Special Ed Philosopher

Now What?

2009-06-13T12:01:00.000-07:00

I apologize for not having posted in a while. I have been quite busy with finishing out the last few days of school. It has been a busy year. My wife has started up her proofreading business with a smashing good year. Both of us got masters degrees (my second, her first), I have finished up my final days at the Baltimore County Public Schools, and in two weeks, we are off do our new place in Newark, DE so that I can start my Education PhD.

Now that I am done my school year, I think it is a good time to pack up my blog. I am now contributing to a new blog, Liberty and Skepticism, and have started a new blog more aptly titled Education Philosopher. This new blog, I think, will focus on the more philosophical side of education, as I will write for it during my PhD study.

I hope that anyone who reads and enjoys this blog follows the other. (I will probably try to limit that one to matters of education, as Liberty and Skepticism will cover the more philosophical and political stuff).

See you all there.

Reflections from the Finish Line

2009-06-13T11:59:00.000-07:00

Yesterday was a hard day; it was my last day in the Baltimore County Public Schools. After two very difficult years, I have decided to give up public school teaching (at least for now) in order to pursue a PhD in Education.

As anyone who has been a schoolteacher knows, it requires a lot of energy just to make it to the end of the year; the stings felt on the worst days often seems stronger than the rewards felt on the best days. But once the finish line is crossed, one remembers the rewards a bit more than the lows; one remembers the lives one touched (and those one were touched by) more than the headaches, tears, and anger.

What I can say, now that I’ve had time to reflect, is that teaching irrevocably changed me…I think for the better. I have much more confidence in my ability to deal with difficult situations than I did before. I have much more strength than I did before. And, yes, I have developed a newfound ability to be stern (while remaining a degree of calm) in the face of challenges. In short: being a teacher toughened me, but in a good way.

And what took me most by suprise is the recurring thought I’ve had over the last few days that I will really miss my life as a public educator. On the average and bad days, I assumed that there was no way I could ever miss it at all! How could one actually miss a job where one felt futile more than one felt productive, where one seemingly struggled uphill daily for so little gain, where the emotional costs seemed to outweigh the benefits at every turn?

Maybe hindsight is always rosier than the view from the trenches, but I did not realize how much I actually got used to all of these things, probably because I got used to them so gradually. There was no precise moment where I said, “Now, I am comfortable in my life and persona as a teacher,” but looking back on it, I can say exactly that. It must have happened, but it happened over two years rather than in one instant.

One of the teachers I said goodbye to yesterday said to me something like this: “Now, go off and do bigger and better things.” Once she realized what she said, she corrected herself; “Well, I don’t know about that; what we do is pretty big and pretty remarkable. You know what I mean, though.”

I could only agree with her. While it might not feel like it at the time, my reflection from the finish line is that teaching IS pretty big and wonderful.

Discipline, Education, and the Concept of Moral Hazard

2009-05-21T13:22:00.001-07:00

The term "moral hazard" has been bandied about lately as a term of economics and the question of whether the government should be "bailing out" failing companies. As an economic term, "moral hazard" means the hazard that comes from insulating an entity form failure and the conseuqences of it. "Running the risk of moral hazard" is the idea that a risk we take in insulating others from failure is that they will never learn from their mistakes and may take as big or bigger risks in the future.

While the term has been used in economics, I think it is high time we apply it to the world of educational psychology. More directly, we educators should remain cognizant that every time we "keep students from failing" by artificially insulating them from the consequences of negative actions, we are ensuring that they do not learn from mistakes. In other words, if the best way to learn from mistakes is to realize that they are mistakes, then interfering with the experience of consequences of mistakes means interfering with the best feedback mechanism one has.

Many times in my career as a teacher have I argued this position and many times, unfortunately, I have lost the argument. In a previous post, I referred to one such incident: me and several other teachers brokered a deal with a senior in danger of failing that if he does x and y, we would see to it that he could pass. Repeatedly, he broke the deal. Repeatedly, the other teachers (without me) rebroekered the deal - all to ensure that he could pass despite having broken the agreement on which his success depended.

Many other times, I have seen the risk of moral hazard come into play when teachers explain rules and cosnequences to students only to, when push came to shove, chafe and allow students to break said rules without undergoing the consequences.

Why do we teachers allow and evene encourage such moral hazards to occur?

I believe that, just as in the current economic situation, it is hard to "hold the line" and enforce consequences when the consequences are severe. It is all well and good to say that companies that are irresponsible shall be allowed to go bankrupt, but it is painful to sit by and watch this happen. Thus, the government ends up caving in and taking the emotionally easy way out by not letting companies go under and people go unemployed.

In the same way, teachers allow such moral hazard becasue, as teachers, we generally do not like to hurt kids. We want to see kids happy, and we do not enjoy seeing kids fail. Unfortunately, we do not often realize that while this is a noble feeling, we often do more harm than good by protecting students form the consequences of their actions, and in the process, interfering with the feedback mechanism of natural consequences. She who places her hand on the stove and gets burned will not do it again. She who places her hand on the stove and is repeatedly saved from such an experience (by having their hand yanked away from the stove, etc) will never, or very slowly, learn that the stove burns. But as no one wishes to see a child get hurt, we protect them and unknowlingly slow down their learning process.

I have learned - and this will sound strange - to find a small (very small) bit of accomplishment in allowing students to fail of their own accord. I see it as a learning opportunity for the student. Of course, I don't actively want students to fail and do not try to make them fail; on the contrary, I want to do everything in my power to see them succeed SHORT OF PROTECTING THEM FROM DESERVED CONSEQUENCES. If this sounds strange, let me illustrate with an example.

One particular student of mine did just about everything wrong in the second and third marking period. He showed up late, talked back, did not do work, disrupted class, etc. I talked with him many times and warned him that he was heading for a failing grade. When his third quarter grade showed up as an "E," he did everyhing he could to try and convince me to change it...to no avail. I explained to him that that was the consequence of his actions and that if he wanted to avoid failing the class, he must improve in quarter four. I would not change his grade or offer him any special benefit of the doubt.

From then on, he has improved greatly. He has been much better in class and is now earning a "B." I tell him as frequently as I can that I am proud of his change in behavior, and when asked what accounts for this new and improved showing, he simply tells me that he knows that acting up will result in a failing grade.

So, there you have it. Fairness means helping children succeed while holding to the rules when they don't. The minute one allows the rules to be overlooked and protecting kids from consequences of their actions, one is running the same "moral hazard" risk the economists talk about: we run the risk of interfering with people's ability to learn from, and correct, their mistakes.

What Does "In X's Interest" Mean?

2009-05-21T12:48:00.000-07:00

Jonathan is overweight and considered morbidly obese. He frequents fast food resteraunts for most meals, and ignores doctors repeated warnings that, with every meal, he decreases his chance of living. He keeps eating fast food because it tastes much better than food he would make himself.

Tamara smokes marijuana every day. Despite the fact that it is illegal, she likes to smoke it because it helps her concentrate and relaxes her. She is not familiar with some of marijuana's health risks but obviously knows the legal risks. She continiues to buy and smoke marijuana despite this knowlege.

_________________________________________________

So are these activities in these two actors interests? Some say that eating fast food and smoking marijuana are in these two's interests because (obviously) these two engage in these activities. Others say that the activities are not in these two's best interests and that engaging in the activities is acting against their true interests.

To me, this difference of opinion resides in the conflict between what we mean by interests. Does 'interests' mean 'what one is interested in' or does it mean 'what is best for you'? If the former, then a case can be made that whatever we do because we like to do it is in our interest. We can make the argument that no one knows their interest better than others.

If, by 'interest' we mean 'what is best for someone,' then it is quite obvious that others can know our interests better than we. After all, it makes perfect sense to see that a child may not know what is best for her while a mother might (especially when the child wants candy while the mother pushes vegetables).

This question undergirds much of political theory. The question generally is not, or should not be, framed in an all or nothing way. Those who take the extremely libertarian (and really, anarchistic) view that only the individual can judge what is best for her will be foreced into many untenable positions (like the idea that 5 year olds should be able to choose to marry, drive, or do heroin, or that manic depressives should never be protected from suicide against their will). Those who take the opposite position - that others can often know what is best for the individual) have no reason to deny that the government knows what is best for us to read, see, or do.

Rather than being a black or white issue, the question generally is this: how can we recognize that there are occasions where y can know what is in x's best interest while also recognizing y's right to make decisions about her own life without x coming to dominate y? In other words, how can we respect y's ability to lead her own life while recognizing that there may be occasions where x may be in a better position than y (a kid, a mentally deluded person, a drug addict) to judge x's interests.

One can say, and many have, that the difference is in deciphering whether x is "thinking straight." But this hopelessly begs the question because, in general, we judge "thinking straight" by the conclusion come to. If one is against pornography, then there is no way that the urge to consume pornography can be seen as "thinking straight." If one is against suicide, then there is no way that a person who wants to commit suicide (however rational they, or their reasons, might be) will be seen as "thinking straight." Thus, "thinking straight' as a criterion is too nebulous and up to personal opinion to be of value.

So is saying that something is in x's best interest if and only if it is justifiable. Justifiable to whom? And what is and is not justifiable depends on who the proposition is being argued to. If it is the anti-pornography judge, then arguments for pornography can never be justifiable (like they would be to one who sees nothing wrong with pornography). Different people see different things as justifiable, and there is no cosmic "justifiability" principle.

So how can we tell whether x is acting in her interest? I think the issue still comes back to what we mean by her interest. I generally take the side that in the absence of evidence that x has sometype of mental deficiency that grossly inhibits her ability to make an objective (or close to) decision, then we lack any ground to say that x is incapable of ascertaining her own interest. (In this case, children, drug addicts, and those suffering from mood or emotional disorders are all considered mentally deficient in this way. Everyone recognizes this of the latter two groups, but children can be seen as mentally deficient in the sense that they lack the intellectual capacity to make fully informed decisions.)

Further, I take the stance that, if a person is seen as mentally deficient based on psychologicl data, we must further ask about the gravity of the decision x is about to make. Unless her decision is one that will have drastic personal consequences of the type she cannot adequately assess, we should let her do as she pleases. Only when what she is about to do has drastic consequences (engage in consumption of a lethal drug, commit suicide, get into an otherwise dangerous and potentially life changing situaiton), should we interfere and prevent her.

Put differently, the two criteria I think should be used in deciding whether x can accurately appraise her interests and whether to intervene are (a) whether the person can justly be seen as mentally incapable of acting objectively or near-objectively; and (b) whether the "interest" in question has potentially disasterous and life-changing cosnequences.

Following this rule would make it so that we can recognize that the child is not capable of deciding to marrry but the adult can. We could see that an adult can decide for herself whether to smoke marijuana but may not be able to judge whether she should continue injecting heroin or cystal meth. We could achieve a libertarian end of "live and let live" without getting to the point of "live and let die."

On Pathetic Republican Arguments

2009-05-16T10:53:00.000-07:00

One of the key principles of rhetoric is to tailor your arguments to your audience. If you are arguing to Muslims, for instance, one should not use logic becuase they do not believe in logic. If one is arguing with democrats, one should do one's best to sound like Karl Marx (they love that stuff!). Etc.

According to this article, there are a handful of republicans with just enough intelligence to employ this strategy - at least they are trying! RNC chairman Michael Steele is trying a new rhetorical poisiton in the gay marriage debate, by arguing that it would hurt small businesses. Here is the quote:

"Now all of a sudden I've got someone who wasn't a spouse before, that I had no responsibility for, who is now getting claimed as a spouse that I now have financial responsibility for," Steele told Republicans at the state convention in traditionally conservative Georgia. "So how do I pay for that? Who pays for that? You just cost me money."

I am not sure that there is a technical name for this fallacy, but the problem with this argument is that it argues againt an effect that is not at all exclusive to the cause being argued against. It would be like arguing against riding on bicycles by suggesting that one could get injured (even though getting injured is not an effect at all exclusive to riding bicycles).

So, let's think about what the REAL implications of Steele's argument against dependents is. If we follow it to its logical conclusions, Steele's argument against forcing employers to pay for dependents could be seen as an argument not only against gay, but straight, marriage, or at very least an argument against having employers pay for ANY dependents (including children).

What is even more horrendous than the fact that Steele thinks he is smart enough to devise an argument is the fact that he is utterly transparent that it is not a sincere argument, but a rhetorical ploy!

Steele said that was just an example of how the party can retool its message to appeal to young voters and minorities without sacrificing core conservative principles. Steele said he used the argument weeks ago while chatting on a flight with a college student who described herself as fiscally conservative but socially liberal on issues like gay marriage.

This brings us full circle, back to the rules of rhetoric. A hidden rule of rhetoric is that while one should always tailor one's arguments to one's audience, one should never disclose that this is what one is doing. Otherwise, one opens onesself up to charges of insincerity and 'ends justifying the means" style of argument.

Steele's suggesting that one can "retool its message to appael to young voters and minorities without sacrificing core conservative principles" will have the likely effect of achieving none of those goals. Arguments for gay marriage (especially those from the young) do not generally focus on economic arguments, but on civil rights arguments (showing that economic arguments will not likely triumph civil rights arguments in their minds). And as for sacrificing core conservative principles, if the principle is (as it always has been to the GOP) that homosexual marriage is immoral, then the principle is sacrificed as soon as one makes the gay marriage argument void of arguments from morality.

(And just for kicks, let me see if I can beat Steele at his own game. Wouldn't his argument against forcing employers to add dependents on to healthcare plans be a GREAT argument IN FAVOR of abortion? After all, the ability to abort potential children certainly would minimize the number of dependents one would claim for insurance purposes, wouldn't it?)

Does This Sound LIke Something From the USSR?

2009-05-14T03:31:00.000-07:00

I just read a quite scary (to me) article today about the forced "govermentizing" of banks, in the form of the government buying bank equity shares. The article is called "Paulson gave banks no choice on government stakes: memos" According to the article, the press now has hold of documents outlining Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's talking points to banks telling them that the government will be buying bank shares and informing banks that they have no choice about this fate.

But there was one quote that caught my attention. Am I crazy, or does this sound like something out of the USSR. (Just add a Russian accent, if you'd like.)

"If a capital infusion is not appealing, you should be aware your regulator will require it in any circumstance," the document said, citing Paulson talking points.

It has been a while since I've read Ayn Rand's Atlas Shrugged, and I am not really a big fan of Rand, but I can't help but think back to her book and (if I recall it correctly) the government takeover of the railroads.

Scary, scary stuff.

Is "African-American" a Valid Educational Category?: A Pragmatic View

2009-05-09T15:13:00.000-07:00

Recently, a sparring match has surfaced between William Seletan and John McWhorter over whether test performance statistics should subcategorize by racial makeup. The hubbub is over a recent NYT article noting that No Child Left Behind is failing to close the black/white achievement gap. The question: why even keep score of such an arbitrary categorization of race?

Seleatan's point is that in the age of genetics, race is hardly the most pertinent or salient category. He writes that McWhorter is relying on an arbitrary categorizing when he:

[is] for airing "findings that shed less than positive light on black people." Not bad parents. Not people with low-performing kids. Black people.

McWhorter suspects that Seletan's motive is simply to put a hush on any statistic that might make black's look bad.

Just as that is antithetical to what getting past race is supposed to mean, we will not pretend that it's okay that black students don't read and do math as well as white kids in order to provide a way for people like William Saletan to demonstrate that they aren't racists.

To be honest, this is a hard discussion to think about and there are good and bad points made on all sides. But my pragmatic inclination is to say that what counts as a valid category is any category that has something pertinent to say (as measured by whether most people believe it does). By this pragmatic light, race is still a valid category (even if it is not a valid genetic category). We still - and especially black intellectuals - talk of black culture as somehow being seperate from white culture.

While my personal sympathies lie with Saletan - I really cannot see how different skin colors are valid educational subgroups) - my social symphaties lie with McWhorter. The very fact that we as a society are so obsessed with the "black/white achievement gap" (that does bear out statistically) means that there is something to subcategorizing educational statistics by racial groupings.

And I further agree with McWhorter that as long as we are talking about the black/white achievement gap, we should be divulging and publicizing statistics reporting on it, even if it makes one group look bad. And as a teacher, I will go even further to suggest that current statistics suggest that blacks DESERVE to look bad right now! Whether race is a valid genetic category, the statistics tell a story of a whole group of people going awry in many areas, such as criminality, educational performance, and single parenthood. I agree with McWhorter that to put rosy dressings on such statistics would do a disservice to the black community, who obviously needs to hear (and get angry at) such statistics.

So, I think it would be unfair for Seletan to win this argument if only for the fact that, in a pragmatic sense, we are a society that DOES see "racial makeup" as a valid social category. As long as we are talking about the "black/white achievement gap," and as long as such a gap is borne out statistically, refusing to break future stats down by race would be the equivalent to posing a question only to censor the answer. And as long as we are concerned with how blacks are performing as an academic group (no matter how loose that grouping is), I think it would be nothing short of pussyfooting not to let them (and others) see their dismal report card.

The Guys Behind the freecreditreport.com Music

2009-05-06T13:13:00.000-07:00

Recently, I saw a commercial for freecreditreport.com without the "band" that has become the company's trademark. This got me to thinking: who are the people that came up with the music for freecreditreport.com in the first place (a question we very seldom ask ourselves considering how often their products infest our heads)?

Well, here is some info. The songwriter for these jingles is a 36 year old jingle writer named David Muhlenfield - a senior copywriter at the Martin Agency.

But unlike what many would assume, Muhlenfield is NOT the frontman in the commercials. That honor - and if you think of the royalties, it is an honor - belongs to Eric Violette, a classically trained actor/musician from just outside of Montreal, Canada. it is interesting to note that in 2004 (a few years before the commercials began appearing, if memory serves) Violette starred in a French rendition of Hamlet at the Société Supérieure de Théâtre du Dehors. According to his resume, he lists his role in the commercials as the "main character" under his acting credentials, but research indicates that he also sang in the commercials.

Forgive my frivolity!

Maine: Legalizing Gay Marriage the Smart (and Correct) Way

2009-05-06T10:55:00.000-07:00

I am overjoyed to find this article detailing that the state of Maine just passed a law legalizing same-sex marriage. And they did it the smart and correct way - which is great for a person like me, who supports gay mariage rights but disagrees strongly with the "legislation by judicial fiat" approach.

Several times I have been asked to participate in signing petitions voicing support for x state's attempt at "legalizing" gay marriage. Each time, I have been caught in a quandary. I strongly feel that states should make marriage laws as diverse as possible, stopping short of sanctioning coercion. (In fact, I question what qualifies the state to decide who we can and can't marry altogether.) At the same time, the libertarian principal I base that on also leads me to a principal in tension with the previous one: that legislation should be legislative and not judicial. Thus, I supported the idea that New York should legalize gay marriage, but was angry as hell at the idea that the judiciary could have the power to override a legislative matter that had NO CONSTITUTIONAL BEARING.

So, I am pleased to see that Maine, following the leads of Vermont and Connecticut, in signing a bill into law legalizing the ability of gays and lesbians to marry. One of the reasons I am pleased about this, in fact, is because when the decision is legislative, critics cannot say - as they often do! - that the bill is unrepresentative of the will of the people. per our democratic republican process, the very fact that these laws were enacted by the congress means that they were conducted properly and, should the people disagree, the people may vote the candidates out of office or petition to those candidates.

And the fact that these laws are enacted properly - by elected representatives - is also to be noted because this trend means that those who live in highly conservative states should not have to worry about the state judges usurping the authority of theiir representatives. In other words, as much as I like the idea of gay marriage being legal, I do not believe that it should be legal in states that do not wish it to be legal. Per the constitution's 10th amendment, the issue of marriage laws is deferred to the states. Until the 10th amendment is undone (or a gay marriage amendment pro- or con-) is added to the constitution, I think it would simply be unconstitutional to force states to legalize (or illegalize) something supported by the representatives.

