirsch
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Maureen Stout's book, "The Feel-Good Curriculum," would make a good companion to the works of ED Hirsch, author of "The Knowledge Deficit." These two authors' theses are much the same: over the past forty-or-so years, the "progressive" changes in American education have led to the decline of academic standards, the over-valuing of (a misguided view of) self-esteem, and and the turning out of students ill-prepared for the disciplined nature of the "real world."
Stout is a professor of education at UC Berkley, and like her philosophical kin Hirsch, is interested not only in demonstrating these saddening trends but in exploring their ideational roots. While the usual suspects (Dewey, Thorndike), she also links non-educators like psychologist Carl Rogers and Erik Ericksson with the "child-centered," whole child," and "self-actualization" movements in education.
These movements changed virtually everything about schooling. Instead of teaching students basic academics, their primary goals were not wo help the child reach self-actualizaiton (whatever THAT means!). Instead of seeing discipline as necessary for an ordered school, it was now seen as an antiquated stifler of student enthusiasm.
...And, as Stout points out, the movement kept on going, becoming more and more extreme despite yielding worse and worse reults. As an educator, I found myself oscillating between chuckling and containing anger as I read about current trends in educaiton - Vygotskyan cooperative learning, social (rather than standards-based) promotion, educators as facilitators rather than instructors - that I sadly recognize all too well. And as an educator, I can attest that these are trends that need to be rethought and revamped, but never seem to be; Stout hits these problems right on the head in writing about these problems, not only identifying THAT, but WHY, they are problems.
Stout ends with a section on how we can turn some of these effects around (and her suggestions sound much like those of ED Hirsch). She does not advocate a return to the dark ages where students memorize rote passages and are paddled for misbehavior. She advocates a return to standards-based, rather than "outcome-based" educaiton, readjust our views on the value of discipine, and maybe get rid of the "progressive" idea of self-esteem that equates it with "feeling good for no good reason" rather than an earned feeling of accomplishment.
This is a very, very good book. Those who read it will either be challenged to re-examine cherished views or be further outraged by problems they know too well. Either way, it is not a book to be missed.
_______________________________________________________________
Maureen Stout's book, "The Feel-Good Curriculum," would make a good companion to the works of ED Hirsch, author of "The Knowledge Deficit." These two authors' theses are much the same: over the past forty-or-so years, the "progressive" changes in American education have led to the decline of academic standards, the over-valuing of (a misguided view of) self-esteem, and and the turning out of students ill-prepared for the disciplined nature of the "real world."
Stout is a professor of education at UC Berkley, and like her philosophical kin Hirsch, is interested not only in demonstrating these saddening trends but in exploring their ideational roots. While the usual suspects (Dewey, Thorndike), she also links non-educators like psychologist Carl Rogers and Erik Ericksson with the "child-centered," whole child," and "self-actualization" movements in education.
These movements changed virtually everything about schooling. Instead of teaching students basic academics, their primary goals were not wo help the child reach self-actualizaiton (whatever THAT means!). Instead of seeing discipline as necessary for an ordered school, it was now seen as an antiquated stifler of student enthusiasm.
...And, as Stout points out, the movement kept on going, becoming more and more extreme despite yielding worse and worse reults. As an educator, I found myself oscillating between chuckling and containing anger as I read about current trends in educaiton - Vygotskyan cooperative learning, social (rather than standards-based) promotion, educators as facilitators rather than instructors - that I sadly recognize all too well. And as an educator, I can attest that these are trends that need to be rethought and revamped, but never seem to be; Stout hits these problems right on the head in writing about these problems, not only identifying THAT, but WHY, they are problems.
Stout ends with a section on how we can turn some of these effects around (and her suggestions sound much like those of ED Hirsch). She does not advocate a return to the dark ages where students memorize rote passages and are paddled for misbehavior. She advocates a return to standards-based, rather than "outcome-based" educaiton, readjust our views on the value of discipine, and maybe get rid of the "progressive" idea of self-esteem that equates it with "feeling good for no good reason" rather than an earned feeling of accomplishment.
This is a very, very good book. Those who read it will either be challenged to re-examine cherished views or be further outraged by problems they know too well. Either way, it is not a book to be missed.
Ayn Rand, Tibor Machan, and Their Mistaken Defense of Objective Morality
Like many others, I first got hooked on philosophy by reading Ayn Rand. Also, like many, there came a time when I started reading other phiosophers. Therefore - again, like many - there was a time when I realized that Rand got just about everything wrong in her philosophizing. In particular, Rand had a habit of claiming that she had solved a vexing philosophic problem generally by vastly oversimplifying, if not getting wrong, a problem only to "solve" something different than the actual problem.
Recently, I have been reading essays in a colleciton called The Promise of Liberty by a follower of Rand's, Tibor Machan. In reading his first essay, which defends Rand's defense of ethical objectivism, I have re-realized how wrong her solution is, and how, as usual, she even got the question wrong.
As PoL is still in press, I am not going to quote from it, but rather from Rand's own essay "The Objectivist Ethics". machan does not really add to or expand to Rand's unfortunate defense, but only restates it with the intention of clarifying it.
