Before going on to a look at why libertarianism is superior to Objectivist justifications for a minimal state, I want to briefly outline my history with objectivism. In the years 2000 and 2001, I was an objectivist of the ARI variety. I was very convinced that Rand's Objectivism was a viable, fully developed, closed system of philosophy. Gradually, I noticed what I thought were some serious flaws in some of Rand's argument - her ethical philosophy was insufficiently thin, her view of what constituted "reason" was too monolithic, etc. - and fell out of love with Objectivism.
Since then, the one sympathy I truly share with Rand is a belief in liberty, a minimal state, and the use of coercive force as suspect. That said, I think libertarian belief without Randian justification is much stronger than it is with.
First, one of Objectivists key complaints against non-Randian libertarianism is that "Although some call libertarianism a "philosophy," in fact it is just a relatively broad political position..." whereas Rand's defense of freedom "is a systematic philosophy: it starts with a theory of reality and a theory of knowledge, then develops a moral view using conclusions from the previous two fields, and all those conclusions provide the basis for its politics. (1)
Guilty as charged! There is a plurality of possible justifications for libertarianism: thinkers have argued that libertarianism is justified on utilitarian grounds, via natural rights, on religious grounds, or in a plurality of other ways. If libertarianism is to leave people free, though, I could not see that a "one justification system fits all," (like Rand's) as fitting a libertarian community.
In fact, if one suggests that there is only one very specific way to justify liberty (as Rand does) then you run a serious risk of restricting yourself into a minority view. As Rand views hers as a deductive system (it is actually inductive, but that is no matter), then she is saying, "If you don't share my views on epistemology or metaphysics, you can not possibly be a true defender of liberty. Check your premises!" With this very restrictive view, you will win only a handful of adherents (as witnessed by the relatively small number of people who actually consider themselves objectivists).
I have long been an advocate of having a plurality of justifications for any moral or political action. The more ways you can justify x (x is justified on utilitarian, natural rights, pragmatic, grounds) then the more chance you have of being able to justify x to a wide variety of audiences. As I take it a free society will likely have a variety of moral codes for people to subscribe to, it seems obvious that the more traditions one can appeal to in justification of a moral act, the better one will be. Rand's "one size fits all" practice of making a proper defense of liberty contingent on literal adherence to a very particular philosophic code means that you are dooming yourself to appealing to the few, rather than to the many.
More troubling still, whenever I read Rand (or an Objectivist's) denunciation of libertarianism, I can't help but think that they are not defending freedom so much as "freedom to be an Objectivist." In other words, Objectivists' insistence that "rational" people will agree on just about everything (i.e., they will follow Rand to the letter) reminds me of the type of "free society" that exists in Mormon Utan, where everyone is free to act as they choose (with the understanding that if one makes a wrong move, one will be excommunicated or cackled into submission.)
Take the following invective from Peter Schwartz:
"Subjectivism, amoralism and anarchism are not merely present in certain “wings” of the Libertarian movement; they are integral to it. In the absence of any intellectual framework, the zealous advocacy of “liberty” can represent only the mindless quest to eliminate all restraints on human behavior—political, moral, metaphysical." (2)
First, this is a bad oversimplification. No libertarian that I have ever been in contact with has ever advocated an "eliminat[tion of] all restraints on human behavior." Libertarians certainly draw the line at the Millian (yes, it was around before Rand) "no harm" principle - the principle that, while certain acts are permissible, government is justified in "stepping in" as soon as one person or ground engages in coercive harm to another. In other words, libertarians are far from the hedonists Schwartz describes, but agree fully with Rand (and Locke) that the purpose of government is to protect the individual.
To libertarians, it seems obvious that no free society would endorse one moral system - particularly a horribly restrictive one - as Schwartz seems to want for his "free society" (Galt's gulch, perhaps, where everyone is completely like-minded?). To libertarians, it is obvious that when you leave people RELATIVELY free to live their own lives, a plurality of value systems and ways of life will emerge; people don't think the same, and generally, a society of people that thinks the same is indicative of coercion.) If Galt's gulch or an Objectivist village is teh model of a free society, then it is either indicative that coercion or threat is involved, or is a "membership only" society that restricts membership to those subscribing to a certain view. Neither is consistent with any real libertarianism.