So, Maine has done the smart thing here. I, for one, am overjoyed. HOpefully other states follow suit. And maybe someday, we will allow gay people to give blood.

On How to Eliminate the Department of Motor Vehicles

2009-05-06T10:15:00.000-07:00

My wife and I were recently at the local DMV to get our names changed on our licenses (both of us are hyphenating our names). It never ceases to amaze either of us how inefficient these people are, which got us - libertarians, both - pondering ways to eliminate, or at least minimize, the role of the Department of Motor Vehicles in everyday life.

Here is an idea we had. The Department of Motor Vehicles is responsible for issuing drivers licenses and ensuring that those who get licenses are good enough drivers to be on the road. Of course, we also require every driver to have valid insurance. So, why not consolidate these two facts and let insurance companies be responsible for ensuring that qualifying for their insurance is accompanied by a driving test? I have little doubt in my mind that having insurance companies issue licenses as a condition of gaining access to their insurance would be more efficient and cost-effective than having the state do it.

The issue is really one of who has the more compelling interest in screening drivers - the state or the insurance companies. Yes, the state has an interest in screening drivers because they pay (or force us to pay, rather) for the roads, the EMT services and the emergency rooms that could be aversely affected in the case of accidents. But, insurance companies have an immediate interest in screening drivers, as they stand to lose money should they insure less than careful, or able, drivers.

I think that privatizing licensure in this way would not only make the screening process for drivers more rigorous (and thereby, have a likely effect of cutting down the number of accidents), but be less costly to the general public. If this large role (which the DMV doesn't do all that well to begin with) were handed over to the private companies, the DMV's traffic and, let's hope, necessry expenditures would be cut in about one half.

It could be argued that such measures would result in stricter driving tests which would ultimately mean that fewer people drive. So be it. Insurance companies would not make tests too strict (as they want customers), but would likely not make tests too lax (as they don't want to increase risk of paying out). My guess is that - think colleges here - the best insurance companies will be the most selective because they can afford to be, and the lesser companies may be less selective. Those who decide to make their tests minimal so as to accept as many clients as possible will then have to deal with the larger payouts that will likely result. Companies with tests that are too lax will likely either go out of business or acquire a horrible reputation.

Drivers who can only afford to be with the worst companies can "work their way" to better companies by taking the stricter insurance companies' tests. As stricter insurance companies will likely have lower rates (as they will pay out less and be more selective), once drivers feel like they are good enough to take the tests of "elite" insurance companies, they can try them.

All of this rests ony my general belief that businesses, while not always trustworthy, are often more trustworthy than government. They must work to stay in business (whereas government can always steal more money no matter how inefficient). Voting with dollars is more efficient than voting every 2, 4, or 6 years (and the number of non-elected government positions dwarfs the number of elected ones).

So, tell me. What do you think?

Reverse-Reasoning in the IQ Debate

2009-05-04T06:29:00.000-07:00

The debate over the existence, and mutability, of IQ is a tricky debate. I am a follower of the debate and try to keep a very open mind. But as I am not a statistician or a psychometrician, I feel that the best I can do is to read and decide on conclusions made by others. And as I try to keep an open mind, I often feel like my opinion and inclination changes with each new book or article that I read. (I try to remind myself that this open-mindedness may be a good thing in a debate so doctrinaire.)

One thing I can't help but think about, though, is that like so many other debates, this one often seems vulnerable to what I call reverse reasoning: figuring out the conclusion you want to come to and finding a way to get there. In particular, any debate with social ramifications for action are particularly vulnerable to this type of reverse reasoning.

In the case of the IQ debate, concluding that IQ is relatively fixed can be used to justify some sort of passivity on the part of educators and policy makers. Libertarians are likely to like this option because it makes arguments for increased education spending (like Head Start) a bit harder to make. This argument is also likely to appeal to those teachers who are frustrated and exasperated by working with students and being met with little to no demonstrable improvement. (I've been here and I can attest that the frustration felt when working with underachieving kids meet with few real results certainly make this view look a bit more appealing. That way, teachers can take the blame off of themselves and place it onto the students' fixed limitations.) I don't think teachers consciously do this, but often this view of a fixed intelligence will seem more appealing to those frustrated by hitting a ceiling with students.

On the other hand, the view that intelligence is a fluid, rather than fixed, entity is equally vulnerable to reverse reasoning based on where one wants to end up. I find that this view is almost always that chosen by those with strong egalitarian political beliefs, and strong aversions to suggestions that some are better than others "by nature." This is also the view that predominates the education field. My guess is because seeing intelligence as malleable provides a good rationale for the field of education. It is much easier to be an educator when one chooses a view of intelligence that sees education as integral to its development. (This is like the idea that it is much easier to play the lotto if one has a belief that one can win.)

The IQ debate is so frought with emotion that I worry about the prevelance of reverse reasoning in the debate. I worry that many of the people I've talked to have made up their minds more based on what they want to see happen than on what facts suggest. I try my best not to take sides on anything other than the facts of the matter (and the reason i've not really taken sides is because the facts of the matter seem quite open at this point).

Why Don't Students Like School (A review of Willinham's fantastic new book)

2009-05-04T05:36:00.000-07:00

A new book by cognitive psychologist Daniel Willingham has come out entitled Why Don't Students LIke School? I am generally skeptical of books claiming to take the latest brain/mind research and apply it to education primarily because of the "brain based ways of learning" fad promulgated by motivational speaker Eric Jensen (and preached unquestionably in professional developments). I picked this kone up, though, primarily due to a blurb on the back of the book by education theorist ED Hirsch, who I very strongly admire. Surely, any book Hirsch reccomends is at least worth a shot.

I was right. This book is fabulous in its 'back to basics' approach. Willingham's main point seems to be that the best way to increase a child's ability is repitition, repitition, repitition. By increasing the number of facts a child can recall automatically, one increases the amount of 'free space' a child has available to think. [ex.: (3+4) - (2-1) is a lot easier when one can recall the math facts automatically.]

Anyway, I strongly, strongly reccomend this book to all concerned with education theory. I hope this book gets used within the schools, but suspect that Jensen will be the continued drug of choice, as his theory manages, unlike Willinham's, to confirm all the constructivist impulses that educators have been in love with for the last 20 years.

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If you are a teacher, like myself, you have doubtless been inundated by advice about teaching to multiple intelligences, active (rather than passive) learning, teaching students to think rather than memorize facts, etc. If so, then you can't afford to pass up this book, which will provide a very helpful guide as to why some of these well-intentioned ideas are wrong, and what it means for you as a teacher.

Dan Willingham's Why Don't Students Like School? is a book applying findings of cognitive psychology to the world of education. Sound a lot like Eric Jensen and his wildly popular book Teaching With the Brain in Mind? Well, unlike Jensen - who educators hear a lot about - Willingham is a PhD in cognitive psychology (while Jensen, who has a bachelors in English, is "working towards" a PhD from an online university, while making his real living as a motivational speaker). Long and short: Willingham is the real deal and I move to suggest that this book infinitely deserves more popularity amongst educators than anything Jensen has written.

Willingham's basic theme is that, despite everything you've heard, nothing works to increase student ability like factual learning and practice. In fact, one of his first ideas is to point out that what seperates the excellent student (or adult) from those performing less well is their ability to recall facts. The more facts you know about your subject, the more you can understand your subject because of significantly less energy spent on fact recall or retention. With facts learned to automaticity, more time can be spent on higher-order concept learning, and once that becomes automatic....etc.

While that may sound mundane, think of how many times you as a teacher have heard the idea of "rote memorization" and "regurgitation of fact" denegrated. Of course, Willingham is not advocating the strawman position that teachers do nothing but drill, drill, drill and enforce memorization of text passages. (No one actually holds that position!) What he reminds us, though, is that the critical thinking we hear so much about teaching our kids simply CANNOT happen without giving kids the requisite background info that must be employed to think critically. (One cannot critically reflect on whether the revolutionary war was justified without some big factual understanding of Colonial American and Empirial Britian, for example.)

Another big idea in educaiton that Willingham works to dispel is the idea that we all have different learning styles - auditory, visual, kinesthetic, etc. Cognitive science, in fact, has shown the opposite: with minor variation, we all learn very similarly. While I may have a better memory for visual phemonena than you (who may be better at remembering sounds), we remember IDEAS not through the media in which they were delivered, but by...thinking about them. When memorizing words and definitions, we are not being asked to memorize sounds or visuals, but ideas, and the fact that I am an auditory or visual learner does nothing to predict what presentation method will help me memorize the best. (The amount I studied, of course, will.)

I don't want to give the impression that Willingham's book is about bashing education icons and maxims. It is not It is a book for teachers designed to bring up ideas we may not have thought about, and to suggest how to apply these ideas to our classrooms. Each chapter is focused around a question ("Is Drilling Worth It?" "Why is it So Hard for Students to Understand Abstract Ideas?") and gives a detailed, but engaging, answer. At the end of each chapter, the author makes several concrete suggestions for how the answer can shape how we teach as well as reccomendations for further readings.

All in all, this is one of the single best education books I have read, and cannot wait to share it with fellow educators. As mentioned, I sincerely hope that this book becomes as widely devoured as those by Eric Jensen and Howard Gardner. Willingham offers a valuable and very constructive counterpoint, especially to Jensen's "brain based ways of learning."

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Anyone looking for more can visit Willingham's website, where there are plenty of good articles and videos.

Show Up, and Get a B - Another way k-12 does not prepare for the real world

2009-05-02T06:07:00.001-07:00

I have recently come across an interesting article documenting a sad trend in college students increasing sense of entitlement. According to the article, professors and administrators are noticing an increasing sense amongst students that they are entitled to certain grades, and an increasing aversion to earning, rather than getting, grades.

The article makes some interesting points but I think it misdiagnoses the problem at lesat a little bit. As a k-12 educator, I think that this sense of entitlement in college students comes from the disjunct between the k-12 schools indirect teaching of entitlement and the college's continued emphasis on earning, rather than being entitled to, academic success. Like it or not, k-12 schools ARE leaving kids unprepared for college by getting them used to the idea that all children will be successful and that effort, rather than product, will be rewarded. Unfortunately, the real world doesn't work that way, leaving those students unprepared for the large paradigm shif that will doubtless come their way.

“I tell my classes that if they just do what they are supposed to do and meet the standard requirements, that they will earn a C,” he said. “That is the default grade. They see the default grade as an A.”

Why do the students think this way? As a teacher, I have seen many teachers TELL students that the default grade IS an A, and that one works to maintain, rather than earn, the high marks. I just dealt with a student yesterday who relayed that her teacher told her exactly this (and I have seen countless other teachers do this).

Of course, mathematically, this is quite untrue. The default grade at the beginning of each quarter is a 0%. If the first assignment is worth 100 points, and the student does half of the assignment, the grade becomes a 50% F. If they do the entire assignment, of course, their grade is a 100% A. From there, the grade can change based on the number of points per assignment and the relative weighting of the assignments, but in no way is the default grade ACTUALLY an A (despite what we tell students).

And there is another way in which the "default A" is unworkable. As Charles Murray points out in his book Real Education, "C" measn "average" in education parlance, or at least, it used to! It is a statistical truism that half of kids will be at or below average and half of kids will be at or above average. If our grade books were redesigned to allign with how they should look, student grades would create a bell curve where "C" would be the tip. "A" means "excellent" in education parlance, and as such, we are giving out too many "A's" if we are giving them to stduents who are not excellent in their subject. (My estimate would be about 10-15% should be getting "A's").

I think that it stems from their K-12 experiences,” Professor Brower said. “They have become ultra-efficient in test preparation. And this hyper-efficiency has led them to look for a magic formula to get high scores.”

The first half is right; the second is not. In the county in which I teach, for instance, 60% of the overall grade for a class is made up of classwork, and 25% is made up of tests and quizzes. On top of this, classwork is most often graded for completion, rather than accuracy. (Tests are generally the only thing grade for accuracy.) This literally means that a student can do all classwork without understanding the content, bomb every test and quiz, and still walk away with a "D." If she does all homework in addition to classwork, she would recieve a "C," and if she does all classwork and homework while scoring 50% "F's" on all tests and quizzes (still not understanding much of the material), she would recieve a 85% "B". I see it happen all the time where a student has a "C" in a class but does not know anything but the rudimentary skills for the class. This trend is at its worst when that student gets passed to Spanish II (or Algebra II) without mastering the requisite amount of info from the previous class.

My point: this teaches students that effort is to be rewarded above product. While this sounds like a good idea, the article points out that it is not. In essence, we are sending kids from an institution which, for 12 years, has taught them that effort rather than product is what counts and throwing them into a 4 year institution that operates in precisely the opposite way! In a college spanish class, it is rare that homeworks are graded for anything but accuracy (if they are graded at all), and tests constitute the majoity of the grade. Contrast that with the high school spanish class where student classwork and homework is graded on completion and together constitutes 75% of a stduent's grade.

There is another huge problem with what k-12 institutions' inadvertent inflating of grades and putting primacy on effort rather than product: it leads to students who become easily discouraged when they get bad grades.

“I think putting in a lot of effort should merit a high grade,” Mr. Greenwood said. “What else is there really than the effort that you put in?”

“If you put in all the effort you have and get a C, what is the point?” he added. “If someone goes to every class and reads every chapter in the book and does everything the teacher asks of them and more, then they should be getting an A like their effort deserves. If your maximum effort can only be average in a teacher’s mind, then something is wrong.”

What's the point? First, the point is to learn, rather than to earn a grade. (We are not good at teaching this in k-12 either.) Second, it is unrealistic (unless surrounded by k-12 walls) to expect that hard work garauntees a product worthy of a high grade. The real world does not work that way. If two people work just as hard at work and one turns in a better finished product than the other, then the better product will yield higher rewards. In college, one can put in all the work one wants, but if one doesn't understand the subject well enough to pass the test, then one does not deserve to pass the course as if one did understand the subject.

But k-12 works differently. In our zeal towards egalitarianism and a very chimeric belief that all children should have success, we have created a aystem so singley focused on this goal that it is artificially padded. In our desire to see all students experience success, we have made a system that places little emphasis on mastery (an elitist concept, that!) and put it on hard work (which all students are at least capable of). And even then, we treat students who do not work hard as "students with special needs" and offer even more "supports" that do little more than ensure that less effort is required of them (lest they earn an F at something!).

For those who think I am exaggerating this last piece, a previous post the story of a student I work with who simply does not show up to class and does little work. The school, however, has made deal after deal with him that he can pass the year if he does x and y. When he doesn't follow through, they re-instate the deal. When I asked why - why not let him experience the consequences of his actions - the most common response is, "Well, if we do that, he might not graduate, and that would be a shame." In other situations, I have been explicitly told to grade students for effort rather than product, or to use a more relaxed standard when grading certain students.

In the bizarre world of k-12 ed, this makes a certain bit of sense to most teachers. Fairness, we are repeatedly told, means giving everyone a tase of success. But as I hope to have pointed out, this egalitarian model does not fit with what kids will experience after high school either in college or the world of work. I shudder to think at how poorly we are preparing students for the merit-based world they will face after high school, where one is not entitled to grades, praise, or raises, no matter how hard one works, and where what matters is product rather than effort.

The Narcissism Epidemic (book review)

2009-05-02T05:47:00.001-07:00

There is a fabulous new book by Jean Twenge and W. Keith Campbell entitled The Narcissism Epidemic. Twenge's previous book studied the rise in narcissistic values in today's teenagers and twenty-somethings, where this book studies this distrubring trend as applied to all age groups.

While reading this, I could not help thinking about many of my students, from the girl who will not hesitate to talk about how hot she is while insulting other students like its nothing, to the student I work with who has behavioral problems (that many teacehrs erroneously beleive stem from poor self-esteem rather than an inflated ego). I would not only reccomend this book to all concerned citizens, but particularly to educators.

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"Narcissism is the fast food of the soul. It tastes great in the short term, has negative, even dire, consequences in the long term, and yet continues to have widespread appeal." (p. 259)

For all intents and purposes, The Narcissism Epidemic is something of a sequel to Jean Twenge's previous book, Generation Me. Wheras that book focused on the younger generation's (and gen y's) increase in narcissistic behavior, this book focuses on the same trend as a nation- and worldwide phenomenon. From our ever-increasing obsession with fawning over the lives of the rich and glamorous (Real Housewives of Orange County, anyone?) to our rampant consumerism, this book tells the tale of a nation in a very strange state of decline. In a sense, we are loving ourselves to death.

The first few chapters start off with the hard numbers. Twenge and Campbell have administered, and chased down, several experimental studies which demonstrate a very clear trend towards a more narcissistic attitude in the population. Young people list "being famous" as an important life goal far more frequently than their predecessors, the rise of platic surgery has increased FIVEFOLD in the past ten years (which COULD be explained by the fact that it has become more affordable, but the increase is so large that this explanation is unlikely to be the MAIN one). More and more newspaper articles and tv shows focus on narcissistic themes than in years past. Infintitely more people, when given the Narcissistic Personality Inventory, yield results consistent with narcissism than in years past. In other words, the rise in narcissism is thoroughly documented here.

From here, our authors talk about everything from whether narcissists tend to suffer from low self-esteem (quite the opposite, as many self-help gurus and educators have yet to figure out), whether narcissism helps one get ahead in life (only if you are a entertainer, it seems), and whether narcissism has its root cause in the well-intentioned self-esteem mmovement of the seventies and eightgies (you betcha!).

As an educator myself, this last point was one of the most fascinating for me. While students today often do not think twice about cheating, disrespecting teacher and peers, or expecting grades without doing the work, we continue to mistakenly believe the problem to be low, rather than way too high, self-esteem. All the while, Twenge and Campell are careful to distance themselves from the view that we should NOT praise our kids or ignore their self-esteem, which is far from what they are saying. They are simply pleading for moderation. Praising a child's virtues is different from overpraising their every move. The authors use the obsesity analogy: just as recognizers of the obesity epidemic do not want us to stop eating, but only eat in moderation, recognizers of the narcissism epidemic are only suggesting that we praise in moderation (while also encouraging hard work) rather than going overboard like we have been.

There are also some timely chapters on how narcissim played a key role in the 2008/2009 recession. While everyone is quick to blame the banks, consumers, and the government, we seem squeamish about criticizing what the three groups had in common: unbounded and irrational greed! Consumers were buying houses and things they did not need so as to satisfy increasing desires to live high on the hog (without having to earn it). Banks focused on quick profits rather than prudent investments in their willingness to dupe consumers into predatory loans. The government just wanted to see everyone own a house (which somehow became a right rather than a privilege to be earned). Twenge and Campbell do a great job in showing that for each group, the culprit was greed, narcissism, and a belief that everyone could have everything without having to (as in years past) exercise hard work and prudence.

But how to stop these trends? Unlike the previous book, Generation Me, the Narcissism Epidemic focuses many of its pages to offering suggestions on how we get out of this dizzying mire of narcissism. Most chapters conclude with a section called "Treatment for the Epidemic" and the last sixth of the book is made up of chapters offering "Prognosis and Treatment." Some suggestions are - or should be! - quite commonsensical: teach your children prudence, work-ethic, and that it is not always about them, regulate the credit industry, teach prudence and humility in school, participate, and encourage others to participate, in social clubs that nurture a sense of community. Some are interesting but quite fantastic: tone down the fevered pitch of product advertising, make "less is more" a new societal catchprase, tax luxury items more heavily (as a libertarian, I am not a great fan of government regulation.)

[One suggestion that Twenge and Campbell infuriatingly left off the list is to let irresponsible spenders feel the full consequences of their action. As it stands now, the government is doing the opposite by penalizing those not in debt by forcing them to "bail out" those who are. Message: narcissists are more important and deserving than the average Joe.]