In short, Rand and Machan's argument is that ethics are objective because ethical judgments are made with the aid of facts. Once one chooses to live ones life, certain values inexorably follow from that: we ought to seek food, shelter, that which will promote our flourishing, etc.
Al;ready, though, Rand has misunderstood the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Quite honestly, what is at dispute is not whether values and moral judgments are (or should be) made in reference to facts, but what the nature of moral norms are. Subjectivists argue that moral norms are come to by subjects, not by some quality inherent in objects. The echo famous subjectivist JL Mackie, for morality to be objective requires that morals have some subject-independent existence in the world.
In fact, Rand's view is completely comapatible with a subjectivist account of morality. Subjectivists can easily, and without contradiction, suggest that moral judgments should - or must! - be made in the face of actual subject-independent facts, so long as the judgments being made are made by individual subjects. All that is required for subjectivism is the acknowledgement that judgments are made by the subjects and are not a pre-existing imperative that we happen to "come across" existing in the world independent of our minds.
The next question is whether Rand or Machan have done enough to show that an objective morality is possible. Life may be the "ultimate value" that undergirds all other values, but is that one value enough to give us any obvious answers to any but the most pedestrian moral questions?
Before going on, I want the reader to pause and notice the subtle "no true scotsman" fallacy going on here. "[t]hat which is proper to the life of a RATIONAL being is good..." By framing it this way, Rand can easily say that x is an objective value. When one point out that more people choose y than x (a possible reason to suppose that x is not an objective value), Rand can simply dismiss them all by saying that they are not rational, and if they were, they'd choose x. Like the "no true scotsman" fallacy, one cannot win with this set up becuase Rand's caveat - "rational" - has rigged the game!
Beyond that, though, Rand once again demonstrates obliviousness to philosophers and ideas that she full well should have known about: in this case, GE Moore, author of Principia Ethica. If she had been aware of Moore's work - what ethical philosopher wasn't?! - she would have realized the need to show how this "equation" was not a violation of the naturalistic fallacy.
Moore's idea was simple; efforts to equate the terms "good" or "bad" with any demarcatioin principle - utility, survival, pleasure - was invalid and we can see this by realizing that our intuitions understand that "good" and x (pick any criteria) are two different things. "Good" is not a direct synonym for happiness (there are good things that don't make us happy), or, in Rand's case, survival (there are many things that don't enhance our survival that accord with our intuition of what is good).
By way of example, Machan's article mentions more than once a moral obligation to be generous. He mentions is as if to imply that choosing to live inexorably entails this obligation to be generous. He does not explain how this is, and I have serious doubts that any attempts to do so would not be very, very erroneous. I am all for generosity, but it is easy to think of a dozen examples of sceanrios where my survival is impeded or harmed by generosity. More straightforward, A person could certainly argue that being generous has social utility and CAN be personally beneficial (via game theory, say) but such argujments would tend to be utilitarian (or rule-utillitarian) in nature, and I am left mystified as to any plausible argumenst that the choice to live necessarily entails an obligation towards generosity (particularly for egoists like Rand and Machan).
Another example of this blunder can be seen when Rand tries to justify the objective (not subjective) value of productiveness.
To Rand, this value is objective in the sense that it is the "central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values." To choose non-productiveness is, in essence, to act against the ultimate value of life and thus the objectively wrong choice.
To be honest, this is the type of rhetoric that I and many others got hooked on when we got hooked on Rand. Now, when I read those words, it is hard to see how, because as stirring as they are, they are wrong. While one can argue that produciveness is a life-sustaining virtue, it is certainly not objectively the only choice. One can - and many have - sustained their lives by freeloading off of people. Also, productiveness is no guarantor of sustaining one's life. Eithe way, to argue that productiveness is an objective value by reference to its utility in sustaining life is hollow, as it is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for sustaining life.
Like all of the other values that Rand defeds - egoism, capitalism, generosity, rationality, etc. - productiveness is a contingent and subjective value choice. One can choose it, but there is nothing compelling us to do so. Rand and Machan would object that the facts of life comepel values like productiveness and generosity, but any anthropologist or sociologist can easily demonstrate that there are a plurality of ways to answer moral questions consistent with sustaining, and flourishing in, life.
There are many other points that could be brought up, but I think I have done enough to show that Rand came nowhere close to solving the problem of moral objectivism v. subjectivism. The fact that she was so confident that she did, and that Machan is confident enough not to heavily modify and reconfigure her arguments, is testimony of the insularity that has and does plague the objectivist "movement."
Recently, I have been reading essays in a colleciton called The Promise of Liberty by a follower of Rand's, Tibor Machan. In reading his first essay, which defends Rand's defense of ethical objectivism, I have re-realized how wrong her solution is, and how, as usual, she even got the question wrong.
As PoL is still in press, I am not going to quote from it, but rather from Rand's own essay "The Objectivist Ethics". machan does not really add to or expand to Rand's unfortunate defense, but only restates it with the intention of clarifying it.