Would an Randian "free society" look like the Ayn Rand Society, where those championing liberty exercise banishment from their group at fast rates? (The David Kelley incident is instructive here, as it led to several 'banishments' from the club, holding no idea of academic freedom. Another great example of such childish and collectivistic behavior can be seen here.)
Objectivists like Schwartz and Peikoff hold an interesting admixture of zeal for individual rights but absolute scorn for those who would exercise it in any way of which they disapprove. Of course, intolerant individuals can certainly function within a free society, and a free society is one in which they would not be barred or coerced unless they did real harm to others. But I shudder to think of how quickly a free society consisting only of those individuals would erect into a statist one where the state monitors behavior to ensure that it is compatible with "reason." Or such a society of like-minded intolerant individuals may quickly become "free" in the way Mormons are in Utah: individuals are free to act in accord with the restrictive ethical code that binds them under threat of banishment or ostricization.
What really concerns me, though, is Objectivism's negativity towrads objectivism's inability to provide strong moral sanction:
Anyone from a gay-rights activist to a criminal counterfeiter to an overt anarchist can declare that he is merely asserting his “liberty” (3)
Why is Schwartz concerned that libertarianism cannot stop the "gay-rights activist" or "overt anarchist" from exercising his liberties? (Surely, libertarians are justified in penalizing the criminal, via the "no harm" principle). My fear is that, in Schwartz's "free society," the gay-rights activist would be censored or censured for doing nothing other than adcovating for the rights of gays to have relationships and marry. (Rand is incapable of justifying, on Objectivist principles, why gays should not be able to marry.) Schwartz also seems desirous of being able to stop "overt anarchists" from expressing their obviously non-Objectivist views.
Schwartz really does seem to want a society where all views other than Objectivism meet with strong reprobation. This is not defense of freedom, but defense of freedom to follow a restrictive code or be censured (a Mormon-esque freedom with Uncle Warren's role being replaced by Aunt Ayn).
This is why I think libertarianism of a plural variety (and with plural justificaitons) leads to a safer liberty than Rand's very restrictive Objectivist view of freedom. It is more inclusive by allowing for a plurality of justifications (appealing to a wider and more diverse audience), and it is certainly more free in that it would allow various groups with various beliefs and codes to live with the maximum freedom possible (as consistent with a "no harm" or similar principle.
(For anyone curious, the libertarianism that I am in favor of looks much like that written about in the works of William Galston, particularly the book Liberal Pluralism..)
Some of us were fortunate enough never to become "Objectivists".
ReplyDeleteIn my own case, I became a libertarian in 1965 and read Ayn Rand [Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged as well as The Virtue of Selfishness and For The New Intellectual] while in my last year in high school, 1966-67] While I found many aspects of Fountainhead to be appealing [as, I suspect would be true for most adolescent males], by the time I got through Atlas Shrugged I had already polished off most of Mises's books and some of Hayek's. I thus found Rand's economic and social theory to be puerile, somewhat silly and likely to result in a complete disaster.
In college, due mostly to being tormented by friends who had been influenced by analytic philosophy, I ended up with a double major in Economic and Philosophy. If I had any notion that there was any merit in Rand at that point[which I didn't] a series of courses in topics like history of philosophy and epistemology put a complete end to such tendencies. If you are going for a Ph.D., you will need a variety of supporting classes and might consider the same remedy.
My observation of "Students of Objectivism," at that time and subsequently, is that they are all grossly ignorant of the subjects in which they claim primary expertise. In fact, the only thing they are competent in is ignorant dogmatic arrogance and idolatrous admiration for a second rate playwright who consistently displayed a similar psychosis.
I think that your commentary well captures that core of "Objectivism," but I still recommend the tonic of some grounding in systematic philosophy and social theory to see how truly and completely silly this "philosophy” really is.