Whereas I gave Twenge's earlier book a three star review, I am giving this book five stars. Unlike the previous book, this book was more cohesive, well-documented, and contained focus not only on the problem but on possible ways out. As an educator, I urge every parent and educator to read this book so that we can see exactly what the misguided self-esteem movement has led to. As a citizen I urge everyone to read this book to get a sense for the import of narcissistic values and how they threaten to make a great country significantly worse.

Why High-School Diplomas Don't Always Mean What They Advertise

2009-04-28T17:17:00.000-07:00

Below is an example of why one should not trust a high-school diploma to indicate mastery of much of anything.

Two weeks ago, I was approached by the school social worker to be party to a deal made for a student in danger of failing Algebra 2. A senior, this student was in real danger of not graduating in large part because he skipped much of the second and third quarter. The deal went like this: the student would promise to attend every single Algebra 2 class, attend every single one of my Study Skills classes (where he could recieve tutoring), and once these criteria were filled, the student would be allowed the chance to pass the class. I entered into this agreement with the stipulation that, as this student has had several allowances made for him, this would be his last chance. Miss a class and the deal is void.

The next day, he failed to attend my Study Skills class. Thus, per our agreement, the deal was void. Or so I thought.

Yesterday, when I was off because I had just gotten married, the social worker did what she promised she wouldn't do: she reinstated the deal. When I asked her and the vice principal why, they both told me - this only seems like a tall tale - that we just wanted to get the student through, and it would affect our numbers if we did not. Besides, they said, giving him the piece of paper might allow him to get a job that he couldn't get without the diploma.

So, you heard it here first (or maybe you are already familiar): diplomas often mean little more than that teachers and principals let a student skirt by so as to boost their numbers and pass the buck.

These are the days when I really question why we have diplomas in the first place. If they are not standards based, or if standards are so movable that they are merely inconveniences to be stretched, I am not sure what diplomas are to signify. Surely not academic mastery! That wouuld...gasp...expect something out of students and hold them to expectations. (How dare we!)

Thus, it may be in employers best interests to administer employment tests rather than relying on the fact that an applicant has a high-school diploma. Whether someone has a diploma seems to be little evidence that they can read, write, think, do math, or do little more than be passed along by lazy administrators and teachers.

We Almost Got Through the Evolution Unit Without a Hitch.

2009-04-21T13:41:00.000-07:00

My coteacher and I are administering the unit test on evolution starting in two days. Thus, the unit which entails treading on thin ice is almost over...but not without a snag. Over the past two years, my coteacher and I have fielded many questions and endured many explanations about such things as gaps in the fossil record, how evolution could produce such complex things as humans, and general disbelief that we are related to simians.

And today, another such comment occurred. During a brief video on transitional forms - "fishibians" to be exact - a student suggested that scientists stop "making stuff up." I treated this comment like any other - with a brief reiteration of the various lines of evidence for evolution.

But, unlike many other times in the past, this comment really bothered me. Generally, I can "brush off" such comments as made by students that are simply in disbelief that evolution could produce such varied and complex creatures (didn't we all experience a twinge of disbelief when first exposed to the theory?)

Her comment got me thinking about the low state of science education in this country and our underperformance in conveying how science arrives at its conclusions. To me, it is as absurd to ask whether one believes in the theory of evolution as it is to ask whether one believes in the theory that the holocuast happened. There is a difference between whether one believes it and whether it happened. But when we ask whether someone believes in evolution, it makes such a question sound like evolution is a story that depends for its validity on our assent. Of course, what is true is true regardless of whether someone mistakenly ignores evidence and chooses not to believe the theory.

What I and other science teachers try to do is to get kids to understand that scientists would not simply state a theory and write about the theory if there were no evidence for the theory. Scientists do not make things up, and the rare ones that try are quickly called out by the peer review and "open disclosure" policy in sceince that demands replicable experiments and that findings be made public for examination. (Anyone who wants to see how quickly science sniffs out frauds can examine the piltdown man hoax

But the crucial issue, to me, is how little we spend in our science classes talking about (a) the scientific process and how it works, and (b) how scientists come to know things like the theory of evolution from employing that process. We talk a lot about facts to do with cell biology, genetics, macromolecules, and evolution. But what we forget to talk about is how the scientific method was used to get these facts. We talk about the double helix model of DNA but neglect to talk about how Francis and Crick came to the theory, and how the theory survived the scrutiny of other scientists. We talk about genetics, but do not emphasize (or underemphasize) the magnificence of Gregor Mendel's experiments (and later experiments by folks like Hershey and Chase).

If we did this more - focused on science as a method used to solve problems and adduce evidence to suppport conclusions - then we might not get as many comments about how scientists are "making all this up." Stduents might better understand not only that there is evidence for evolution, but how that evidence points to evolution (and how evolution has survived test upon test).

So, my coteacher and I are almost done the unit on evolution. But everything seems to indicate that we as a nation are nowhere near done teaching people about evolution.

When Teachers Vent

2009-04-16T14:33:00.000-07:00

Occasionally, teachers get together with other teachers - after school in an empty classroom, over drinks at a local "happy hour" - and vent. And once this venting gets going, it is hard to put the breaks on. I am guilty of it, and I don't feel bad about this because most of my teacher friends do it too.

What do we vent about? Generally, we vent about students: how difficult it is to teach this one, the latest story about that one, did you know this other one is in a gang, etc. To the outsider, this might appear a bit like pessimists giving voice to their pessimism, or see it as an example of a bunch of lazy teachers complaining about having to teach.

But, as an insider, I think these venting sessions are necessary. I would be the last to say that teaching is one of the hardest professions there is (maybe it would be if there were fewer days off and perks), but will certainly say freely that teaching is like no other profession out there. Not only is it unique in that our "clients" generally are forced to "buy" our "product" by force, but also because for 9/10ths of our day (save for cafeteria duty and transition between classes), teachers do their job in isolation from any peers whatsoever. In most professions, when things go wrong, one can talk to a coworker or peer in the office. With teaching, there is none of that. At the end of the day, I see many tired, stressed, and dragging adult faces when I leave the building, and I am sure my face looks the same as theirs.

So, naturally when teachers get to talking after school, they let it rip. They were not able to vent all day. When the knucklehead in second period told them to f*** off, she just had to keep her cool for 5 more hours (and try not to get angrier when someone in period 4 followed suit). My story today happened during second period, when a student ran out of my room because I refused to write him a pass, only to have an administrator catch him, bring him back to class, and TELL me to write a pass for him so that he might be appeased. Soon after, my class broke loose, and kids began throwing paper balls into the trash can, cursing up a storm, and generally ignoring anything I had to say (as they had just seen a peer get away with running out of the classroom).

But I had to keep my chin up until the end of the day because, as any teacher knows, when one loses their cool in front of the kids, the kids come at you all the harder triggering a nice downward spiral. But all of this stoicism gets to us.

And that is why the after-school venting sessions are so necessary to us. Other teachers are the only ones who understand how we feel, and letting go to them serves as a catharsis. When my colleage tells me her stories about teaching the same student who ran from my class, she is subtly telling me that I am not the only one who is having thsee problems - not the only one feeling like their mind is slowly being lost. And when the two of us complain about how difficult it is to motivate the unmotivated students, we are subtly letting each other know that we are not the only ones who feel like we are banging our heads against the wall with no results.

So, I know that many outsiders view with contempt the vision of teachers griping to eachother about their kids. But these people don't realize how lonely a profession teaching is, and how frustrating it can be both for that reason and for many others. to a teacher like myself, being able to vent to other teachers who understand what it is I am going through is simply better help than talking to a therapist who doesn't.

House of Cards: The Economic Down Turn and the Impossibility of Playing the Blame Game

2009-04-13T15:52:00.000-07:00

Recently, I watched a MSNBC special entitled "House of Cards," about the origins of the current recession - the bursting of the "housing bubble." I assume that the special is based on the book by the same name, which I am going to read as soon as I can. It was quite an interesting, and maddening, special. Of course, I am not an economist, so the following essay will not be written as if I were one. Rather, I want to focus on something others may have missed during the special: while the media and public are wont to blame someone - government, wall street, consumer greed - for our current financial predicament, the special never gets involved in blaming anyone in particular. In fact, the special seems to make an implicit point that, like a house of cards, no one piece can be "blamed" for sending the edifice crashing.

But first, here is my attempt to summarize as best I can thespecial's depiction of the fiasco. The government (Bush administration and Congress) had a noble idea that we should do all we can to promote home ownership, and particularly minority home ownership. Thus, the federal reserve encouraged lenders to find 'creative' ways to give loans to those they might not otherwise give loans to. And that they did. An example of one type of new mortgage offer is depicted here:

“the pay option negative amortization adjustable rate mortgage.” It was designed to help first-time homebuyers who couldn’t actually afford the cost of the loan. Those homebuyers would have the option to pay only part of the interest they owed each month. The unpaid interest was added to the total amount of the mortgage. As a result, the mortgage balance increased; instead of the mortgage being paid down, it was getting bigger.

Now, as stupid as banks were to concoct such doomed-to-fail schemes, consumers were stupid enough to sign on to them. Thus, home ownership went up, home prices went up (because 'loose' loans made it possible to raise home prices as there was now more demand) and banks went lower and lower, only to push home prices up and.... etc.

So who do we blame? The two most common suspects are the banks who created such hairbrained schemes and the government. Generally, those who have left-leaning sympathies blame the former and those with right-leaning or free-market symapthies blame the latter. Even though I have free-market sympathies, I blame both and neither (and can't understand WHY no one thinks to blame consumers for where they spend and misspend their money!).

The problem is this. Each group is responsible for a certain piece of the puzzle, but wiithout willing participation by ANY of these three groups, the party would have been cut short and the housing bubble wouldn't have soared to gargantuan and unjustified heights. Yes, the government cut interest rates and encouraged banks to do what they did, but if banks or consumers didn't take the bait, the point would have been moot. Yes, banks practiced predatory practices, issuing loans to people they knew could not afford the loans they signed on to, but the consumers eagerly joined the action. And yes, the consumers were stupid and greedy, but had the banks not played to that stupidity and greed, there would have been no transaction.

And this, to me, is one of the beauties of capitalism. In a centrally planned system, it would be easy to blame one party (the government and its economics board). But also, since all economic decisions would be centralized, mistakes like this one would be easier and more frequent, as there would be fewer checks and balances. In the current case, THREE distinct groups rather than one economics board) had to make the exact same mistake in order for catastrophe to strike. The problem is not that one group screwed up (which is all that would have to happen to send a centrally planned economy into a tail-sprin), but we all screwed up.

And here is the other great thing about capitalism. Were the president familiar with capitalism, he would recognize that one of its assets is that it punishes the guilty. If capitalism were allowed to work, the guilty banks would be penalized with bankruptcy and the stupid and greedy consumers (who bought houses they could not afford knowingly) would be homeless. (Of course, the government - just as guilty a party as the rest - would not be punished becuase they can just keep stealing money. from the public to stay in buisness.)

Thus, while some see capitalism as encouraging greed, if it were allowed to work in this situation, we would see that greed is just as often punished in a capitalistic economy.

But, really, the point here is that those intent on playing the blame game need to explain how the group they decide to blame could have done their damage without the willing complicity of the other two. I don't see how that could happen, and that is why I blanche at any suggestion that there is A guilty party (other than all the government and bank officials as well as consumers who let greed, rather than temperance, dominate their thin heads).

But give Obama seven more years, and this will surely not be the case. The next time the economy goes awry, we will be able to blame one party - maybe the nationalized banking comission, or the centarlized economic planning comission. Until then, I like not being able to blame JUST ONE party.

Nonverbal Communication, Autism, and the Interbrain Problem (Review of Tantam's book on autism)

2009-04-13T14:16:00.000-07:00

Autism is one of the most tricky disabilities there is to understand. It is also one of the most prevalent As a special educator, I find autism puzzling and am always interested to try and understand it as a phenomenon. Recently I recieved a complimentary copy of "Can The World Afford Autistic Spectrum Disorder" to review (courtesy of amazon.com). It is a book that offers quite a novel theory about what autistic spectrum disorder is (primarily, the author says, an impairment in ability to pick up on an interpret nonverbal communication). For those not familiar, this view is in direct contrast to the predominant theory that autistic spectrum disorder is marked primarily by the inability to see others as intentional agents and, therefore, understand people as people. Anyone interested in the puzzle of autism should check this book out.

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The title of Digby Tantam's book - Can the Wold Afford Autistic Spectrum Disorder - is a bit of a misnomer. The question only comes up, and is answered in the affirmative, in the book's last chapter. The majority of the book is devoted to a novel theory the author expounds that the primary impairment encompassed by ASD is that of nonverbal communication (rather than, say, mindblindness).

Theorists have debated for the past 10 years (at least) what the main impairment of autism was. Is it trouble with language? Lack of ability to see others as persons with intentions? Lack of ability to process emotions in self and others? The dominant theory, with Simon Baron-Cohen as its progenitor, is that autism is primarily a disorder marked by "mindblindness," or, lack of ability in tke autistic to see others as intentional agents, and hence, be able to "understand" people AS people.

Tantam offers a different, and quite convincing, theory. Tantam suggests that autism is a disorder (sticky term, that) marked first and foremost by difficulty reading non-verbal communication. To use his term, autistics have difficulty with things involving the "interbrain" connection between people. Most of us are born with and have no trouble developing our ability to "read" people and the subtle cues - gaze, body language - that autistics often cannot pick up. He uses a computer analogy; if the interbrain is like the internet (that non-physical connection that we have between each other), then the autistic is the one who cannot log on.

The first two chapters of the book are devoted to illuminating to us neurotypicals how important nonverbal communication is to everyday life (as we often forget because nonverbal communication is so automatic to us). The next few chapters are devoted to outlining and defending the interbrain theory. Tantam finishes off by suggesting some things that autistics and particularly those who care for them can do to help them cope with this lack of ability to access the "interbrain" world of nonverbal signals.

I would suggest that anyone reading this also read Simon Baron-Cohen's book "Mindblindess," which outlines the main theory Tantam is arguing against. To my mind, I think that Tantam's theory, while still quite speculative, is interesting and suspect that mindblindess (inability to see others as intentional actors) and the lack of ability to "access the interbrain" are quite connected. When one cannot appropriately read nonverbal communications, it becomes all the harder to "see what others are thinking." If one has trouble telling that someone is angry (recognizing their arms crossed, their face turn red, and their voice get tense), then it stands to reason that it would be very hard to predict what that person will do. In other words, I suspect that one will not need to choose between Baron-Cohen's theory and Tantam's theory. I suspect that mindblindess and lack of "interbrain ability" are quite related (whether one causes the other or they simply develop in parallel.

The last few chapters will be the chapters most helpful for caretakers of autistics (like myself). The author suggests that caretakers can help autistics navigate the world of nonverbal communication by acclimating them to it strategically - at once making sure they are not bombarded, but stay connected to others. We can also monitor out own behavior to be as literal and as verbal as possible, making sure that we cut down on the number of nonverbal cues we personally send out.

And as to the question of whether the world can afford autistic spectrum disorder, the author's answer is an unambiguous: "We better." He acknowleges the difficulty in expecting neurotypicals to accommodate themselves to such a large degree to the autistic, but also argues that autistics often have traits that it would be a shame for the world to go about. In the author's own words, "If the future lies more and more in collaboration with machines, then we may need more people with ASD, not less." For all the difficulties (both for autistics and neurotypicals) that ASD can cause, it would be a real shame to deprive ourselves of the unconventionality, originality, and often outstanding intellect and talent often associated with ASD.

Would Privatizing American Education Threaten Democratic Values?: An Analogy Between Schooling and the Media

2009-04-07T16:57:00.000-07:00

This article... argues that, in an increasingly fragmented world, privatised control of civic education in state-funded schools in England threatens the integrity of public education and the civic objectives of state schooling.

This quote is taken from an abstract for an article in a prominent education journal. It voices a common criticism towards the idea of privatizing American education, via either a voucher or a wholly private model. The argument is that, by getting rid of the "common school," education becomes unstandardized and, hence, threatens the idea of a common value set needed for a functioning democracy. Here is a nice summary of what the argument often looks like:

The Undermining America Argument: Choice will siphon off needed funds from public schools and, as a result, the quality of public education in the United States will suffer. In addition, choice will undermine democratic values and lead to segregation and division.

The problem I have with this argument is twofold. First, it contains an assumption that I am not convinced is valid: democracy relies on the citizenry sharing common values. While this statement is often bandied about as fact, it is generally never, but really should be, argued for. But this is a discussion for another time, as this objection is not the one which concerns us here.

The primary reason I object to the argument that a plurality of private schooling option would undermine necessary common values is simply that the conclusion is dubious. And such can be seen if we look at an analogy: that of the media, and whether it functions best as a monopoly or plurality.

The irony that one notices is that the biggest defenders of public "common" schooling tend to be on the political left. This has been true since John Dewey and Edward Thorndike all the way to the present day, as seen with Jonathan Kozol and Alfie Kohn. (Yes, the right supports public ed as well, but vouchers and privatization seem to be primarily a "right wing" phenomenon). But another argument found primarily on the left argues against the "monopolization" of the media. There is a disjunct between these two arguments. One the one hand, it is said that monopolizing education is healthy for democracy, and on the other, that monopolizing the media is unhealthy for a democracy.

What?

Wouldn't one expect that those in favor of pluralism in the media would also be in favor of pluralism in education? Both the media and the education system, after all, have to do with the exact same thing: educating citizens. Why is it that there exists no argument that pluralizing media sources would result in an undermining of democratic values?

The reason is that those in favor of citizens having a plurality of media sources to choose from argue, rightly, that a diversity of voices is good for democracy and when news sources become monolithic, a well-educated citizenry is threatened. An extremizing of this argument can be seen here:

Arguably, the US's much-vaunted "free media" practice a form of adroit self-censorship that's all too reminiscent of Soviet models of the past. Example: could a state-owned American media machine have been much more avid as a cheerleader for the US occupation of Iraq?

In other words, the minute we have an entirely state-run media (or corporate run monopoly on media) then the easier it is for society to be indoctrinated rather than educated.

But I fail to see how this argument would not also work brilliantly as an argument against a monopoly of state-run schools! Let's try it out by taking the above quote and changing a few words:

Arguably, the US's much-vaunted "liberal education" practice a form of adroit self-censorship that's all too reminiscent of Soviet models of the past. Example: could a state-owned American school system have been much more avid as a cheerleader for the US occupation of Iraq?

The point I am trying to make here is that, if critics of privatization of schooling as a threat to common values were consistent, they would also be equally against pluralism in journalism and the press. If different people get their news from different places, we will ot all receive the same news, and therefore (allegedly) democracy will break down.*

Of course, we rightly realize that a plurality of media sources does not hurt, but helps democracy by offering people a choice on what news to receive, and keeping everyone in check by making it extremely unlikely that the type of indoctrination hinted at in the above quote could take place. People can choose their news and news organizations must compete with each other.

The exact same can be said for why pluralization of education outlets is a benefit to democracy. Allowing choice in educaiton means that one source (federal or state governments) do not control the curricula for every child. This means that, while certain schools will choose to indoctrinate in certain ways, a diverse populace will be sustained. Schools will be forced to compete for business, and as a result, will strive to produce better education than competitors. (Can you imagine how low the quality of news would be if the federal government or Foxnews were the only game in town with no one to compete against?)

In closing, democratic values are not threatened, but strengthened by, a plurality of news media sources. No one (save for Dr. Sunstein) takes seriously the argument that, for a democracy to function, we must all receive the same news. Thus, I don't see how the education situation is not directly analogous. No one should take seriously the idea that for a democracy to properly function, all students must receive exactly the same education.

*[Ironically, legal professor Cass Sunstein actually does make a similar argument in his book Republic.com, where he argues that the proliferation of media sources is a bad thing because it produces a fractious polity which, apparently, makes democracy less workable rather than more robust. Not many agree with Sunstein, for good reason.]

Why Ebooks Must Fail? Hardly.