In short, Rand and Machan's argument is that ethics are objective because ethical judgments are made with the aid of facts. Once one chooses to live ones life, certain values inexorably follow from that: we ought to seek food, shelter, that which will promote our flourishing, etc.
An organism’s life depends on two factors: the material or fuel which it needs from the outside, from its physical background, and the action of its own body, the action of using that fuel properly. What standard determines what is proper in this context? The standard is the organism’s life, or: that which is required for the organism’s survival.
Al;ready, though, Rand has misunderstood the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Quite honestly, what is at dispute is not whether values and moral judgments are (or should be) made in reference to facts, but what the nature of moral norms are. Subjectivists argue that moral norms are come to by subjects, not by some quality inherent in objects. The echo famous subjectivist JL Mackie, for morality to be objective requires that morals have some subject-independent existence in the world.
In fact, Rand's view is completely comapatible with a subjectivist account of morality. Subjectivists can easily, and without contradiction, suggest that moral judgments should - or must! - be made in the face of actual subject-independent facts, so long as the judgments being made are made by individual subjects. All that is required for subjectivism is the acknowledgement that judgments are made by the subjects and are not a pre-existing imperative that we happen to "come across" existing in the world independent of our minds.
The next question is whether Rand or Machan have done enough to show that an objective morality is possible. Life may be the "ultimate value" that undergirds all other values, but is that one value enough to give us any obvious answers to any but the most pedestrian moral questions?
Since reason is man’s basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil.
Before going on, I want the reader to pause and notice the subtle "no true scotsman" fallacy going on here. "[t]hat which is proper to the life of a RATIONAL being is good..." By framing it this way, Rand can easily say that x is an objective value. When one point out that more people choose y than x (a possible reason to suppose that x is not an objective value), Rand can simply dismiss them all by saying that they are not rational, and if they were, they'd choose x. Like the "no true scotsman" fallacy, one cannot win with this set up becuase Rand's caveat - "rational" - has rigged the game!
Beyond that, though, Rand once again demonstrates obliviousness to philosophers and ideas that she full well should have known about: in this case, GE Moore, author of Principia Ethica. If she had been aware of Moore's work - what ethical philosopher wasn't?! - she would have realized the need to show how this "equation" was not a violation of the naturalistic fallacy.
Moore's idea was simple; efforts to equate the terms "good" or "bad" with any demarcatioin principle - utility, survival, pleasure - was invalid and we can see this by realizing that our intuitions understand that "good" and x (pick any criteria) are two different things. "Good" is not a direct synonym for happiness (there are good things that don't make us happy), or, in Rand's case, survival (there are many things that don't enhance our survival that accord with our intuition of what is good).
By way of example, Machan's article mentions more than once a moral obligation to be generous. He mentions is as if to imply that choosing to live inexorably entails this obligation to be generous. He does not explain how this is, and I have serious doubts that any attempts to do so would not be very, very erroneous. I am all for generosity, but it is easy to think of a dozen examples of sceanrios where my survival is impeded or harmed by generosity. More straightforward, A person could certainly argue that being generous has social utility and CAN be personally beneficial (via game theory, say) but such argujments would tend to be utilitarian (or rule-utillitarian) in nature, and I am left mystified as to any plausible argumenst that the choice to live necessarily entails an obligation towards generosity (particularly for egoists like Rand and Machan).
Another example of this blunder can be seen when Rand tries to justify the objective (not subjective) value of productiveness.
The virtue of Productiveness is the recognition of the fact that productive work is the process by which man’s mind sustains his life, the process that sets man free of the necessity to adjust himself to his background, as all animals do, and gives him the power to adjust his background to himself.
To Rand, this value is objective in the sense that it is the "central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values." To choose non-productiveness is, in essence, to act against the ultimate value of life and thus the objectively wrong choice.
To be honest, this is the type of rhetoric that I and many others got hooked on when we got hooked on Rand. Now, when I read those words, it is hard to see how, because as stirring as they are, they are wrong. While one can argue that produciveness is a life-sustaining virtue, it is certainly not objectively the only choice. One can - and many have - sustained their lives by freeloading off of people. Also, productiveness is no guarantor of sustaining one's life. Eithe way, to argue that productiveness is an objective value by reference to its utility in sustaining life is hollow, as it is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for sustaining life.
Like all of the other values that Rand defeds - egoism, capitalism, generosity, rationality, etc. - productiveness is a contingent and subjective value choice. One can choose it, but there is nothing compelling us to do so. Rand and Machan would object that the facts of life comepel values like productiveness and generosity, but any anthropologist or sociologist can easily demonstrate that there are a plurality of ways to answer moral questions consistent with sustaining, and flourishing in, life.
There are many other points that could be brought up, but I think I have done enough to show that Rand came nowhere close to solving the problem of moral objectivism v. subjectivism. The fact that she was so confident that she did, and that Machan is confident enough not to heavily modify and reconfigure her arguments, is testimony of the insularity that has and does plague the objectivist "movement."
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