Philosopher,
ReplyDeleteFor a person who claims to have once been immersed in Objectivism, this entry shows little evidence that you ever in the past or present understood its content very well. For instance,
"the one sympathy I truly share with Rand is a belief in liberty, a minimal state, and the use of coercive force as suspect. "
The libertarian politics of Objectivism rests on and derives from a single ethical principle: that the human animal that survives and flourishes by applying the product of his rational capacity to his physical actions and who is volitional and therefore fallible, requires autonomy from all other equally fallible human beings. When one extends this principle that is operative in the context of the life of an individual human being into the context of an individual living and interacting with many other human beings it necessitates a politics, the primary principle of which is:
No person may initiate the use of physical force to gain, withhold, or destroy any tangible or intangible value created by or acquired in a voluntary exchange by any other person.
This principle recognizes the fact that physical force is the only means men have of interfering in the ethically mandated autonomy of individuals. Therefore, man's only political necessity is the absence of such force in human interactions. And the only moral goal of any government of human beings is the total elimination of such use of physical force in the society it governs.
Contrary to your statement quoted above, you do not sympathize with Rand's belief in liberty as manifested in this principle if you only regard coercive force as "suspect". Even if the choice of this term was just stylistic, it is not in sync with Rand's position that coercive force as immoral - an absolute condemnation vs. your mere suspicion that coercion might be always wrong.
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"There is a plurality of possible justifications for libertarianism: thinkers have argued that libertarianism is justified on utilitarian grounds, via natural rights, on religious grounds, or in a plurality of other ways."
You have failed to distinguish between a justification and an attempt to justify. A valid justification must be able to substantiate its claim to being true at a fundamental level so that it will be valid in all possible instances that ever were, are, or ever will be. That is why Rand requires her libertarianism to be consistent with and derived from a supportable definition of the fundamental nature of the human being.
Utilitarian grounds are notoriously unreliable, because they are inherently without a standard with long term (eternal) validity. Religious grounds are insufficient because the ultimate measure of their truth is inherently based on arbitrary assertions backed by declarations that deny any necessity to be consistent with perceivable existence (faith).
Consequently, your political pluralism constitutes an assertion that truth itself has multiple definitions
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"if one suggests that there is only one very specific way to justify liberty (as Rand does) then you run a serious risk of restricting yourself into a minority view."
So with no standard by which you can measure "truth" qualitatively, your standard of validity becomes quantitative - a body count of the other equally fallible humans who agree, without bothering, of course, to check the worthiness of their own reasons for doing so. By that standard, libertarianism is dead on arrival, since the present majority has opted for statism.
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"I can't help but think that they are not defending freedom so much as 'freedom to be an Objectivist.'"
Since application of the Objectivist political principle I stated above applies to all human beings equally, an occurrence of what you are suggesting here would automatically disqualify such a defense of freedom from being Objectivist in any way.
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"Would an Randian "free society" look like the Ayn Rand Society, where those championing liberty exercise banishment from their group at fast rates? (The David Kelley incident is instructive here, as it led to several 'banishments' from the club, holding no idea of academic freedom."
The open/closed philosophy issue is not one of academic freedom. It is one of definition. No philosopher's philosophy has ever been or ever will be "open" to additions or completion by others.
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"Why is Schwartz concerned that libertarianism cannot stop the "gay-rights activist" or "overt anarchist" from exercising his liberties?"
According to the quote, he isn't. In that quote he is referring to assertions of liberties that are not actually liberties (for anyone). For example: Objectivists uniformly support the right of gays to marry, because it is a non-coercive act. But gays may not assert a right to be free from discrimination (in housing or club membership or hiring practices), because that "right" the government now enforces for others is inherently a violation of property rights and no human being may claim such a right.
You should also be careful to distinguish what Schwartz or Peikoff say, which is their interpretation of Objectivism, from what Rand said, which is Objectivism. You may not damn Aristotle for what Aristotelians do with his ideas.
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"to live with the maximum freedom possible (as consistent with a "no harm" or similar principle"
A "no harm" principle begs the question of what constitutes "harm", how long or short the run in which it is defined, and whether it results from a voluntary or involuntary act. The maximum freedom possible is possible only in the total absence of coercion by physical force, a more fundamental, non-ambiguous standard.