2009-04-05T09:36:00.000-07:00

Recently, I read an online article, entitled "Why Ebooks Must Fail." In short, the article is an economic argument against the viability of ebooks (for ebook readers like the Amazon Kindle and Sony Ebook Reader) from the perspective of the publishing industry. As an owner of an Amazon Kindle myself, I took great interest in the article. I also think the arguments are dead-nuts wrong.

The author's point is that the book publishing industry is built on and depends on a certain model of doing business and that "ebooks don’t follow these rules."

In brief, publishers act as middlemen between authors and the buying public. Publishers contract with authors and pay authors advances (that will be recouped by future book sales). In addition to paying authors, publishers must pay for marketing and design of the book. In order to afford this, they "presell" books to stores, not all of which will be sold (but the publishers make money in these presales and have incentive to presell as much as possible so that they can get as much money as possible.) In order to encourage stores to buy as much as possible, publishers will accept returns of unsold copies for full monetary credit.

So, in order for publishers to be able to spend money on author advances, marketing, and production is that they make money "preselling" books (even if they have to give some back later in "buying back" unsold copies) they still get short-term cash flow via "presale."

And the author's argument - why he thinks ebooks must fail - is because ebooks do not work this way, and cannot be "presold" to "brick and mortar" bookstores in the way that paperbacks and hardcovers can.

Ebooks are effectively sold on a consignment basis - meaning the money for the sale is distributed after the sale is made, not up front. Stores don’t buy inventory, they put the file in a database and distribute copies as they are sold. This means that ebooks don’t have a huge returns problem, but it also means they cannot generate short-term cash flow like print books do.

Unfortunately, one never gets a straight answer as to why this inevitably spells death for publishers, other than the sense that publishers depend on the short-term income of "presales." But am I crazy, or do presales seem to be almost the equivalent of a loan made by bookstores (where the bookstore is simply paying the publisher in advance of the actual sales)? Actually, it is unclear why publishers wouldn't be making the exact same amount of money if bookstores payed publishers AS THE SALE OCCURRED rather than BEFORE THE SALE OCCURRED. (Think of it this way: a loan shark pays you winnings before your team actually wins, with the stipulation that you pay the money back if the team loses. How is that ANY DIFFERENT quantitatively from the loan shark who waits to pay you until after your team wins?!)

The other thing that annoys me about this article is that the author seems to forget that this situation is not at all unique to book publishers. Record companies have gone through a DIRECTLY ANALOGOUS situation when CD's gave way to mp3's. And they are doing fine, because they figured out a way to adapt.

Record companies play a role directly analogous to book publishers. Record companies "sign" artists to their label, give them monetary advances to be recouped by the artist's future sales, and pour money into marketing and sales of the artists' records. Also, like book publishers, record companies "presell" to record stores and promise to "buy back" the remaining unsold units. This was how they got their "short term" income to be invested into marketing and production - that is, until the mp3 trade changed the rules.

As evidenced by the first two years of Napater (a file-sharing website), there were initial growing pains, and the record industry was forced to change their rules about many things, nonetheleast of which was the fact that mp3's (which have no physical existence) cannot be presold, and hence, record companies had to learn to wait until "units" were sold to the public to be paid.

One could easily see our author's article having been written about the mp3 industry, arguing that mp3s must fail because they do not accord with the record/CD model of doing business. But the record companies did adapt, and it took a small number of years for them to do it.

The author also complains about the fact that publishers will have to adapt the way they do marketing and advertising, suggesting that these are new costs (all to sell books which are less expensive than their physical counterparts).

Ebooks will still have to be sold and marketed, just in different ways as there will be far less reliance on an upfront advance buy-in, but far more reliance on ongoing marketing through the use of content and metadata - as well as user-generated content and promotion tools to get the book marketed. These are completely new expenses for publishers who traditionally think of marketing as publicity and display advertising for new books, not ongoing support and marketing for long-term sales.

New expenses? Yes and no. While the expenses of e-marketing may be new, they would simply REPLACE the expenses of marketing physical books to "brick and mortar" establishments. The expense of designing websites, blurbs for existing websites, etc, will simply replace the costs of designing in-store displays. And I have to imagine that the cost of involving authors in cyber-chats to promote their books would be less expensive then flying those authors to bookstores and putting them up in hotels for book tours.

Of course, as much as I want e-books to replace regular ones (I don't miss regular books at all!), it will be several years until publishing goes fully digital. As such, the transition will not be as "all-at-once" as our author dreads, and the "cash flow problem" will likely not be catastrophic, as it will happen very gradually, allowing publishers to adjust gradually (just as mp3's replaced CD's over several years, and record stores even still exist).

Why won't the change happen quickly? Because ebook readers are quite expensive. The Kindle 2 lists at $359, and it is unlikely that the casual reader will buy it. At its prohibitive price, buying ebook readers is not in the economic interest of most readers (who may go through several books a year, but not enough to justify the one-time cost of $359). Where I read enough books a year to make the cost worthwhile (or at least a non-factor) I don't see too many readers eager to give up the, at this point, more cost-effective option of "real" books.

All of this means that publishers won't be suddenly starved of the "short term" income provided by preselling books. They will not wake up one day and find that this income is gone. Instead, what will likely happen is that publishers find a gradual diminution in "presale" revenue each year until one day, the last bookstores close their doors.

But in their place will be ebooks stores. And while publishers cannot presell ebooks to these stores, they will still get the same amount of money, but in a more "real time" scenario; instead of getting the money from book sales in advance, they will get them, say, on a monthly basis (or even in absolute real time, as the sales happen).

And I cannot think of one reason why publishers cannot function this way. Just as most other businesses do, publishers can learn to make their money as sales occur, rather than before sales actually take place. Record companies have gotten used to doing this. So can book publishers.

In the end, "Why ebooks Must Fail" may be better named, "Why the Old Model of Book Publishing Must Adapt."

Reflection on, and Review of, Gatto's "Weapons of Mass Instruction"

2009-04-01T15:19:00.000-07:00

Recently, I read John Taylor Gatto's book "Weapons of Mass Instruction." Gatto, a former New York City Teacher of the Year, has become an outspoken advocate of abolishing compulsory education. While I share his libertarian sentiments, I similarly distrust his solution of "open source education" which basically means that every child is on his or her own to get an education however they can (i.e., some may be homeschooled, some may become apprentices at an early age, and some may have to "learn on the street.")

One criticism I did not put in my book review was that Gatto demonstrates a Rousseauean faith - a faith I do not share - in the "natural" education written about in books like Emile and those authored by Maria Montessori. Here, students choose their own educational trajectory and, through sheer will, educate themselves (possibly with teachers playing the role of 'facillitator'). This idea sounds good in theory, and would probably work for some highly-motivated and passionate kids. But (a) youth and short-sightedness are otften positively correlated, and I shudder to think of how many kids would not become educated (about anything socially productive or marketable) if left ot their own devices. (b) I think that this approach mistakenly assumes that students know what their interests are from the get-go (where many actually find new interests via education that they would not have chosen on first blush).

___________________________________________________________________

I began this book with high hopes. I am a libertarian and, like Gatto, a teacher who is very unsatisfied with our (mis)education of children. Like Gatto, I strongly feel that the "one size fits all" system may be more accurately summarized as a "one size fits a few quite well, and the rest can fend for themselves" system.

For all that, I found Gatto's case to be surprisingly weak. First, Gatto breaks a cardinal rule of those aiming at reform: tearing down a system need always be accompanied by putting something explicit in its place. Gatto's "open source education" proposal is far from explicit. "Let kids get education on their own, each in their own way," is about the extent of his suggestion, and the suggestion begs many questions: what about those who come from unmotivated or ill-equipped (financially or intellectually) families? How can we ensure that students pursue not only what they are immediately interested in, but also become well-rounded? Gatto might not feel these questions to be important enough to address, but many others do.

He attempts to allay our concerns about open source education by reminding us that many folks have been successful without formal schooling. Abe Lincoln, after all, became president with only a fourth grade education. NASCAR driver Danica Patrick does not possess a high school diploma. Craig Venter, of the Human Genome Project, was a D student who passed high school by the skin of his teeth (Gatto fails to mention that he went on to get a BS and PhD, which would ruin his argument against the value of formalized education).

All in all, Gatto provides us with about 30-35 examples of people who have achieved a lot without formal education. I am sure, if you give me about a week, I could come up with at least as many examples of students who did not achieve much without a formal education and an equal number of examples of those who have achieved a lot that would credit formal schooling as a key component to their success. Unfortunately, Gatto's argument here is so highly anecdotal that one is tempted not to call it an argument (but an appeal to emotion).

He does make some interesting observations about formalized schooling's inability to (he says it is a deliberate lack of desire to) foster skills like critical reasoning. I wholly concur, but fail to see how the inexorable conclusion to this is to abolish formal schooling. (Gatto is convinced, in a very conspiracy-theoristic tone, that the government is deliberately dumbing down students to make them better sheep. He never really cites evidence for this.) Gatto's argument here is analogous to a person cooking a recipe and when the results turn out less-than-tasty, automatically making an argument that the utensils (rather than the recipe) is the problem. In other words, the fact that schools often turn out ill-equipped and ill-learned kids could as much be attributed to HOW we instruct rather than the fact that we do it under compulsion. (Other nations don't seem to have our problem turning out kids who can think.)

Frankly, I am surprised that Gatto does not even consider the idea of revamping the school system we have, maybe into a competitive voucher system. And if creating an education system relevant to student interests is the concern, then a voucher system may achieve a similar objective to Gatto's ideal without leaving everything up to chance and luck of the draw, as his "open source education" does.

When it all comes down to it, I admire much that Gatto stands for. Like him, I am deeply dissatisfied with the system of schooling that I teach in, and am convinced that we can make schooling fit individual students better. I, too, decry the increasing centralization of education (and notice that it is accompanied by lessening performance.) But I don't think that Gatto's solution is TOO laissez-faire ("anything goes") in a way that leaves too much up to chance (especially for those who are not lucky enough to have parents who can homeschool or ambition to self-study). He does not provide any reason to suppose that a voucher system could not allay many of the problems he discusses, but in a way that guarantees at least some degree of guarantee that all students have the opportunity to receive schooling.

For a much more interesting, plausible, and fact-based book on educationa reform from a libertarian perspective, read "Education and Captalism."

On the Human Quest for Cosmic Purpose and Rationale

2009-03-31T13:05:00.000-07:00

On anothe blog, a fellow atheist hs written a piece oce the human quest for external purpose. Many humans, that is, quest for a purpose in life that is extenal and not of their own making ("I am part of god's plan, etc.)

The author of the article correctly notes that as the universe does not itself have desires and is not cognizant, the world has no ultimate purpose (and even if a god created us for or with a purpose, that is not mean we are bound by that purpose or that it is a purpose that would satisfy us.

Early in the article, though, he asks a very non-rhetorical question that I think should and can be answered:

I do not know where this want for an external purpose comes from. Perhaps it is some left-over brain program from our childhood where we are inclined to prefer the values of our parents. Perhaps it is something that is taught from one generation to the next without stopping to consider the wisdom (or foolishness) of doing so.

Fyfe cannot identify with the search for an external, larger, purpose to life, or the emptiness many can feel when they do not find one. While I can relate - I have no need to find a 'bigger' purpose - I can certainly relate to those who do and think I can give some explanations here. And a search for a 'bigger' purpose has little to do with motivations that Fyfe proposes.

Why do we search for grand purpose in life rather than being satisfied with human-made purposes? First, I believe that we do this because many lives that contain hardship are assuaged by the belief that "there has to be more than just this." Slavery is a good example of this. The slave, who was/is forced to toil for many hours a day under brutal condition, and who had no control over his/her life, may take comfort in the idea that he/she is part of something larger and better than his/her own day-to-day. Saying that the slave's own life is the purpose of his/her life does not do becuase he/she feels their life to be intrinsically purposeless.

But what about those who are better off? Why do folk with relatively happy (or at least very tolerable) lives feel the need to search for a larger purpose? I have known many who've done this - who go into a particular profesion, for instance, because they feel they are "serving the greater good," or the like. Even if they are creating this purpose for themselves (which often they have), they are comforted by the fact that they are serving a purpose larger than themselves, and would be unsatisfied with the suggestion that they have created, rather than been given, a purpoose for their lives.

In these cases, having a purpose imposed on one (or the feeling of it) makes the purpose feel more real and legitimate. It does not feel self-serving, but other-serving. Teh best analogy I can think of is the satisfaction of scoring well on a test of someone else's creation versus scoring well on a test that one whore oneself. The latter does not cause satisfaction because the task was too easy, as one simply gave the answers to questions one created. The real satisfaction lies in beating the challenge of performing well under conditions not of one's own making.

In the same way, creating one's own purpose to live up to is less satisfying, because less challenging, than fulfilling a life purpose created by onesself.

Another reason why serving a "larger" purpose is seen as more fulfilling than serving one's own individually made purpose is because when serving others, one can feel like they are making a difference in the worldd, rather than just in themselves. This is seen by the familiar film and book plot/theme of the shallow business person (or other type of egoist) that lives like solely for themselves but unexpectedly finds joy in helping others (which was, generally at first, against his will). [films like "Family Man" or "Two Weeks Notice" are more popular examples.]

I have never really felt the need to seek after an externally imposed, and larger, purpose. But I have felt the need to help others rather than pursue solely what is in my own personal interest. I did this when I became a teacher rather than went into a PhD program. I wanted to do the latter, but did the former because I wanted to do something at once hard, helpful, and effectual. All I can say is that this choice, while certainly the tougher path, felt more "solid" than the self-serving goal of PhD because it involved helping others by making a sacrifice. While I was not searching for a higher purpose, I can attest to the psychological pull that serving social (and in some sense, larger) purposes can have over serving individually made (and smaller, by radius) purposes.

Mackie and Kevin and Ben...Oh My! (A re-defense of moral subjectivism)

2009-03-29T17:31:00.000-07:00

I have been recently, and pleasantly, surprised by a recent, lengthy post on my friend Ben Hayek's blog with a main subject of...me. (Is there a better subject for an extended essay, I wonder?) Specifically, Ben takes issue with several posts I've made here defending moral subjectivism - the view that moral judgments are subjective preferences rather than objective facts.

Like many objectivists, Ben is quite angered by subjectivism because, without it, we could not make objectively valid moral judgments. The first part of his post suggests a moral dilemma: Ben and I confront a person torturing a cat. Ben, the objectivist, would be able to very objectively condemn the torturer, while I would not.

On Kevin's view, when a subject declares that "torturing kittens for pleasure is immoral," the subject is not identifying a a fact about the world (i.e., not picking out a constituent of objective reality), but rather identifying only a state within the subject's consciousness. Kevin describes this state within the subject as no different to whenever a human being feels an emotion. Thus, if I encountered a sadist on the street about to torture kittens for the pleasure it gives him, if I rescued the kittens by force prior to their fate, I would not be doing so because it is a matter of objective fact that what the kittens were about to be subjected to is objectively wrong, but because I only feel that it would be wrong.

I suppose I am guilty as charged here. Ben is right that I agree with him that torturing kittens is wrong, but that I disagree with him about the objective import of that view. I would, in a sense, be powerless to objectively condemn the sadist.

I am quite at a loss, though, to think about why objectively condemning a sadist would have any more import than subjectively condemning her. Does the sadist care if my condemnation is coming from me or from the Cosmic Objective Order? I doubt it. I doubt a sadist who tortures kittens feels very bound by a moral excoriation - no matter whether it is subjective or objective in nature (whatever the hell the difference looks like.)

And this is one of the big objections I have to moral objectivism; like JL Mackie and others have noted, if morals exist as objective things, they are very strange things - things like no other things we know of. They do not have any physical embodiment or mode of detection (other than an introspective method identical to that used to ascertain subjective emotion!). And they are the only things (assuming they are things) that impose obligations on witnesses' behavior. Facts are real, but I can think of no fact that obligates us to change our behavior like morals do. So, are they facts? I cannot see any good reason to see that they are.

But apparently, Ben does. He suggests that they are facts just as 2+2=4 is a fact. He suggests that just as this mathematical axiom has no basis in observable sense data (but remains a fact nonetheless), so with moral facts. 2+2=4, killing kittens is wrong... pretty similar, eh?

Actually not. 2+2=4 actually does have basis in physical fact and is observable (verifiable, if you will). As numbers are symbols, "2" means ** and "4" means ****. We can verify, then, by using our number system that 2+2=4 is valid by adding ** to ** and seeing whether it equals **** (the representation for "4").

But Ben has upped that ante. He suggests that if I hold that morals are not facts because they are not grounded in the world of observable and testable things, then I have a problem: that very statement (that morals are not facts because not grounded in observable and testable things) is itself not grounded in the observable, testable world. Oh dear!

Of course, Ben's objection misunderstands the burden of proof. Just as he who claims that faeries do not exist does not bear the burden of proof (the affirmer of faeries does), my statement is something of a null hypothesis equivalent to a denial of faeries existence. Just as the faery denier is waiting for proof of so-called objective faeries, I am waiting for proof of so-called objective morals.

And, yes, there is reason to doubt such existence. While Ben is right to say that the fact of moral disagreement is not enough to make the case for moral subjectivism, it does not itself bode well for moral objectivism. Moral disagreement is not just existent, but quite pervasive and often intractable. When two people disagree over whether capitalism is wrong, for instance, they can argue facts (capitalism leads to x, socialism does not lead to x), but the argument often comes down to an impasse (I think x is wrong, and you don't), where one cannot think of any fact-based way to convince the other.

This is not very explainable under moral objectivism other than to say, as Ben does, that " people in general are stupid." This will not do, though, because he who makes that charges must be able to point to - POINT TO - what it is that the dummies are overlooking (and if that something is intuition, I am sure the dummies also have those, in which case, the accuser must argue as to why his is superior to theirs non-circularly).

Lastly, Ben wonders what my criteria for truth is. Unfortunately, this is an area of philosophy I have little patience for. What we mean by "true" appears to be a tautology: "truth" is "that which accurately describes how things are." How do we recognize truth? The only good answer to this I see is: by experiment. If I write out the directions to Sean's house, the best way to test this is to see if the directions actually get us there. If I say that x theory is true in science, the way to test that (unlike what ID creationists do) is to experiment the theory, and try and falsify the theory. If I say, "I love my Fiancee," the only - and imperfect - way to see if that is true is to observe me and see if my actions are consistent or inconsistent with that statement.

But how in the world do we verify "killing cats is wrong." We can verify "killing cats will cause them physical pain." We can verify "I have an aversion to seeing cats inflicted with physical pain." Those are all matters up to perfect or imperfect experiment. But what we cannot verify is the next step: "imposing physical pain is wrong." What does "wrong" refer to? We can't observe it. We can only intuit it (just as we intuit our own subjective emotions, or God talking to us.)

Ben is clearly not satisfied with the idea that to be called "truth" a thing has to be observable. He hints at logic being a falsifier of this claim. I think not. Logic is only so good as the results it leads to, and the only reason we call the law of non-contradiction true is because we test it both empirically and mentally. After all, logic is seen as a tool, and the only truth a tool has is that it does what it says it will do. When we use logic, it leads us to results that work as they say they will (as theories are tested by seeing if they work the way they say they will.)

And as for 2+2=4, it is the same. Its truth comes not from a heavenly mystical Platonic realm that humans cannot see (but can intuit) but from the fact that we can observe ** plus ** equalling ****. So, I am afraid, I hold to the horrible idea that "truth" gets its name from its ability to work in practice.

In the meantime, I'm going to keep on believing concepts that I believe exist in the world, albeit in a transcendental sense of course, such as mathematical truth, logical truth, and moral truth, just like I believe in the thoroughly objective nature of truth in general, along with the believe that they are - all of them - constituents of the world.

Many men intuit God and argue very fervently that He "exist[s] in the world, albeit in a transcendental sense," and that, despite his objective nature, we can't sense him with the five senses. We can only intuit him. Ben has made the case that ethics are like this. But is he persuaded by such religious arguments. (Hint: Ben is not a Christian because, despite God having all the properties Ben argues that morals have, he does not believe that there is evidence for God's existence.)

Hmmm....

The Intrinsic Pleasure of Nice Things

2009-03-29T09:47:00.000-07:00

Several weeks ago, while my fiancee went shopping for wedding accessories, I killed time in a Brookstone store. While browsing the items, I came across the clock pictured on the left. I did not buy it because I do not need an alarm clock. Even though I found it a positively eye-catching clock, I did not want to buy it solely for that reason. Such things would invariably make me feel guilty.

So, I am writing this essay in attempt to justify yesterday's purchase of the said clock. I liked its look, and even though I didn't need it, I bought it. Is there, I keep asking, anything wrong with that?

First, I must explain that I am not a frivolous spender. As a teacher, I make a modest amount and as such, don't waste money. Generally I don't buy it unless I need it. This clock is, you might say, an isolated incident. But enough delay; is there anything wrong with what I did?

Like many, I have unconsciously bought into the school of thought that sees buying "luxury" items as a shame, and a sense of shallowness and - pejorative ahead - consumerism. Some theorize that luxury buying is our attempt to gain power and order in our otherwise powerless and orderless lives. Others suggest that luxury consumerism stems from our increasing and insatiable desire to chase after a certain vision of a perfect life (that is, as the word "perfect" connotes, unattainable).

Such frivolity equates, in intellectual circles, to a lack of appreciation of "real" value in favor of ephemeral and fleeting value. As mentioned in a previous post, a television show I watched recently contained a philosopher whose name I don't remember affirming Plato's point that focus on sensual pleasure is surely to miss or ignore the "real" pleasures (like, of course, intellectual stimulants like philosophy). Philosophers, it seems, are Platonists rather than Epicureans.

Similarly, a book written a few years ago by another snooty intellectual, called "The Middle Mind", excoriates those who do such ghastly things as shop for luxury items (or at Wal-Mart) as "middle minds," - those less intellectually equipped than enlightened minds (that presumably buy only ugly things).

I have absorbed these ideas well; they are part of the generation I grew up with. (How many movies and tv shows were made in the nineties that mocked materialism and contained the underlying message that consumerism is the antithesis of a life well lived.) So here I am, feeling guilty about buying a clock I don't need simply because I like the design.

I have mulled over my motivations for buying the clock several times, and must say that I disagree with all of the above theorists. I bought the clock because I like the look of it, and wouldn't mind looking at it every morning. I did not buy it because of a desire to control my uncontrolled life. I did not buy it because I quest after perfection in life. I did not buy it because I am ignorant to non-tangible and more lasting pleasures (yes, I love philosophy as much as I did pre-clock). I bought it...because I like the look of it, and am naturally drawn towards things I like.

And, honestly, I can't see what is wrong with this. Of course, I would be able to spot the flaw if I were one to buy in excess and rely EXCLUSIVELY on aesthetically pleasing procurements to make me feel good. Were I frivolous in spending, the flaw would be a pragmatic one of spending more than I could afford. Were I nothing but a stuff-worshipper, one could question my psychological well being on good grounds (in the same way one would question a person obsessed with plastic surgery as their only source of self-esteem). But I am neither of these. Try as I might, I can't see why my desire for nice items is wrong if not done in excess.

Virginia Postrel, in fact, has written a very interesting book on the subject, called "The Substance of Style." And any reader thinking that I am making much ado about nothing would do well to read her book, as she demonstrates how prominent and present are current antipathies towards people's desire for nice things.

In this book, Postrel makes an interesting but very, very simple argument: that aesthetic value is a very legitimate value, and a thing's form is a legitimate part of its function. Why this is so remains a mystery, but that it is so seems almost undeniable. Our desire to look at nice things can be seen everywhere from the world of marketing to the very real and important value of "first impressions." (In an ultimate irony, even the anti-consumerist author of "the Middle Mind" has to rely on something other than an all-white book cover to sell his books. And I would even move to suggest that many anti-consumerism folks still base more of their purchases on physical appearance than they realize.)

Is such an eye for art endemic to our human nature - a part of our evolutionary past? Denis Dutton has written an interesting case for an affirmative answer in his book "The Art Instinct" Putting value on things' appearance is a huge part of our history, especially inexorable since the human species primarily relies on visual and auditory information to make judgments. Once we see that early humans that had the strongest connection between these two senses and their ability to make good, quick judgments had a survival advantage over those who couldn't, it is but a short leap to the idea that, as an evolutionary byproduct, we acquired a love for things that look and sound good. (This, of course, is just as true if "good" and "bad" turn out to be subjectively defined terms. It is still undeniable that we make judgments about how a thing looks and sounds.)

Embarrassingly enough, all of this is to say that I have no IDEA what made me love this absolutely unnecessary clock enough to buy it (rather than save the money). I know that I like the way it looks, and know that I like the idea of being able to see this nice looking clock every day. But that is the best I can do. To see this very natural reaction as mindless or shallow is as absurd as to see my desire to wear or smell cologne rather than body odor as equally shallow.

In my opinion, theorists who rail against the intrinsic pleasure of nice things are, in this sense, arguing against the way human beings are. They are also making a mistake very common amongst intellectuals - the judgment that since they like intellectualism so much that anyone who doesn't must be shallow, much in the same way some jazz musicians wrongly judge those who don't like jazz as shallow and unintellectual.

So, I guess the reason I bought the clock has to do with the very inexplicable (but somewhat less than sinister) drive to see nice things. My buying the clock did not, in all likelihood, have to do with an eschewal of "deeper" pleasures or a quest for controllability, but rather, a benign desire to see and keep seeing something that is attractive aesthetically. I hope the reader is not disappointed that I am ending this essay on a tautology (I am attracted to attractive things), but it is the best I can do. As much as some might hate to think it, I - and we all - are attracted to attractive things.

It's Like Dobzhansky Said: A review of Coyne's "Why Evolution Is True"

2009-03-29T08:26:00.000-07:00

I recently finished reading Jerry Coyne's book "Why Evolution is True." It is a book that lays out, very patiently, the various lines of evidence for the theory of evolution, in case some people missed it the first 100 times.

As a science educator (I co-teach two biology classes) it is frustrating that this book seems to need writing again and again. Right now, my classes are in the middle of the evolution unit, and it is meeting with a bit more resistance this year than last. I have had to answer several student objections about the idea that humans can trace their lineage back to sea-dwelling creatures (when I pointed out our vestigial webbing between our fingers.) I have also heard several disparaging comments from students about evolution (like the student who insisted that a theory is a story about something for which there is no real evidence; it was an interesting class discussion.) I have also been advised by a supervisor that I should not even touch the Scopes and Dover trialw, which I still think could serve as a strong motivator.

I wanted to read this book primarily to look for interesting ways and illustrations I can use to explain how, and how we know, evolution occurs in nature. Below is my review for this very reccomended book:
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Nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution. This is the main theme running through this book. What Coyne's book is not, is a directed rebuttal of ID creationism. What Coyne's book IS, is a very well- and clearly-written survey of the various evidences for evolution. Coyne's point is similar to Dobzansky's: all of this varied evidence can only be made sense of via the model of evolution. The fossil record, genetic evidence, etc, would simply be nonsensical under a theory like ID (unless the designer designed everything to look like it had evolved).

As a science teacher, I wish this were a book I could give both to my kids and to other science educators. Coyne gives very engaging and crystalline summaries of concepts like speciation, genetic drift, the significance of vestigial structures, and the falsifiability of evolutionary theory. For my fellow science educators, this book provides some great ideas on how to explain these and similar concepts, and also provides fascinating examples of evolution in action (I had no idea, for instance, that several sea-dwelling creatures have vestigial and all-but-functionless eyes!)

Two things that particularly struck me about this book: first, one of the most common ID objections is that we have never directly observed macroevolution/speciation in action. While Coyne incorrectly fails to correct this misimpression - any doubters, look it up - he deal well with his reply (which will still doubtless be disappointing to ID supporters). Coyne rightly notes that macroevolution takes place generally over many, many thousands of years, and that its glacial pace makes it appear as if it is not taking place. (Long and short: the best way to see the slow process of macroevolution at work is via the fossil record, and we have done that in spades.) The only reason I bring this up is that this is considered by IE supporters to be a very "live" and concerted objection, and Coyne's response, by contrast, is very, very subtle and indirect. This indirect response could be seen as a weakness by evolution's handful of critics.)

Secondly, Coyne goes through all of the lines of evidence for evolution in some detail EXCEPT the genetic evidence. As many have noted, one could ver well throw out all the fossil evidence and still have enough evidence, via genetics, of evolution. The chapters on paleontological, embryological, and zoological, and geographic evidences for evolution are very powerful. But I really missed, and hoped for, a good chapter on what many feel to be the strongest evidence for evolution: the genetic code. (Good books have been written entirely on this evidence, including Daniel J. Fairbanks's "Relics of Eden," and Sean Carroll's "Making of the Fittest." Both are highly reccomended.

Despite these points, this book is exactly what the lay-public needs. As statistics confirm that the general populace lacks good education and understanding of how evolution works (and why evolution is a sound theory), Jerry Coyne has written a patient, clear, and interesting book marshal ling the various evidences for evolution (and, by converse, against ID). As mentioned, Coyne's book is not devoted to direct confrontation with ID "theorists" like Behe and Demski. (See Miller's "Only a Theory" and Pennock's "Tower of Babel," just to mention two of hundreds.) Rather, Coyne does a great job arguing the positive case that, as Dobzhansky said, nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution. If only everyone would read this.

Doing All We Can to No Avail

2009-03-27T15:12:00.000-07:00

It is crunch time at _____ ________ high. The third quarter is almost over, and everyone (staff, that is) is feeling the squeeze. I forgot how much the end of the third quarter bothered me last year, but now it is all coming back.

Waht makes the third quarter's end so disheartening for me - a special educator - is that this is the time when students who have slacked for three quarters are in danger of officially failing for the year - recieving "E's" for three of four quarters. Of course, they have not offiially failed yet so the question I hear all day every day is: what can we do to make sure they pass?

This question would not bother me - does not bother me - when it is about a student who is trying hard but coming up short. I will help those students as much as possible. The problem is that the large majority of those who we are trying to avoid failure for the third quarter are those who have shown little to no effort. It is hard for me to get up the motivation to help students I truly feel do not deserve to pass, pass. It is one of the most heartbreaking parts of my job.

A colleague of mine was the first to fall victim. He has been asked to "assist" a general educator in a class where many of the seniors are in danger of failing (a class they need to graduate). While looking at the students' "numbers," my colleague noticed that almost all of these students have a 0-10% classwork grade, a 10-20% classwork grade, and very nonexistant test/quiz grades. Long and short, these students are not failing because they try and come up short; if it were that, they would have at least decent classwork and homework grades. Rather, they are failing because they do not take the class, or school, seriously. How would you feel if you were charged with helping kids who do not help themselves and "finding a way" to turn their E into a D? Probably exactly like my colleague feels.

I have a Study Skills class, where students can work and get help on assignments for other classes. Recently, two students have been placed into that class because they are in danger of failing certain classes they cannot afford to fail. Both were put in my class last week; I have yet to see them. They have been cutting class. Perhaps they do not want help? Perhaps they are not serious enough to think help warranted? Nonsense, says my supervisors! Find a way!

In all honesty, this is a main reason I suspect that many teachers quit. Those who were once optimists have their hopes dashed on a daily basis, and those who were pessimists become hardened pessimists. I am well aware of the saying, uttered by plenty of busy body mentors, that we need to "focus on the good ones," and "do only what we can." We "plant seeds," rather than grow trees. I cannot accept that. Does that mean I don't care enough or that I care too much?

At some point, we as a society have to accept the fact that others cannot be held responsible for one's own succses or failure. Yes, teachers CAN inspire unmotivated students to learn, but to make such "cans" a job requirement (we MUST inspire even the most uninspired) gets us away from teaching and makes us cheerleading babysitters who occasionally instruct. At some point, we need to accept the fact that those who do not do enough to pass will fail, and that the worst thing we can do for those students is to send the message that we will catch them when they fall. Sometimes, falling is the only way to let you know how important it is to walk.

Is "Meritocracy" a Dirty Word?

2009-03-23T14:07:00.000-07:00

I have a bold confession - one that is most certain to be "politically incorrect." No...I am not a racist, sexist, or homophobe. No... I am not a nazi or a fascist. But it will be hard to convince some people that I am not any of these things because of what I AM: a meritocrat. I believe very firmly in the idea of meritocracy - that deserts should be doled out by merit before any other criteria - and because of this, some will think that I must be racist, sexist, an a fascist.

Why do I make this bizarre and, to some, grizzly confession? Because I have recently been noticing the word "meritorcracy," floating around, and when I see it, it is always used pejoratively. When looking through education books on amazon.com, for instance, I see books like "The Big Test: The Secret History of American Meritocracy," which professes to show that "The current crises in American education have deep roots," in the elitist and racist idea of meritocracy.

Another pejorative referral to meritocracy can be seen here, in an online summary of an article by political scientist James Flynn,, who refers to meritocracy as a "materialist-elitist value," and whose article title juxtaposes meritocracy with "true justice."

Most surface level discussions of meritocracy do exactly what Flynn does: suggest that a meritocrat is an elitist. Of course, when the term "meritocracy" is defined, meritocrats, like myself, turn out to be quite different from elitists. Here are their definitions:

elitism: practice of or belief in rule by an elite.

meritocracy: leadership by able and talented persons.

When one confuses belief in meritocracy for belief in elitism - as often happens - one makes a categorical mistake. Belief in meritocracy could be seen as a kind of elitism, but there are many kinds of elitism that are not meritocracy. Meritocrats do not, for instannce, believe in the value of elites by birth order, financial privilege or any other criteria that is not directly related to ability at the relevant task(s). The connotation of elitism is that "elites" should be praised BECAUSE OF their "elite" status (by whatever criteria that is). For the meritocrat, the only relevant factor in one's praiseworthiness is one's ability - one's merit in performing the task being measured.

Why do I oppose forms of ranking not based on merit? Why not support that more egalitarian/equalitarian ideal of the day that desert be meted out based on need rather than ability or meted out equally to all regardless of ability?

There are several reasons I oppose this idea. First, I believe strongly in the idea that ranking by merit provides incentive to people to achieve more than they might if they were guaranteed a certain level of "reward" regardless of merit. On the flipside, nations/schools/business strucutres that do not work on the merit system (who promote based on time served rather than achievement) tend to emcourage employees to focus less on output and more on "putting in your time." (To see this in action, look at the relative lethargy of public school employees versus private school employees).

The second reason I oppose non-merit-based programs, like affirmative action and social promotion in schools, is that its attempts at fairness are not fair at all, for two reasons. First, when reward is not meted out by merit, but by other factors, then we are inadvertently saying that ability to do x is relevant to the reward one should recieve for x (that one's ability to get into law school is not related to one's ability to demonstrate legal ability). The second reason non-merit-based approaches are not fair is that they inadvertently tend to put people "in over their heads," by putting the non-law-school-ready applicant into law school without demanding a certain level of attainment (leaving them unequipped). Those who are "helped" in the short term often end up harmed in the long term by thrusting them into a situation requiring x level of mastery without being equipped with x level mastery.

The last reason I oppose non-merit-based ranking is purely pragmatic: even if there are defects in merit-based systems (there are), I cannot think of a more fair alternative. If one has to mete out deserts somehow, it seems best that they are meted out in proportion to ability and effort. As the old dictum says, "you get out what you put in." The alternative - the "null hypothesis," if you'd like - is: "what you put in is irrelvent to what you get out." To me, that is unnaceptable.

To illustrate, let's look non-merit-based hiring like affirmative action. It is often argued that purely merit based hiring ignores such factors as socio-economic and racial differences. It is probably true that those coming from middle- or upper-class backgrounds are more "hirable" to many than those from lower-class backgrounds, as they have been afforded more opportunity in education and life. Those who are in the lower-class probably had not the educational opportunities of those "above" them in socio-economic station. Thus, meritocracy isn't fair because it "stacks the deck" against those who are less well off.

I concede the point of meritocracy's critics that a pure meritocracy does not often exist. Decisions are often made based on decisions unrelated to merit (personal biases, family connections, etc.) But this DOES NOT mean that I concede the conclusion that meritocracy is, therefore, unethical or wrong. Meritocracy - even if it exists only imperfectly - may still be more moral than its alternatives.

And this is what I hold to be the case. Notions like affirmative action to access certain things by lower standards than others who must reach higher standards. Thus, black students can attend universities with a 3.0 GPA where other students might need a 3.25 or 3.5. And if we wanted to go further, we could simply apply a fully egalitarian impulse to college admittance, admitting students regardless of GPA or any other acadmic standard.

Are thes more fair than meritocracy simply becuase some admissions boards may make some decisions based on family attendance to the school ("You're father went to Yale, therefore...") or race (which I highly doubt in this day and age)? Not unless you assume that merit is irrelevant or a minor, rather than major, criteria for deciding how to mete out rewards. If merit is irrelevant - or not as relevant as some other standard - than what standard should we use in its place? Race (as the affirmative action supporters say.) Family lineage (as the elitists suggest)?

To me, it all comes down to the maxim quoted before: you get out what you put in. Instead of getting out what your skin color dictates, what your sex dictates, what you need (regardless of whether you put anything in), or what befits your family heritage, I propose a meritocracy. We get out what we put in. Nothing else makes much sense.

Why Do Philosophers Have Such an Antipathy Towards Consumption?

2009-03-22T06:51:00.000-07:00

On a recent episode of the television show, No Dogs or Philosophers Allowed, the topic under discussion was "the ethics of consumption." One guest, drawing much from Plato and Aristotle, brought up an interesting point: philosophers have largely "spoken with one voice" in their antipathy towards consumption of bodily pleasures.

While this statement's absolutism was challenged by another guest, the point is very correct. While philosophers differ in degree of antipathy, they have largely "spoken with one voice" in antipathy towards consumption. Even the most "happiness focused" philosophers, like JS Mill and Epicurus, were always insistent that true happiness is something untied to consumption and that consumption is something of a transient and crass, and lesser, version of happiness.

My problem with this idea - that happiness is something very unrelated to true happiness - is that it does not jibe with the way real people live. While a philosopher may be able to convince another philosopher that true happiness cannot be enhanced or affected by consuming nice things, I don't think that the philosopher would be able to convince P. Diddy, any member of "The Real Housewives of Orange County," or the myriad of real people who aspire to make more money so that their standard of living might improve of the idea that pursuit of nice things is a mirage of real happiness.

The question is: why are philosophers so unanimous in their antipathy towards consumption and acquisition of physical pleasures and their suggestion that real happiness comes from intellectual and "spiritual" pleasures such as good conversation, an active mind, and the like?

My first thought, as I watched the program (where one guest very explicitly suggested, and another agreed, to this dictum) is that perhaps, this is an example of philosophers projecting their predilections onto others. Philosophers, after all, are the happiest when undergoing intellectual pursuits and are not as concerned with the world of concretes. As such, it would make sense for them to beatify the "life of the mind" as the road to real happiness, and the "life of bodily pleasures" as a distracting detour. (I've always thought that this was why John Stuart Mill was so insistent that, in ranking pleasures, bookish pleasures of the type he valued were placed above all others; his mistake was to assume that the pleasures he found most desirable were THE most desirable.)

Another thought is that philosophers may devalue material wealth because, subconsciously, they are justifying the fact that they are generally forced to get along with less. Plato may have devalued material pleasures and extol intellectual pleasures because this was the way he was forced to live. It is quite possible to suppose that as philosophers don't tend to make as much as merchants (but FEEL much more important than merchants), their way of "justifying" this (to themselves and others) was to philosophically devalue materialism and extol intellectualism as the true ideal.