Craig,
ReplyDeleteIt sounds like yours and my experiences were quite similar, except for the fact that I broke with Objectivist, and dispensed with any illusion that Rand knew much about philosophy, before I pursued my first masters degree. (The first book I read after breaking with my Rand craze was Karl Popper's "Objective Knowledge," doubtless because it had the word "Objective" in it. It didn't take long to realize that Rand never solved Hume's problem of induction.)
I also agree with you in that I am quite embarassed, when talking with Objectivists, at the thought that I ever was like that: angry, pompous, and uncritical while professing to be critical.
Michael,
ReplyDeleteFirst, from here forth, you can call me Kevin (though Philosopher sounds good too!).
>>>For a person who claims to have once been immersed in Objectivism, this entry shows little evidence that you ever in the past or present understood its content very well.
It is funny, because every time I ever talk with an Objectivist, and every time I have ever read discussions between Objectivists and non-Objectivists, this is the first thing they say: you obviously don't understand Objectivism. I am not sure if you really think this, or whether yours is the same rhetorical move made by Marxists, when criticized, in saying that the critic misunderstands Marxism .
>>>The libertarian politics of Objectivism rests on and derives from a single ethical principle: that the human animal that survives and flourishes by applying the product of his rational capacity to his physical actions and who is volitional and therefore fallible, requires autonomy from all other equally fallible human beings.
This is a gigantic non-sequitor. You are assuming that there is some logical connection between the fact that "the human animal survives and flourishes by applying the product of his rational capacity to his physical actions," and the "require[ment]" of "autonomy from all other equally fallible human beings."
I am not sure how the fact that humans must survive or be rational requires in any way autonomy.
Not to say that Objectivists cannot use this for a justification, but I will say that it is certainly not the best or only possible justificaiton for libertarianism. (I prefer Sowell's more utilitarian justificaiton that since we are all differently situated, epistemically speaking, humans can do better when acting freely on their own interests - that they know better than anyone - than for others' interests. Or Smith's even more utilitarian justificaiton that capitalism simply works better because of the mechanism of competition.
Either way, yours is a very restrictive and, frankly, weak justification (as evidenced by the fact that only Objectivists are convinced by it.)
>>>A valid justification must be able to substantiate its claim to being true at a fundamental level so that it will be valid in all possible instances that ever were, are, or ever will be.
I must appear like an evil subjectivist for saying it, but justificaitons are good or bad based on whether the judger is convinced by them. In the absence (I think) of a cosmic Judger, the erm "justified" without the subsequent "to whom?" doesn't make much sense (as to "justify" means "to successfully argue for," then the success of any justification depends on whether the judger buys it.
Therefore, it is good to have a plurality of justificaitons for something, as this increases the chance of people being convinced by them.
>>>The open/closed philosophy issue is not one of academic freedom. It is one of definition. No philosopher's philosophy has ever been or ever will be "open" to additions or completion by others.
Yes, that was a low blow, wasn't it? I was just speculating that an open society consisting of Leonard Peikoff, Yaron Brooks, Tara Smith, and those with similar temperments seesm like one that would end if not in coercion, than in a very stifling environment resembling the city of Provo, Utah - where all mormons are free to do as they please, but if they make a wrong move, they will be cackled until they move...freely.
>>>You should also be careful to distinguish what Schwartz or Peikoff say, which is their interpretation of Objectivism, from what Rand said, which is Objectivism.
This is like the fact that we must be careful not to take anything Lenin or Stalin said as a product of Marxism because Marx was the only true Marxist. Very convenient.
>>>A "no harm" principle begs the question of what constitutes "harm", how long or short the run in which it is defined, and whether it results from a voluntary or involuntary act.
And any astute observer of political theory should recognize that this is a much blurrier issue than you make it sound. JS Mill devoted about 60 pages in "On Liberty" to exceptional and hard cases. (Mill's is also regarded as one of the best discussions on the issue of all time. Oddly, Rand never responded to this canonical work!)
>>>The maximum freedom possible is possible only in the total absence of coercion by physical force, a more fundamental, non-ambiguous standard.