I am certainly not the first to suspect this idea. Philosopher Robert Nozick - one of the few to openly prise capitalism - wrote an essay offering answers to the question, "Why Do Intellectuals Oppose Capitalism?"

In the essay, he gave two main answers: (1) intellectuals often feel that they are slighted by capitalism, as they tend to make less, but feel they are worth more, than businesspeople; (2) intellectuals were the group generally told in school that they were "the best" and were often raised with a sense that they should be the prized group in society. (Therefore, any system that does not value them more than merchants is inherently unjust.)

Intellectuals now expect to be the most highly valued people in a society, those with the most prestige and power, those with the greatest rewards. Intellectuals feel entitled to this. But, by and large, a capitalist society does not honor its intellectuals.

The last possible reason I want to offer for why philosophers may devalue consumption more than most of the "real world," is that, as they deal in ideas and abstractions rather than concretes, there is a tendency to believe (implicitly if not explicitly) that ideas are more real, lasting, and pure than the "real" world of concretes. This can be seen by the scorn that has often been thrown towards the philosophy of pragmatism, which always attempted to put ideas in the service of practice, rather than the other way around. AS pragmatism cared more for what worked in practice rather than ideational soundness (efficacy over consistency or philosophical beauty), pragmatism has often been seen, pejoratively, as the philosophy of businessmen and "the bottom line."

This may explain why people who are not intellectuals or philosophers do not tend to take as crass an attitude towards material wealth than philosophers and intellectuals. To the former group, material pleasure is a very real thing and ideas do not have quite the status placed on them by philosophers (who employ them constantly). Most regular people are not as happy mulling over Proust and Wittgenstein as they are watching a Blu-Ray on a big HD TV. (Philosophers, of course, cannot relate to this. It doesn't hold true for them.)

I am not one to say that material pleasure has any 1:1 relationship with happiness, and have seen enough empirical studies suggesting that no such relationship exists to know better. But I simply think that this is an area where the rift between philosophy and the real world is very great indeed. It is also an area where philosophers so easily fall into the mistake of WRONGLY assuming that what it is like to be them is what it is like to be everyone else. (Of course material consumption is inferior to intellectual consumption! Who would suggest otherwise?!)

Until philosophers can prove to non-philosophers (the decided majority) the intrinsic value of not pursuing nice things and good sensual experiences (and rather living the life of an intellectually satisfied ascetic) - which I don't think can be done with a straight face - then I will regard it as a shame to hear that philosophers "speak with one voice" on the undesirability of consumption. Unfortunately, that "one voice" will be one only heard by philosophers.

How Can Smart People Do Dumb Things? (Dysrationalia?)

2009-03-18T15:01:00.000-07:00

Below is a review I recently wrote about a book called "What Intelligence Tests Miss." The author's argument is that while IQ is a valid concept, basing estimations of intelligence on it alone overlooks an equally valid concept of rationality. As we all know, "book smarts" and "street smarts" do not seem positvely correlated (one can have a high amount of one with a low amount of the other.)

As an educator, it is frustrating because I often feel (a) that the idea of IQ is unjustly inflated and does not give the whole story; and (b) alternatives like Gardner's "multiple intelligence theory" are more politically and socially good-sounding than they are scientifically valid.

Stanovich, I think, offers an interesting "middle view." I would love to see his ideas fleshed out a little more.

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We are all familiar with the phenomenon of those who have high IQ's doing things that seem stupid. This leads to the distinction between "book smarts" and "street smarts," but strangely enough, we call BOTH of these things intelligence. We recognize both the absent-minded professor and the low IQed entrepreneur as "intelligent." How, though, can the term "intelligence" apply to two seemingly non-correlated things (being book-smart and street-smart)?

Psychologist Keith Stanovich has an interesting idea: maybe "intelligence tests" measure intelligence (as traditionally defined) but not a wholly different faculty of rationality. To Stanovich, the difference between intelligence and rationality is the difference between the "algorithmic mind" and the "reflective mind," or, the difference between the ability to employ algorithms and the ability to think about and CRITICALLY employ algorithms. (I might say that intelligence may be the ability to map or write a sentence and rationality is the ability to formulate arguments and write a persuasive essay.)

The first half of Stanovich's book is dedicated to showing that while IQ tests are a valid measure of a faculty of general intelligence (he does not deny that IQ tests measure a very real thing), it simply does not measure all that we understand to be good thinking.

Stanovich, though, is also a critic of those like Gardner and Sternberg who want to add to the number of "intelligences" (musical intelligence, naturalistic intelligence, creative intelligence). These things, he says, inadvertently beatify the term "intelligence" to be a be-all-end-all that it is not (by implying that any good mental work must be called an "intelligence" rather than a "talent," "skill" or "proclivity.") Instead, Stanovich makes the point that intelligence is simply one component of good thinking. The other, often overlooked, ingredient is rationality (and he alludes to several studies which show these two faculties are not very positively correlated. One can have high amounts of one and low amounts of the other.)

What I thought and hoped Stanovich would do next - what he did not do - is offer a sense of how we can test for RQ (rationality quotient). While the first half makes the case very well that rationality should be valued and tested every bit as much as intelligence, he does not follow it up by showing how such a thing might be done.

Instead, Stanovich devotes the second half of this book largely to cataloguing and demonstrating "thinking errors" that distinguish rational from irrational thought. For example, humans are "cognitive misers" by nature, who like to make decisions based often on first judgments and quick (rather than thorough) analysis (a likely evolutionary strategy, as ancestors that were quick and somewhat accurate probably did better than those who were slow and very accurate). Also, humans often put more emphasis on verification than falsification, and fail to consider alternative hypotheses in problems, preferring often to go with the most obvious answer.

All of these, while interesting, have been better and more thoroughly documented in other books by decision theorists and psychologists. All Stanovich needed to do was refer us to these, at most, devoting a chapter or two to examples. There is more important work for Stanovich to do then rehash what we can just as soon read elsewhere. Instead, I think he sh old have begun outlining ideas on how to test for rationality. What would such tests look like? How would such tests affect our educational system (focused, as it is, on IQ)? What would test questions even look like and how can they be adjusted for by age/grade level? Are there pitfalls?

None of these questions were answered, and Stanovich's argument is the worse for it. Stanovich himself notes that one big reason for IQ's predominance in the psychometric world is that it is measurable (which is a big strike against many of Gardner's "multiple intelligences"). Ironically, Stanovich's failure to suggest ways to measure RQ will likely have the same effect for his idea as it had for Gardner's.

It is a shame, though. As an educator concerned both with the undeserved predominance of IQ and also the failure of concepts such as Gardner's "multiple intelligence" to offer a serious challenge, I quite like Stanovich's germinal idea. As we all know that rationality is a key component to good thinking, and it is hard to think that it is positively correlated to IQ, it would be interesting to find a way to measure RQ as a valid supplement to IQ. It is simply too bad this book did not explore the practical questions involved with his tantalizing suggestion.

Does "Socially Constructed" Equal "Bad"?

2009-03-15T14:18:00.000-07:00

Like so many other good ideas that went too far, our insatiable urge to "deconstruct" things began in the 1960's. With the help of postmodernist philosophy, The Western World began its infatuation with pointing out social constructions and deconstructing them - allegedly to show the truth behind the fictions.

But we seldom take the time to ask ourselves a simple but necessary questions: Just because it is socially constructed, does that mean it is wrong or bad? All it means for something to be socially constructed - as the label suggests - is that a thing is artificially constructed by individuals rather than naturally existing. While baseballs, bats, and gloves exist, the rules of baseball are socially constructed. While dinner plates and teacups exist, the etiquette of the tea party are socially constructed. Does that mean that the fomer "really" existing things are any more beneficial than the latter? Does the fact that the rules of baseball and tea parties are socially constructed mean automatically that they are arbitrary? (Unfortunately, postmodernism taught us not only how to spot social constructions, but to automatically associate them with arbitrariness.)

Consider the following quote from an interview in the book Generation Me:

"My generation is much more independent. I pride myself on being a free and independent thinker. My wish is to break down the walls that humans have socially constructed." (Generation Me, Kindle edition, loc. 457)

That which is socially constructed is synonymous with a wall that needs to be "broken down," while that which is not socially constructed - in this case, that which is individually constructed, is to be worn like a badge connoting "free[dom] and independence."

Just as one can argue that blind acceptance of social constructions is a symptom of not thinking, so, I think, is the above reaction that "social constructions" should be avoided. The question that both sides should be asking is whether the social construction has merit - whether it exists for a good reason or whether it is, in fact, arbitrary.

Many socially constructed rules I can think of are not only completely non-arbitrary, but exist for a definite and good purpose. One example that always comes up is (what used to be) the etiquette of walking in crowds. Like rules of traffic, people used to adhere to the rule that one walks on the right. This rule, while socially constructed, serves (actually, served) a definite purpose of reducing the amount of bumping and careening that would occur when walking in public. (Nothing maddens me more than walking in a mall where no one follows this rule, and as a result, one must watch in front of them every second to avoid careening into other walkers.)

The use of money (and especially credit), the idea of tipping wait staff, and the courtesy of sending thank you notes to those who do something nice for you are all social constructions. But I don't see how anyone could argue that these things are arbitrary.

To me, the measure of whether to follow a social construction or not is to evaluate whether the rule is one that, if followed by everyone, does some good and, if ignored by everyone, would make things less good. (Certainly this is why the rule of walking on the right side is worthy of being followed, because when no one follows it, walking in crowds becomes more haphazard.)

Inevitably, someone reading this will wonder if its author is a conservative prig that bemoans the good old days when we followed rules for the sake of following rules. I assure this reader that I am nothing of the kind, but only one who believes that there is something to be said for rules when those rules can be shown (by the above method) to be well-advised and practical.

In fact, my fiancee and I are getting married in about six weeks and have decided to dispense with many of the arbitrary but oft-followed socially constructed rules. Here are a few rules that we have decided not to follow (much to the dismay of the more conservative ones in our families):

(a) we are going to hyphenate both of our names. (We will both be "Currie-Knight." We decided that doing it any other way does an injustice to the 50/50 nature of our fusing of identities.

(b) my parents are paying for the wedding (her parents have opted to give us a down-payment on a future house)

(c) I will not be wearing a tuxedo, but a very nice suit

(d) We are not going on a honeymoon (as getting the time off of work is tedious, and we have already taken big vacations together. We'd rather use the money towards something more useful.)

All of the rules that are broken above (taking the man's last name, the bride's parents paying for the wedding, wearing a tuxedo, honeymoon) are examples of social constructions that have no utility and are etiquette for the sake of etiquette. These are the types of social constructions that I think many have in mind when they express disdain for social constructions. Traffic laws, an economy built on credit, and the US Constitution are examples of social constructions that nobody seriously argues are arbitrary.)

So, why do we have so much disdain for anything smacking of "social construction"? Like so many other good ideas, I think the idea of nonconformity and skepticism of tradition is an idea that was just pushed too far. It is certainly good to be independent, but being so to the point of abandoning the mores of the job interview can be positively deleterious. It is okay to question authority, but to do so to the point of developing a knee-jerk reaction to anything that smack's of instruction or the imparting of wisdom can bite one in the ass. It is okay to rebel against rules of etiquette when such rules can be smacked down as arbitrary, but we must be mindful that many socially constructed things were socially constructed for a reason: they serve a valid social purpose of creating order.

So next time you get bumped into while strolling the aisles of the mall, ask yourself: are all social constructions arbitrary and wrong and arbitrary?

The Impossibility of Objective Morality

2009-03-12T16:57:00.000-07:00

Every once in a while, I force myself to take seriously the idea that morality, and moral disputes, are a matter of objective fact. I confess that I have never been able to find a good argument for this viewpoint, and while I know that many have been convinced by it, I confess my blindness for how.

The most convincing argument for me against the possibility that morality is about objective fact is the idea that the only "thing" we have to measure the "correctness" of moral statements by is our moral sentiments. Further, there is simply no good reason to suspect, and every reason to reject, that these are objective in nature. In other words, we have no objective moral blueprint to hold up to our moraal judgments to help us know whether they are correct. We only have our individual sentiments on the matter, which seem far from being objective.

To put the matter concretely, when two or more people disagree on a scientific proposition or conjecture, experiments can be performed (and it is quite hard to deny that the world these experiments are performed in is not objective). Competing theories will stand or fall based on their results in experiment against an objective world, results that are independent of anyone's wishes or desires.

Contrast that with disagreement over moral matters. When two people disagree on moral matters - one says x is right and the other, that x is wrong - there is nothing resemblinng the objective world - a world of moral fact- that we can hold the competing judgments up to. IN order to know whether x is REALLY right or wrong, we would have to have access to the world of moral facts, so that we can find out which proclamation that world endorses. So far as we can tell, there is no such world of moral facts (and when people say there is, they are generally getting there by intution, begging the question of how objective those intutions really are.)

Some diagree with this; they suggest that there IS a factual resolution to moral disputes. When I say x is wrong and you say x is right, some say that we can experiment. Per Hume's is/ought dichotomy, it is a different thing to say, "x causes suffering," than it is to say, "x is wrong." That x may cause suffering is an observable fact. That x is wrong expresses more than that x causes suffering, but goes further by inserting a value judgment that suffering is wrong. As good as that may sound, there is no objective way to prove the latter as there is the former. This is precisely because "x causes suffering," can be validated solely by appealing to the objective world of descriptive fact. That x is wrong is unprovable because it goes beyond the brute world of descriptive fact.

I confess that I cannot see how to get around this. The arguments I've heard seem to mistake the speaker's strong intuitional moral sense for an objective world of moral facts. And to me, there seems no good reason to suppose that these intuitions are anything more than psychological preferences (that we mistake solely becuase they are so strong that they SEEM to be obvious to everyone).

I have tried and tried to "get into the belief" and understand how one can believe in an objective morality, but there seem too many problems to make such a belief worthwhile. How can moral disagreements be resolved similarly to the objective resolutions in science? Where are the incontestible proofs of some moral propositions over others? How can "is" (recognition of fact) lead inexoribly to "ought (a prescriptive obligation)?

The Possibility of Overdoing It: The Case Against Too Much Inclusion

2009-03-12T03:40:00.001-07:00

One of the arguments made against the rehabilitative effect of prisons is that prison teachers criminals to be better criminals by putting them into a situation where they can freely network and disseminate ideas. Long and short: it is often argued that prisons don't rehabilitate because they get criminals used to being around high concentrations of criminals.

The same can sometimes - certainly not always - be said of special education. When one puts a student with behavior or social problems in either a self-contained class of nothing but special education students, or an inclusion class with many special education students, often, that child will become worse because he now has others to play off of.

In particular, my high school has a "social skills" class. At first, we all thought this was a great idea, but now, it has become jokingly referred to as the "antisocial skills class." Two of the students on my case-load (who I think are decent kids around the right people) have become worse because they have begun hanging out with some of the worse kids in the class, and have developed those kids' attitudes. One, who I was helping to quit smoking, has now been overheard about smoking cigarettes and weed after school.

Another example is a student on my caseload who is very smart but has social problems interacting with peers. This student is quite mature when dealing with "good" students and quickly changes into an "in your face" student when dealing with "bad" kids. In Spanish, the student does fine (and even avoids conflict), but in "special ed classes" like Social Skills (or a Government class with many other students with learning and other disabilities), this student becomes much more difficult and obnoxious, even instigating verbal altercations.

The problem is that, as much as we special educators try and deny or excuse it away, "inclusion" classes - classes with higher numbers of special education students - are generally the classes with the highest proportion of behavior problems, underachievement, and distraction. It seems to make less and less to put learning disabled students in classes where less learning occurs - "inclusion" classes. And there seems to be no wisdom at all in putting an ADHD student in the class with the most non-academic distraction.

So, the dilemma is that while we all want to see heterogeneous groupings of students, we all know that higher percentages of special ed students in a particular class means the less productive that class is likely to be. And while we want to "spread the special education students" out so that we can avoid high concentrations in relatively few classes, that would bring up a "manpower" problem because special educators cannot float around to too many classes (which is why putting all the special education students in relatively few classes makes more "manpower" sense).

I suppose the situation of whether to put learning disabled students in a "regular" or "inclusion" class should be made on an individual basis. The question I have begun asking myself is whether x student would benefit more from the individualization and assistance that an "inclusion" class (usually with a general and special educator) could provide is outweighed by the student's need for a distraction-reduced and more focused environment that could be provided in the "regular" class.

As a result, I have placed more than a few students in "regular" classes that, for all intents and purposes, should have been in inclusion classes simply because I feared that the student would be undercut by the inclusion environment. If the goal of special education at the high school level is to make students more independent, I think that, done cautiously, will be a good decision.

An Interesting Look Back

2009-03-10T16:01:00.000-07:00

It has been quite a journey, but it has recently paid off. It is officlal that I am going to University of Delaware next year to start on my PhD study in Education. It is also official that I will be fully funded by the University.

All of this moved me to look at my University of Delaware application, its "essay questions" and my responses. I am going to print here the most interesting of the question/answers, which gets me into what I have long realized is a strange background.

Are there special circumstances related to your academic record that you feel we should know about? Have you ever been convicted of a crime? If the answer is yes, explain the circumstances, give the dates of the offense(s) and discuss what you learned from the circumstance.

While I have never been convicted of a crime, I can say that, at one time, graduating high school was far from a certainty. I remember well the meeting in Liberty High School’s guidance office where I was informed that, without serious concerted effort, I would be repeating the 11th grade. At the time, I was certainly not academically motivated and even toyed with dropping out of school.
Unfortunately, this apathetic attitude towards academics followed me through my undergraduate education, and this is why I find myself needing to apologize for my lackluster undergraduate GPA, and for my “extended stay” in undergraduate study.
I did graduate high school for two reasons: my parents’ desire to see me do so, and my thoughts of attending the esteemed Berklee College of Music, where could do what I loved: to play the drums and write songs. I made it into Berklee on academic probation and while I did well in most of my music classes, I merely tolerated the academic classes as a dry matter of course. I cared so little for academics that when the registrar’s office informed me in my fourth year that I would finish three (academic) credits shy of my degree, I decided that I would move on to Nashville anyhow. Songwriters don’t need degrees, and publishers don’t ask for academic resumes.

It took a full year of living as a struggling songwriter in Nasvhille for me to realize not only that everyone around me knew more than me, but also that this fact really bothered me. I began reading more, in attempt gain on my own the education that I should have already gotten. Once I started, I just kept going, reading in philosophy, science, literature, etc. I decided to get the remaining three credits to complete my Bachelors degree at a local community college so that I might try for a Masters. Much to my surprise, I gained admissions to the very selective University of Richmond and – as the saying goes – never looked back. The once academic-loathing kid, somehow became the student who could never read enough.

Explaining my academic history is uncomfortable for a few reasons. First, it forces me to be acutely aware of early shortcomings, if not outright failures. Second, it makes me wish that I had the type of standard academic history that does not take four paragraphs to explain or apologize for. Behind all that, though, I must admit that I am strangely proud of my non-traditional history: that I was the prime mover of my education, rather than a University. This is how it has been ever since. While I have attained one Masters degree (and am set to attain a second), it is fair to say that I do much more independent reading than my courses require, and have an enjoyment for learning that a more traditional academic history may not have instilled in me. It is this enjoyment for learning that I want to bring to PhD study and a career in academia.
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In many ways, I see myself in some of my students: unmotivated but possibly in posession of latent skills or motivations that might manifest later. This is why it is so frustrating to teach in the public schools. I think my experience has taught me, more than anything, that one cannot motivate the unwilling. The reason I got through high school was because my parents forced me. No high school teacher ever got me to love learning. That only happened when I began learning on my own.

So, in many ways, I see my role as a public school educator as helping kids get through with enough skill, discipline, and wherewithall to ensure that no opportunities are unduly closed to them. I would like to motivate, but I harbor no delusions that most students would recieve it. I wouldn't have.

As Mortimer Adler said, the best schooling prepares one for future education. K-12, he says, is not education, but schooling. Living is the "education" part.

Capitalism and Temperance

2009-03-10T13:07:00.000-07:00

Who is rich? He that rejoices in his Portion.

He that drinks fast, pays slow.

What is prudence in the conduct of every private family can scarce be folly in
that of a great kingdom

These quotes may seem as if written by the great virtue ethicists like Aristotle and Plato. In reality these three quotes, which beautifully illustrate the need for modesty, temperance, and prudence were written by two of the greatest champions of capitalism: the first two are from Benjamin Franklin, and the third is from Adam Smith.

In recent discussions, the words "greed" and "capitalism" often get confused, and the former is seen to be the inevitable outcome of the latter. I can understand this connection; it seems quite obvious that as capitalism depends on the profit motive, great progress can only be achieved by great profit motive, which means "greed."

Truthfully, greed often is a big part of capitalism. The most successful entrepreneurs and businesses are those ambitious enough to desire domination of their market. Wal-mart, Southwes Airlines, Microsoft and other "high flyers" can only get there by, in some sense, being greedy - by wanting to control their markets and make as much profit as possible.

But capitalism also rewards the temperate and prudent. As Adam Smith (3rd quote) rightly notes, prudence can "scarce be folly." While risk-takers are generally greedy (which is why they are willing to take risks), capitalism more frequently rewards those who spend within their means, grow steadily over time rather than meteorically, and have realistic ambitions.

Companies which acquire huge debt, grow too fast, or try and do too much often end up losing out just as fast as they rose (if they rise at all). Companies that focus on one or a few good products, look before they leap, and do not acquire substantial debt are often the "slow but steady" companies in the market.

As with producres, so with consumers. Those who are spendthrifts, live beyond there means, and do not overextend their finances are the ones who generally go unpenalized. Those who take too many chances, buy excessively on credit, and don't limit their expenditures to their revenue, tend not to last long. The natural consequences of capitalism for this behavior are that sooner or later, their "luck," and finances, will run out.

So, far from encouraging greed, capitalism seems more to encourage temperance and prudence. While some of the more exuberant are rewarded from time to time, any good money manager will tell you that you cannot go wrong with prudence. Rather than encouraging great spending, capitalism punishes big spenders the most and moderate to small spenders the least. And a great benefit of capitalism is that it is a system - the only system - which allows one to choose for themselves what they want to be: a glutton or a spendthrift, a big shot with a stressful and high-paying career, or a "small guy" who has a less stressful pace for a lower pay, complexity or simplicity.

As I have mentioned, my fear is that the new Obama bail-out plan will immunize those who need to learn this lesson (provided by the natural consequences of capitalism) form learning it. Overspending and overextending can only lead to trouble; moderacy and prudence seldom get penalized. What Obama is doing is ensuring the opposite: those who have been prudent will be forced to pay for those who have been extravagant.

This is not the lesson of capitalism. And I like capitalism more than Obama.

Greed, Not Capitalism!

2009-03-09T12:16:00.000-07:00

What was it that got us into this recession, anyhow? Is it the banks' fault? Is it the consumers fault? Is it the government's fault?

Yes, yes, and yes!

What got us into this recession is greed - not capitalism. We cannot blame 'the market' for the recession, as markets do not act on their own. People act within rules of the market. Thus, people - bankers, consumers, creditors, debtors - not the market, got us into the predicament we are in. People bought houses they could not afford; banks promised loans they could not support to people that should not have gotten loans; people bought too many things on credit and let their finances get out of control; banks let them do this.

Greed! Not capitalism! These two things can go toghether, but are not by any means synonyms.

Captalism functions on the principle of a profit motive, and that may lead some to think that capitalism bases itself on greed. But one can have profit as their motive without overextending themselves, just as consumers may be motivated by money and material pleasures while keeping these desires in check. The problem is NOT that banks and consumers were motivated by material gain, but that they let this cloud their judgment; they ceased thinking about the long tern (can I afford to make this loan or buy this Hummer?) and did without thinking.

Greed!

My hope is that the era of frivolous spending is over. (That is a quote from our frivolously spending president for which I no longer have the link.) What many - including Obama - don't realize is that recessions are the economy's natural way of making us take stock. When spending gets out of control and people are spending more than the economy can monetarily support, recessions slam on the breaks by penalizing irresponsibility; loans must be defaulted on, business gets slower, jobs get cut, and prices and spending go back to a nice even keel.

What worries me, though, is that our very spend-hungry president is working to ensure that the good times artificially keep rolling! He is working to make sure that loans get forgiven or bailed out, jobs get artificially reproduced, and the irresponsible are saved from consequences of irresponsibility.

This will not fix the problem (as any economist worth anything will tell you), but it just postpones the inevitable. If a recession would naturally occur because we are spending out of control, the best way to curb it is make it so that spending cannot remain out of control. Our president and congress, though, are redistributing wealth precisely so that it CAN remain out of control. instead of making it so that those who have no business buying a four bedroom house can no longer pay their mortgage, the president will just make everyone pay four the four bedroom house. Instead of making sure that those who bought too much on credit must go into bakruptcy, he will make sure that we all pay for her things. Instead of ensuring that mismanaged banks be eliminated by forcing them to close under economic pressure, we are all going to pay for them to misrun their businesses.

My fear is that we will not have learned our hard-won lesson about greed's ability to tank an economy. My fear is that our leaders will protect the guilty (banks, greedy consumers) by punishing the innocent (those who don't need bailouts will pay for those who do.) My fear is that, in the process, all of this recession business will be for naught, as no one will have learned anything at all.

Interestting, if only in theory (Review of Adler's "Paideia Proposal")

2009-03-08T16:02:00.000-07:00

Here is a book review I wrote for philosopher Mortimer Adler's "Paideia Proposal," - a conservative work arguing for education reform. Adler is somewhat of a critic of "progressive educaiton" and advocates for a more "liberal arts" type of k-12 educaiton. For those unfamilar, Adler was also a vocal advocate of educating with the "great books" of the Western canon.

I agree with some of Adler's ideas about restoring rigor and discipline into educaiton, but I disagree with his very monolithic "one size fits all" approach, as well as his view that k-12 education should not utilize electives or vocational training. Even though I dislike many excesses of "progressive education," I see much value in a utlitarian approach to education that sees education for what W. James might call its "cash value" to students, rather than as an end in itself (which it can be to many, but will not likely be to all). In other words, Adler treats all students as if they are "bookish," managing to suggest that those who are not simply need to be molded to be so.

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Mortimer Adler's "Paideia Proposal," ("paideia" means "education" in Greek) is a book which intends to offer a stern antidote to many "progressive" ideas in education. One might call Adler an educational conservative - an "essentialist" who believes that education is of value in itself (and should not be justified by its utilitarian value). Adler also believes in the value of a liberal arts education for all, the role of order and discipline in education, and the value of cultivating the intellect as the primary goal of k-12 education.

Adler's Paideia proposal "breaks" education into three types which students should receive in equal measure:

(a) knowledge acquisition: this is where direct teacher/student instruction goes on, and where the student learns to store and recall facts.

(b) developing of intellectual skill: this is where the student "learns by doing," and practices the skill under the teacher's facilitation.

(c) increase in understanding and insight: this is where students learn to evaluate, analyze, synthesize, and create ideas from ideas. Students engage in teacher-led discussion and reflections while learning "higher order thinking" skills.

I agree with these goals, but disagree much with Adler's approach. A key criticism I have of Adler's writing is that, like many philosophers of education, he speaks of students as they exist in theory rather than in practice, and tends to see them as a big monolithic group (while he says he doesn't).

Put differently and bluntly, if I had a child, I might be tempted to send it to a Paidiea school, but would be hesitant to suggest that every child should be forced into this model.

What makes the Paideia project unworkable in practice is Adler's insistence that "one size" of education "fits all." Alder does not believe in tracking of any kind, dismissing it as very undemocratic (by which he really means unegalitarian). He writes as if things like differences in intelligence (by the measure of IQ) do not exist. He repeats frequently the idea that "all children are educable," but turns it cleverly into "all children are capable of learning and absorbing the same stuff as all others." (He does bring this up as a possible criticism but dismisses the problem with high-sounding rhetoric, intimating that naysayers simply don't believe in equality.)

As a special educator, I think this idea of a "one size fits all" education is a pleasant sounding disaster. As one of my colleagues put it, "It is not a God-given right to comprehend Algebra II," by which he means that some simply learn slower, and are more limited than others. (I think Alder would realize his mistake when he put a child with Downs Syndrome, mental retardation, or autism into his Paidiea school.) Alder's point that we should challenge all students is well taken, but he doesn't seem to take seriously the FACT that students differ not only in "learning style" but in innate ability. To subject each child - regardless of ability - to the same curriculum is as unfair as hasty and strict tracking.

The other disaster in Adler's proposal is the idea that all K-12 education should be non-specialized and non-vocational. Under Adler's proposal, electives are essentially abolished and, as he says, we should "eliminate all the non-essentials from the school day." If it doesn't have to do with cultivating the intellect, we don't want it.

This would not only make school a positively dreary place for kids to be (eliminating any classes that might appeal to those not budding philosophers) but it would also lead the non-college-bound out in the cold. Alder suggests several times that all vocational training should take place post-high-school, meaning that school would no longer prepare students for a vocation at all, and those who can't afford to put off work after high school to receive additional training would be ill-prepared to start a career.

Like many schemes philosophers make about how to reform education, the Paidiea Proposal would make for some very interesting private schools. Like the Montessori method, this system might work for some or even half, but certainly not for all. Many students - those who might go into blue collar vocations - would likely do poorly in Paidiea schools. Adler might suggest that I am being pessimistic and "undemocratic," but I would charge him with utopianism and...being a theoretician rather than a statistician.

As long as differences in ability exist (and the fact is unfortunate), the Paidiea proposal, by expecting different abilities to access the same curricula, runs the risk of being as unfair as those he charges with excessive differentiation.

Teaching Them to Be Students

2009-03-06T15:08:00.000-08:00

Music teachers are not often philosophers. Yet, at a staff meeting yesterday, where the faculty talked about a new curriculum for "freshman seminar," a high school course required of freshman to teach them basic academic skills, a music teacher responded to a question posed to us: What do you think all freshman should be taught?" Her reply got to the core of what was on many of our minds: "we need to teach them how to be students before we can TEACH them anything." She commented that before she can teach a student how to play the oboe, they must be taught how to learn, take and use guidance, attempt success, and not give up if they stumble. These are things that, sadly, many students do not come to high school knowing.

This is an often neglected and integral piece of the educative process: in order that students can learn, they must learn to be students first. In an age where we tell students many grand stories extolling the virtues of challenging authority - from the American founders to Galileo - we neglect to teach them the value of authority and the wisdom to know how and when to accept it.

We live, quite justly, in a classless system, where anyone from anywhere has the civic freedom to move up or down in the world based on their own efforts and a pinch of luck. Because of this, I think, we are inherently distrustful of words like 'authority,' 'wisdom,' and to the ideas that come with them. To accept instruction from those who know better than we hints at the idea that some are "better" than others and that the learner must bow to the teacher.

But just like skepticism in matters of science, while sometimes good, can be taken to the extreme, so can the idea that authority should be rebelled against. In order to learn, students must at some point accept the fact that they do not know all they need to know and must become willing (even grudgingly) to receive information from those in a position of authority.

This is what I think the music teacher means by saying that students must learn to be students before they learn anything. We must teach them the wisdom to know when to challenge authority and when to accept that authority may have something to teach them. They must learn when to have an ego and when to pack it away for the sake of their betterment. They must learn that while "doing their own thing" can be good, they must also do things that are not of their own design or choosing, but are things that BOTH things can benefit them. (One without the other becomes detrimental to well-being.)

These are some of the things students are not coming to us with. Sometimes, it is as if they come to us convinced that they inhabit a universe of one. We, as teachers, must take as our first mission to widen their universe.

Liking Children versus Liking to Teach Children

2009-03-05T14:45:00.000-08:00

There is a big difference between liking to teach children and liking children. Many, I think, get into teaching because they posess a like for children rather than a like for teaching children.

I started thinking about this when reflecting on what it is I dislike so much about teaching where I do. After all, I really do like to teach children. I got into teaching as a profession after taking a long-term substitute job at a high school where I worked in the 'resource room,' (where kids go when they need extra assistance with work, or accomodations for their disability). I vividly recall "connecting" with several students - particularly one I suspect was an undiagnosed autistic girl. I spent many hours teaching her physics, and got quite a few compliments on being able to get through to her when most teachers couldn't. I knew then that I wanted to try special education.

So, that I like teaching children is not in dispute. But I have been coming to the realization that, as much as it hurts me to admit it, I don't have the innate love for kids that many teachers do. If my job involved no possibility of teaching, for example, I would find being around kids for 6.5 hours per day too daunting to bear. It is not the kids that get me through, but the teaching of them.

And what makes matters difficult is that, where I teach, teaching is very frustrating and comprises only a small percentage of what "teachers" do. Teachers first have to motivate, then control behavior, and then, get a little teaching done. Kids actively resist us at every turn and are quite fond of defying our attempts to instil things into their brains.

This is why I think teaching where I do is so hard for me, and perhaps, not (as) hard for many others. Many of the teachers really love the kids, and don't mind as much that the kids aren't learning nearly what they should, just as long as they get to interact with them. But for me, who likes teaching kids more than being with kids, it is a source of endless frustration and dejection that the "teaching kids" part is such a small role, while the "handling kids" part takes most of the time.

If you haven't been able to tell by now by my blog entries, I am not a coddler. I do not feel bad when I don't appease kids. I don't have much trouble with trading pain for gain. I suspect, though, that a lot of teachers who like kids more than teaching kids are the opposite: their desire is to encourage over instruct, and enable rather than equip. This has been my particular experience with those who go into elementary education; they are teachers more because they like kids than any drive to teach. Students become "little guys," which is a sign, to me, of an overly motherly approach that sacrifices rigor and high-expectations for happiness and high self-esteem.

I cannot be that way. Alas, I am going on to study for my PhD, where I might teach college students - where classroom management is not the ultimate concern, and where teachers are not expected to baby, but to teach, and students are expected to exercise some independence.

I think I am making the right choice.

Which Counts More: Motivation or Intent?

2009-03-03T14:41:00.000-08:00

There is a longstanding strain in law and public morality which tells us that bad acts may be excused if it can be shown that no malicious or wicked intent accompanied them. In law, killers are judged 'not guilty' because the killer suffered from a mental defect. In public morality, we often view a drug addicts crime in a different light when we find out that her actions were "caused by" drug addiction, rather than malice.

Well, here is the latest example of (what I see as) this egregious tendency. A man in Canada has recently been arrested for "beheading and cannibalizing a passenger on a Greyhound bus." According to the article:

Li's lawyers are not disputing that he killed McLean, but they will argue Li was mentally ill and not criminally responsible. A psychiatrist told the court Li is schizophrenic and believed God told him to do it.

I understand the dilemma of putting a man away in prison for an act which may have been "caused by" a mental defect. But prison isn't just about punishment either. One of the reasons I have never warmed to the "insanity defense," is because it misses the point that one key reason to put someone in prison is to keep others safe from that person. It makes absolutely no sense to argue that a person whose psychiatric disorder (an unpredictable one at that) caused him to behead and cannibalize someone is the type of person who should avoid imprisonment. That person is, to me, the very definition of a person who SHOULD be in prison - if only to guard against future beheadings that God might tell him to comit.

Why do we have such a hard time with this idea that a man afflicted with a mental disorder should be allowed to argue that he is not guilty of a crime he is in fact guilty of? Because current thought puts more weight on intent and motivation than action. We are less likely today than we were thirty years ago to feel contempt for the man who gambles his family's savings away because he is a victim of a disease. We are less likely to morally judge the action than we are the intent.

I think this is wrong-headed for several reasons. Flrst, judging intent is a very subjective business, while judging actions is not. It is a fact that this man beheaded and canibalized a person. No one, not even the lawyers, dispute that. Is it a fact that God told him to do it? Only if we take the killer's word. If a man gambles his family's savings away, this is factually verifiable. What is not is the idea that he was powerless to choose not to.

Secondly, from a legal and political sense, judging intent rather than action is a dangerous precedent. In order to protect society against certain acts (cannibalism, murder), it is best to make a rule against murder (without exception) than it is to make a rule against murder which allows for murder within certain psychological parameters. If we want to make sure that no one else feels free to behead or cannibalize, the precedent should be that ANY instance of these things are wrong, not just that it is wrong only if there is bad intent behind it.

And I reiterate my concern that, as part of imprisonment is for public safety rather than punishment, it simply does no one any good for a self-confirmed schizophrenic who has beheaded in the name of the god issuing him orders to walk the street solely becuase he has a disorder. If he walks, maybe he can kill the judge and blame it on god.

The Problem of Student Motivation

2009-03-02T10:19:00.000-08:00

Recently, I have come across an interesting article: "Who is Responsible for Student Learning," by Baylor University education professor, J. Wesley Null. The main thesis of the article is that in an age where "accountability" is a buzz word, we must remember that, as wrong as it may sound to some, teachers can only do so much in getting students to learn. We often forget that the other half of the responsibility MUST lie with the student.

Null suggests that the view which sees teachers as the primary responsibility-holders to student learning confuse the business of education with most other businesses. There, if the product falls short of expectations, the workers are the likely culprit. As Null rightly points out, this ignores one key difference between "factories" and education: students, unlike cars and insurance policies, are agents that are often actively resistant to being "worked on." If a car turns out not to work well, something in the workmanship is likely to blame. If a student graduates history class without being able to recall history facts, it may be due to poor teaching by the teacher, or poor learning by the student.

Null provides an analogy to bolster the point:

[I]f a husband and wife enroll in, say, a marriage course at their local church, should the pastor who teaches these classes be blamed if the couple's marriage never improves? Or do the husband and wife have a joint responsibility to improve their own marriage?

Obviously, we would suggest that the pastor can persuade, guide, cajole, instruct, and remind. What we would not say, though, is that any of this can make the marriage work. In the end, teaching, guiding, and reminding are only so good as the will of the person recieving the instruction, guidance, and reminders.

That this is analogous to the limits of the teacher's role is obvious. What we do with this recognition is not. When teachers say things like, 'we can only do so much,' or try to shift at least some of the "blame" onto parents, students, and an anti-intellectual culture that many students come to us imbued with, we are seen as offering a subterfuge. In turn, teachers may be charged with laziness and unwillingness to be accountable.

In some sense, this view is sometimes justified. There certainly are such things as bad teachers, and often, those teachers ARE shielded from accountability by the ill-thought-out mechanism of tenure. And, as a "public service," there has to be some way to hold teachers accountable for results. Otherwise, poor-performing teachers can pawn all responsibility onto their students.

There are several other reasons for our collective uncomfortability with blaming at least some of education's failure on students:

(1) Doing so forces parents and society at large to take a critical look at their practices and whether they may be (inadvertently) sending teachers students who have not been taught such basic prerequisites to learning as respect for authority, impulse control, and some reason (internal or external) to value the enterprise of education. It is easier to blame teachers for students' low performance.

(2) As trivial as it seems, all of us have become familiar with the "feel good" teacher movies like "The Ron Clark Story," "Dangerous Minds," and "Freedom Writers," where a teacher is able to overcome all educational obstabcles with students by pure dilligence and tenacity. Take this, couple it with the egalitarian idea that every child has equal potential, and we grow intolerant with the view that student failure is not purely a symptom of bad teaching.

(3) As most of us have had at least 12 years of direct experience with teachers, teaching is the one job that most people have seen close-up, and as such, most people feel is not so difficult. I think that this inadvertently plays into notions that student failure is due to bad teaching because, unlike most professions, it is easy to "play at armchair teaching." Laypersons might not be quick to offer opinions on how accountants can do their job better, but are generally unafraid to criticize the "common sense" discipline of teaching.