Nonambiguous? I find that difficult to believe. First off, government action, even in the protection of individual rights, is coercion. Waht about the question of whether I am justified in restraining a gunned person because I have reason to believe that he is going to shoot another individual (but only 85% certain)? Or the question of whether I am morally justified in punishing a student at school against her will because she was disrupting the class? Do parents have the right to coerce their kids if it means keeping them from crossing the street without looking, or droppling out of school?
My point in these examples - all discussed at length in legal and political papers - is that the issue is far from messy. When I was an Objectivist, I thought the issue was not messy either. But I can truly attest that this was due primarily to Rand's over-confidence and poor understanding of the issue.
>>>Consequently, your political pluralism constitutes an assertion that truth itself has multiple definitions
How so? I am making moral and political arguments, not metaphysical ones.
>>>Contrary to your statement quoted above, you do not sympathize with Rand's belief in liberty as manifested in this principle if you only regard coercive force as "suspect". Even if the choice of this term was just stylistic, it is not in sync with Rand's position that coercive force as immoral - an absolute condemnation vs. your mere suspicion that coercion might be always wrong.
This may be the one point on which I will agree with you. I am a libertarian, but I do not take any concept - even liberty - as an unqualified absolute. There are certaiinly instances (like some of the questions above) where force can be reasonable if a certain favorable outcome is strongly necessary yet unobtainable without coercion.
What I do think, though, is that when entering into contextual questions, liberty and absence of coercion should always be the 'default position,' with arguments for coercion having the burden of very large proof.
Like Craig pointed out in his post, the more one studies non-Objectivist sources, the more one realizes that so many issues - not just this one - are stickier than Rand makes them appear. Politics simply cannot be a game of absolutes, but necessitates trade-offs. (YEs, Rand sees this is unjust compromise, but I see it as necessary compromise. Most of the world's wars - physical and ideational - have been won by pragmatists; none that I know of have been won by Objectivists.)
Michael M's comment is absolutely correct. He has done a great job of homing in on the worst elements of the post. As he suggests, the post demonstrates enormous confusion (misinterpretation) as to what Rand (Objectivism), Peikoff and Schwartz actually present.
ReplyDeletePerhaps the most absurd accusation is that banishing non-Objectivists (from ARI) is the same as a political banishment. The former is no different from asking someone to leave your own home due to their bad behavior. You have a right to your home without that person, and that person has no 'right' to use your home other than as you permit. The same is true of ARI.
Banishment from society is only necessary for criminals.
Unfortunately, Libertarians like David Kelly fail to grasp that one cannot keep essential principles if one allows the unprincipled to argue for them. Nor do they grasp that one cannot keep essential principles if one disregards the more fundamental principles on which they depend.
Richard,
ReplyDeleteI certainly agree that political banishment is not the same banishment from a private organization.
The problem I have with blokes like Peikoff profsesing a belief in liberty while being so willing to "morally sanction" and spew against those in his organization is that, to me, one cannot profess a belief in civil liberty without also being willing to exercise tolerance that some will not live or do as you would want them to. Peikooff (and just about every ARI Objectivist I've ever ran across) hold the ideal of civil liberty without holding tolerance as a value.
So, as I explained to Michael M, I find it difficult to see what the Objectivists envision as a free society to be anywhere close to a real free society. It is almost certain that most people living in a free society will not be Objectivists or hold values in accord with Objectivism, which would be extremely hard for ARI Objectivists to tolerante. (Yes, they may not exercise physical force, but I don't think many non-Objectivist citizens would feel very 'free' there.)
Hi Kevin,
ReplyDeleteTo come to the point bluntly, with no intent to inflame...
Tolerance of what? Surely it can only be of wrong doing and/or wrong ideas!
Objectivists (who vary a great deal in understanding and practice) can be patient with the latter, provided the person is in pursuit of what is right. When it becomes clear that his intent is otherwise, tolerance can only be 'tolerance' of evil.
The greatest evil a human can perpetrate upon himself is the refusal to think... to evade, or to "blank out" as Miss Rand put it.
From the Ayn Rand Lexicon on moral judgment.(my bolding):
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"One must never fail to pronounce moral judgment.
"Nothing can corrupt and disintegrate a culture or a man’s character as thoroughly as does the precept of moral agnosticism [tolerance], the idea that one must never pass moral judgment on others, that one must be morally tolerant of anything, that the good consists of never distinguishing good from evil.
"It is obvious who profits and who loses by such a precept. It is not justice or equal treatment that you grant to men when you abstain equally from praising men’s virtues and from condemning men’s vices. When your impartial attitude declares, in effect, that neither the good nor the evil may expect anything from you —whom do you betray and whom do you encourage?
"But to pronounce moral judgment is an enormous responsibility. ... Just as a judge in a court of law may err, when the evidence is inconclusive, but may not evade the evidence available, nor accept bribes, nor allow any personal feeling, emotion, desire or fear to obstruct his mind’s judgment of the facts of reality —so every rational person must maintain an equally strict and solemn integrity in the courtroom within his own mind, where the responsibility is more awesome than in a public tribunal, because he, the judge, is the only one to know when he has been impeached."
___
Objectivists do not expect a free society to consist only of Objectivists, but when society is overrun, and ruled, by Subjectivists of all stripes, it has devolved to a state of pre-Grecian barbarism —think "Medieval Dark Ages".
In an Objective society, non-Objective citizens would have the same freedoms as the Objective. The non-Objective citizens are free from the initiation of force (or fraud), but they are not 'free' to initiate such force. If that is the freedom you want for them, you advocate the 'freedom' of bank robbers ...who run to nations lacking extradition agreements.
That is, a) your 'tolerance' advocates the 'freedom' to escape responsibility for criminal actions. On those terms, Objectivism rightly holds that the non-Objective should NOT, in your words, "feel very free".
Similarly, b) your 'tolerance' advocates for the intellectual equivalent of the bank robber: for the 'freedom' to think by whim and by feelings, rather than by reason, and to be respected as if he was in pursuit of reason.
BTW that, above all, is why David Kelly was banished from ARI and true Objectivism.
Kelly's "Truth and Tolerance" was a masterpiece of rationalization for the purpose of tolerating the intellectually dishonest... the evaders, the slothful, and the whim-driven emotionalists. Kelly had to write it, to rationalize his own egregious abandonment of reason.
Which side are YOU really on? There are no half ways, just as one cannot be half pregnant.
Which side are YOU really on? There are no half ways, just as one cannot be half pregnant.
ReplyDelete========================
Thus spake Stalin
And so speaks Bolton!
ReplyDeleteHowever, he clearly cannot grasp his own infantile approach:
In so absolutely condemning my remark for being an absolute —by claiming it to be a wrong of Stalin-esque proportions— Bolton places himself in the very position he seeks to reject.
In logic that is known as the Fallacy of Self-Exclusion -- no one else is allowed to be absolute but him!
Nauseatingly tedious.
Richard,
ReplyDeleteI understand what you are asking, and I did not take it harshly. Your question is an interseing one: tolerant of what?
Quite simply, tolerance of anything that does not result in coercion of others or tangible harm to others. Unfortunately for many of us, that means tolerance of others to do things we think are evil or wrong, as long as those evil or wrong things do not do others tangible harm.
>>>Objectivists (who vary a great deal in understanding and practice) can be patient with the latter, provided the person is in pursuit of what is right. When it becomes clear that his intent is otherwise, tolerance can only be 'tolerance' of evil.
This sounds dangerous, only because "tolerant of evil" is exactly what I think the true libertarian must be, again, if the "evil" is not coercing others or causing them harm.
The reason I think so many ARE NOT lovers of liberty is because they simply cannot handle this - the idea that everyone has a perfect right to do things we may think immoral, blasphemous, stupid, wrong, or evil, just as long as that person is not forcing others to participate or causing them harm.
But your above quote seems almost unwilling to accept the idea that we must, or should, be "tolerant of evil."
And why is it that one can only be free to pursue their goals unfettered IF they are in the "pursuit of truth?" Are you saying that coercion is justified against people not pursuing truth? That would rule out most people I know as most are not, or aspire to be, philosophers. Are you suggesting that we coerce them?
I just can't help but think that someone with Peikoff's temperment would end up finding "tolerance of evil" too emotionally difficult to bear. He seems less to want liberty and more to want liberty to do as Rand would have them do.
>>>In an Objective society, non-Objective citizens would have the same freedoms as the Objective. The non-Objective citizens are free from the initiation of force (or fraud), but they are not 'free' to initiate such force. If that is the freedom you want for them, you advocate the 'freedom' of bank robbers ...who run to nations lacking extradition agreements.
Then you and I may well be on similar pages. I am very much against the use of force (though I still do not take liberty as an absolute, I do put heavy presumptive favor upon the concept).
But again, I am also very much for the idea that libertarian tolerance is often the "tolerance of evil": the tolerance of things like polygamy, fundamentalist Christians right to publish and preach without restriction, the rights of neo-Nazi's to demonstrate, and other things that are emotiolnally difficult to let people do. If we do not have this type of willingness to "tolerate evil" (to let evil alone so long as it is noncoercive), then liberty would be quickly lost.
>>>Similarly, b) your 'tolerance' advocates for the intellectual equivalent of the bank robber: for the 'freedom' to think by whim and by feelings, rather than by reason, and to be respected as if he was in pursuit of reason.
This is where I suspect that many Objectivists are lovers of liberty in name only. To be a true defender of liberty, you should be willing to defend the liberty of people to "make mistakes" or "do evil things" liike " think on whim and feeling," as much as defending people's right to "think by reason."
If you do not, then I do not see how you are not advocating for coercion of thought. Not accepting people's right to think in ways you think are incorrect amounts to accepting only the freedom to think in ways you approve of. (And this is what totalitarians, fascists, and communists do.)
So let me ask you: in your free society, would you let the communist or neo-Nazi publish freely? Would you let fundamentalist Christiains send their children to private schools where evolution is not taught? Would you allow Mormon polygamy (if it is freely consented to by adults)?
Hi Kevin,
ReplyDeleteGenerally speaking, I agree with your answer to the tolerance question. I see two distinctions within it:
1. the tolerance of actions that constitute the initiation of coercive force, and
2. the tolerance of ideas that accept or promote the initiation of of coercive force.
We agree that #1 is wrong, and requires intervention using the retaliatory force of police or military.
#2 does not call for the use of retaliatory force, but it does call for verbal condemnation and possible shunning of the speaker/writer. Shunning someone, who promotes wicked ideas, is the private Right of any individual or company's management.
Freedom of speech means citizens are safe from state prosecution for whatever they may say (short of shouting "FIRE" in a crowded theater). It does NOT mean citizens should silently tolerate ANY speech. They too are free to object to bad ideas, so long as their intolerance of those bad ideas is expressed in a NON-coercive manner.
This points to the problem with hate-speech laws. It directs the State's monopoly on (retaliatory) force upon a speaker, and becomes an initiation of force against a free man.
I believe the foregoing fits best with the Objectivist position. E.g. Rand defended adult pornography as a litmus test of freedom of speech/media (its legal status), but condemned it on moral terms. This logically extends to communists, neo-Nazis, fundamentalist Christians and polygamists. I would not let most of those people in my house, and would not hire them if I could avoid it. At the same time, I would defend their right to their views and to live according to their views provided no other person was coerced in any way. If the State requires that I hire one, against my wishes, then my Rights are abrogated.
I think the confusion between the legal and moral tolerance above, runs deeper with Subjective minds. The Subjectivist quite literally feels his Freedom of Speech is proscribed when his arguments run into some immutable fact of Reality, and are shown to be resoundingly absurd. He wants his ideas to remain sacrosanct, and be respected as reason, regardless of Reality. However, it is not his political Freedom of Speech that has been restricted, only his wish that others respect his whims as if they were reason.
I believe I have, in the above, answered the main point of your comment, and have done so with an accurate representation of the Objectivist (Rand's) view. Of course it is via my understanding, so she should not be held responsible for mistakes I may have made.