It is difficult to know how to strike a good balance between holding teachers accountable for results and accepting that teaching, unlike other professions, requires willingness from producer AND PRODUCT in order to be successful. it may even be as simple as involving teachers who produce scores of underachieving students in more stringent observations and professional developments. It may also involve offering teachesr financial incentives, as some districts have done, for good results (thus not penalizing underperformance, but simply rewarding outstanding performance.

But what many don't realize is that teaching is hard as it is. It is even harder when we teachers are held solely or even primarily accountable for students low performance on tests (when they admit, as they often have to me, that they do not studey), for low homework grades (homework is the responsibility of the home), and even student truency.

As Null correctly notes, and as hard as it is for many parents and policy-makers to hear, "Individual agency matters. Put another way, one person cannot be held responsible for another person's behavior."

On Schemes and Schools: How We Got "Here" from "There"

2009-03-02T07:48:00.000-08:00

Below is a recent review I have written of Diane Ravitch's bok, "Left Bac: A Century of Failed School Reform." In the book, Ravitch attempts to give an in-depth history of the progressive turn in education and its excesses. In the end, she argues that progressivism bears the responsibility for the Amreican education system losing its way. While I disagree with Ravitch on a number of points (she is very anti-utilitarian when it comes to education, and I cannot see education justified any other way), her historical arguments are very persuasive. Highly reccomended!

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Diane Ravitch's "Left Back" is both a history and a polemic. As the subtitle suggest, Ravitch does not only cover the history of educational ideas over the past century, but the history of "failed" educational ideas. As other review rs suggest, Ravitch's book is a history of, and argument against, progressivism in education.

Most of this book centers around two recurring dualisms of 20th century educational theory: essentialism v. utilitarianism, and learning as transmission between teacher and student v. learning as natural student-led proces.
The debate between essentialists (like Bagley) and instrumentalists (like Dewey and Thorndike) was over whether educational learning was valuable in itself or whether its value derives from its utility. In Left Back, Ravitch demonstrates that the concept of justifying education in utilitarian terms (how useful it is to students' lives) may have been an interesting idea at one point, but, like many ideas, it was pushed too far. Not many people - even the eseentialists - would argue that education should not have utility to students lives, but the overselling of this idea by progressives resulted in everything from hastily done tracking (tailoring instruction to students' predicted 'station' in later life), to the stripping away of academic rigor (why take biology when one can take a class on how to grow plants?).

The debate between those who argued for teacher-led education versus those who argued for student-led education was an outgrowth of the previous debate. The 'student-led' advocates (William Kilpatrick, Carl Rogers) rediscovered and revamped the Rousseauian idea that the best education is a non-coercive process of letting the student explore what she likes, and fostering her creativity. By contrast, the 'teacher-led' advocates (Leon Kandel, Michael Demiashkevich), believed that learning was as often an artificial process that necessitated the teacher being a teacher, and that part of s good education was learning things beyond what one would learn on one's ow.

In each debate, the progressives (utilitarians, student-led believers) won the day, often in spite of public outcry against them. In fact, one ironic theme in Ravitch's book is that while the progressives constantly invoked the word "democratic" to support their various cure-alls, the movement was, at every turn, undemocratic. Progressives always saw themselves as superior to the clamor of "reactionary" parents (who audaciously wanted their kids to learn subject-matter), were constant enthusiasts of tracking students at an early age by their predicted 'stations' in life, and constantly spoke of "creating a new social order," rather than educating independently-thinking students.

The undoubted hero of the book is William Bagley (an education philosopher that may have been John Dewey's most serious rival that is unjustly all but unheard of today). For his part, Dewey is portrayed as an out of touch intellectual whose "innocence was [often] comical" [p. 207) Many will object to this characterization of an educational icon, but Ravitch is certainly not the first to suggest that Dewey was entirely too aloof to articulate a philosophy with any real clarity.

Some negative reviewers comment that Ravitch's characterization of the various progressive movements is an unfair and mistaken straw-man. While I have only read a handful of the plentiful original sources she cites, it is difficult to see how an author who quotes so frequently from primary sources can be said to have gotten them (many unambiguous in meaning) wrong. My thoughts are that this book is a fair portrayal of progressivism, and that the reviewers may be mad because Ravitch is not afraid to mix history and polemic.

All in all, this is a stunning work for anyone who wonders how we got here - social promotion, self-esteem movement, flexible standards - from "there." Ravitch may have mixed history with polemic, but the book is well-researched history and necessary polemic. Ravitch's conclusion:

"If there is a lesson to be learned from the river of ink that was spilled in the education disputes of the twentieth century, it is that anything in education that is labeled a "movement" should be avoided like the plague. What American education most needs is not more nostrums and enthusiasms but more attention to fundamental, time-tested truths." (p. 453)

"Don't read it! Just see the movie!"

2009-03-01T09:48:00.001-08:00

Being a high-school teacher has, I fear, has made me more quick to anger when watching horrible parents. I never used to get too angry when in the presence of bad parents (like those who let their kids run around unatttended in the supermarket), but being a high-school teacher forces me to see poorly parented kids as potential poorly parented young adults.

Here is the most recent situation to get my blood boiling: a family friend has their elementary aged child in a school-sponsoered book club. The book they were assigned a few weeks ago has gone unread and, today, the family is going to see the movie (in leiu of reading the book).

Normally, a situation like this would be mildly annoying to me. But upon hearing about this, my "teacher mode" turned immediately on, and I have not been able to stop stewing over such a blatant act of parental irresponsibility. Here we have a great example of a parent tacitly informing their kids that skirting rules is completely permissible, and that the parents glowingly endorse such rule-skirting. In addition, this child (who actually does like to read) has now been introduced to the dilemma that all children eventually face: why read the book when I can just see the movie?

I recall when my parents found out that I had not read a required book for a high school class. What did they do? They called the teacher! They let the teacher know that I had not read the book, and advised the teacher to "catch me in the act" by pulling me aside and quizzing me on it. I did not find out that my parents put the teacher up to it until years later, and to tell the truth, I am glad they did. It encouraged me to read (if only by force) which eventually lead to a joy for reading.

Would I do what my parents did in this child's situation? Yes. Being a teacher has made me appreciate that, sometimes, one must be creative in teaching kids how and why to follow rules. Yes, this means that the child may not like you for a time, and yes, this certainly means that the child will be discomforted when the teacher "calls them out," but they will learn the lesson they should learn and be the better for it in the long run.

When I think of this story, I cannot help but think about kids I teach who expect A's simply because they show up to most of my classes (and the parents who back them up). I cannot help but think of the stduents who miss inexcusable amounts of time from school with their parents permission, and those whose parents don't make them do homework or study, but pretend that they value education.

With any luck, this student will never have a teacher in high school that has the audacity to set expecations and hold students accountable for them. Unfortunately, unless the student goes to a private high school, it seems unlikely that they ever will.

Special Education: A Delicate Balance Between Inclusion and Differentiation

2009-02-28T15:21:00.000-08:00

For my final "Portfolio" class, I have to include an article articulating a personal philosophy of special education. It has taken me a while to figure out how I might write an honest article while not risking a good grade by being a contrarian. Below is my best attempt.
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Special Education: A Delicate Balance Between Inclusion and Differentiation

Special education in the public school setting presently exists in a state of tension: the tension between the ideas of inclusion and differentiation. While inclusion refers to the act of including all students in the general education setting with the general education curriculum, the idea of differentiation is about keeping mindful of differences in faculties, abilities, and proclivities. Where the former idea strives towards some sense of universalization, the latter idea aims to recognize and accommodate plurality. Special education’s challenge, then, is to educate students with disabilities in a way that includes, giving the students some degree of “sameness,” while differentiating and recognizing sometimes intractable differences.

This job of the special educator is complicated when one realizes that, as these goals are in tension, any emphasis on the one results in de-emphasis of the other. If we decide, for instance, to place a student into a more inclusive setting, then we are tacitly suggesting that the student will experience less differentiation. Conversely, the more we want to differentiate for a student, the less included that student will be in the general curriculum of her “general education” peers.

Commenting on this delicate balance, Kauffman, McGee, and Brigham (2004) write of the ever-present danger within special education of “losing its way in the single-minded pursuit of full inclusion” at the expense of recognizing student differences. They go on to suggest that once this overemphasis on inclusion occurs, the pressure on special educators becomes more on the “appearance of normalization without the expectation of competence.” (original italics) An overemphasis on inclusion has led to the unintended negative consequence that “general education is now seen by many as the only place where fair and equitable treatment is possible and where the opportunity to learn is extended to all equally.”

As I see it, the bigger problem is the difficulty in maintaining balance between this idea of inclusion, where all students are to access the same general education curriculum, and the need for differentiation of the curriculum based on student abilities. While students with “milder” learning disabilities may be able to function in an inclusion setting with minimal supports of a kind fully implementable in an inclusion environment, students with more severe learning disabilities, who are also being pushed into an inclusion setting, may often require extensive modifications and differentiation of a kind that conflicts with the idea of inclusion. (To put it more directly, some students may require enough modifications and adaptations to the curriculum that their “inclusion” means little more than them doing different work than their peers while existing in the same room with them.)

By way of example, the following is a practical question that often plagues general and special educators in the inclusion setting: how can we modify the content enough to accommodate a particular student while maintaining the standards of which the general education curriculum demands mastery? This question gets to the heart of the tension between inclusion and differentiation. Include too much and one runs the risk of ignoring students’ needs for differentiation. Differentiate too much and a student’s education becomes so different that “inclusion” becomes so in name only.

Another problem created by the tension of the inclusion setting is one of difficulty in implementation. Differentiating in a self-contained classroom, where class sizes are generally smaller, is an unproblematic affair. Differentiating in an inclusion class, where class sizes tend to be larger, can be more difficult. When the student/teacher ratio is 6-10:1, it is much more workable for the teacher to spend individual time with each student, so as to differentiate her approach. When the ratio is 15-30:1, this type of individual differentiation becomes much more difficult. In some sense, students who are in an inclusion setting will be expected to “fend for themselves” more than students in a self-contained “special education” environment.

While certain accommodations – extended time, use of a calculator, student being provided with notes/organizers, etc – are easily and unobtrusively implementable in an inclusion setting, others are less so. Some accommodations, like verbatim reading of tests and quizzes, are intrusive to the general education environment (i.e., cannot easily be done in the classroom). Others, such as reducing the reading or work-load requirements placed on a particular student, are difficult to practice in an inclusion setting while maintaining equity (“Why does she only have to do 5 problems while I must do 10 to get the same grade?”) Others, like requiring the teacher to place the student in an area with reduced distractions, become down right impossible in many inclusion classrooms. In a variety of ways, differentiation can become all the more difficult in larger, inclusion classes than smaller, self-contained ones.

Why should the fact that these ideas of inclusion and differentiation are in tension matter to the practice of special education? In figuring out placement and service options for students, the special educator must stay mindful that more emphasis on the one requires diminution of the other. The more differentiation one demands for a student, the less inclusion that student will experience, and vice versa. Further, special educators must stay mindful that the goal for all students – to be as included as possible within the limits of each student’s ability – means that the goal should be to foster as much self-sufficiency in disabled students as possible. (As inclusion necessitates a certain level of self-sufficiency, differentiation should be used only when it is necessary, and only with the objective of teaching the student to differentiate for herself.)

Unfortunately, if often happens that differentiation is employed as much to hide of skirt student difficulties as to teach students how to overcome difficulties. It often happens that students are placed in inclusion classes before they have mastered the basic skills required in those classes, and differentiation is employed so as to render those basic skills superfluous – to allow the student to “get by” without having to demonstrate skills expected of other non-disabled students. As Kaufman, McGee and Brigham point out (2004), it happens quite often that “attempts to accommodate students with disabilities can undermine achievement.”

As mentioned above, there are several reasons that the inclusion setting limits the amount of differentiation that can or should be done. If inclusion is to be truly inclusive, students who require extensive differentiation may be best served in a “self-contained” special education environment. Conversely, when placing students in an inclusion setting, educators should very honestly ask if the student is truly ready to access the general education curriculum with as few differentiations as possible.

None of this is to assail the goals of inclusion and differentiation. Both are worthy goals for special educators to pursue. My argument is simply that special educators should always be mindful that too much differentiation takes away the “inclusive” aspects of inclusion, and pushing for full inclusion necessitates keeping differentiation to a minimum. In placement decisions, annual IEP reviews, and discussions about how to deliver IEP services to students, recognition of the tension between inclusion and differentiation may force us to be more realistic in how we deal with students. The answer we come to about how much inclusion and how much differentiation is needed will doubtless differ from student to student, but the special educator must be careful to avoid overreliance on either differentiation or inclusion and recognize the delicacy of striking a healthy balance between these contrasting concepts.

Works cited:

Kauffman, J.M., McGee, K, & Brigham, M. (2004). Enabling or disabling? Observations on changes in special education. Phi Delta Kappan, April 2004. 613-620

Social Promotion: The lesser of two evils?

2009-02-28T13:43:00.000-08:00

In my opinion as an educator, the idea of social promotion is just about the worst idea in education today. For those unfamiliar, "social promotion" is the idea that we should pass students on to further grades regardless of whether they have met that grade's academic standards. From what I understand, this idea was brought about because it was thought to help students' self-esteem by avoiding stigmatization attached with "being held back."

Is this simply another bad idea foisted onto the education system by those who believe self-esteem is more important than academic standards? In a discussion I had with one supervisor, she eluded to data which shows that "holding kids back" for failure to meet requisite standards not only had no effect on their subsequent academic improvement, but also that holding students back increases the likelihood that those students will fail to get their diplomas.

I have run across an article seconding these arguments, suggesting that "holding kids back" is ineffective and increases the likelihood of drop-out. The authors write:

Grade retention is one of the methods often proposed and used to help poor performing students catch-up to their peers. At best, most research on the effects of grade retention portrays it as a practice that provides no benefit to the students; at worst it is considered a damaging practice.

These authors relay a study which found that "third graders who were retained showed no difference in test scores to those who were promoted and sixth graders who were retained scored worse than those who were promoted." In addition, they also note studies which suggest "that retained students are more likely to drop out of high school," than those who have not been retained.

The first thing I would note is that these results seem almost bordering on circularity to be of any real import. I am not a statistics guy but from what I remember from my Ed Statistics class, this is indeed a very flawed conclusion. Saying that being held back increases one's chance of dropping out or failing to earn a diploma is like saying little more than that those who are not cutting the academic mustard are those most likely not to cut the academic mustard.

The above statistics seem quite tautologous because when looking at students who get held back, chances are that you are dealing with those who are least academically motivated or inclined. So, it is being held back that caused the likelihood to ditch high school, or is being held back and dropping out of high school both due to an underlying lack of academic motivation and/or facility? (In the same way, one can suggest that the more homework one does, the more likely one will be to get an advanced degree, but this would be inaccurate, as inclination to do homework and getting an advanced degree are both symptoms of academic motivation, which is more likely to be the primary factor).

When in discussion with my supervisor, with who's views I disagree, she reminded me of the converse of the above truism: kids who are socially promoted are more likely to get their diplomas than those retained. At the risk of sounding course, no s###! Kids who are pushed through the school system are probably more likely to get diplomas...because they are pushed through the school system! This amounts to little more than saying that those who are not grade on their abilities to cook are more likely to be able to graduate culinary school than those who are retained because they can't cook well.

Good job!

The question is not, as my supervisor thinks, whether social promotion leads to more diplomas than retention. Instead, the question is whether social promotion leads to more DESERVED diplomas than retention. We would, after all, have a 100% graduation rate if we simply handed them out without making them contingent on any standards; all kids would pass because passing would be easy. This "ends justify the means" reasoning that proponents of social promotion use!

But would such a policy be right? The diplomas would be more plentiful, but would they be deserved? I can't see that they would. They would be ill-gotten in the same way that kids who are socially promoted in order that they may be handed (rather than have earned) diplomas would be.

It seems like, at root, educators once again speak from both sides of the mouth: on one hand, we talk about grade levels, passing classes, and graduating to the next grade. On the other side, we are afraid to hold kids to standards because some of them might drop out or get their feelings hurt. I sympathize with kids who are in danger of dropping out, but unlike proponents of social promotion, I am not willing to do away with the notion of standards in order to ensure that these students stay in school under artificial pretense. (That is how we wind up with students in Algebra II that don't know how to multiply, and students who can't read being in English 10).

In my opinion, social promotion is not the lesser of two evils (the other being student retention and possible drop-outs). The lesser of two evils is pushing students through to grades that they have no business being in for the sole purpose of making us educators feel better. THAT is the evil.

What Are the Special Educators DOING?!

2009-02-24T15:00:00.001-08:00

Recently, I have been talking a lot about how the discipline of special educaiton has been steadily lowering the bar so that students can "succeed." The reasoning goes like this: since special education students are having a hard time meeting standards, it is easier to lower the standards than to raise the students.

Today, an e-mail crossed my desk (written by a supervisor) that provides a brilliant real-life example of this nonsense. Lately, it has been noted that special education students (and many non-special education students) have been performing poorly on tests ("benchmarks") and quizzes ("short cycles"). My supervisor and some of the higher ups have figured out a positively brilliant way to erase this problem: From now on, we will provide the following "accomodation" to special education students struggling with tests and quizzes:

Test scores will be given reduced percentage when computing grades.

That's right. Since our students are not performing well on tests and quizzes (which comprise 25% of the total grade, per Baltimore County policy), the problem must be that tests and quizzes are too much of these students grades. (What they will find, I confidently predict, is that lowering the test/quiz percentage won't help, as doing poorly on tests and quizzes is strongly correlated with not doing homework [15%] and classworks [60%]. Maybe these will be the next to be reduced!.)

Lowering the bar so that students can APPEAR successful when they are not? This is the very definition of that! Fudging the numbers? You bet. Providing students with the message that it is okay to fail because we will make failure look like "success"? Yep.

This last effect is why the suggestion irks me so much. Schools talk all the time about accountability but, as the above suggestion illustrates, we will gladly bend the rules so that students don't actually HAVE to experience the negative effects of accountability. (This is like the parent who tells their child not to hit or else they will forego dessert, only to avoid enforcing the policy because enforcement would make the child feel bad.) What this rule is inadvertently telling kids is:

(a) don't take our "tough talk" seriously becuase when push comes to shove, we will cave to what is convenient for you; and

(b) it is okay to fail the tests/quizzes beause we will actively help you do it by shielding you from the consequences.

To my mind, special education is not a synonym for immunity from standards and consequences. To me, the best way to help children get though hurdles is to help them - show them how to study, tutor them, and equip them to get over the hurdles, rather than to remove hurdles altogether. The irony is that both methods - equipping students to get over hurdles and removing hurdles - achieve the same results on paper: both lead to the appearance of success.

Unfortunately, special education seems more and more to opt for the latter option. It is easier. It involves far less work from the teacher and far less frustration for the student. It even jibes with the nurturing instinct that so many special (and general) educators have - our desire to see kids successful and aversion to seeing them frustrated. But here's what a policy of lowering and removing bars does NOT do: it does not teach students anything constructive. Not only does it avoid teaching them the information needed to face academic challenges, but it does not teach them how to deal with challenges constructively.

My last big objection to minimizing the ill effects of low test/quiz grades for special education students is that by doing so, we will virtually ensure that students manage to pass classes without demonstrating the requisite mastery of the subject. If a student was not able to pass the 9th grade English tests and, thanks to this "fudge the numbers" policy, ends up passing the class, imagine how lost she will be in 10th grade English. In such a situation - and such situations WILL occur - have we helped anyone? We have worsened the student's situation, we have engaged in the type of number-fudging considered unethical in buisiness practices...but at least we will make the school's numbers work better.

Things like this are going on too often in the world of special education. We have taken our noble desire to see all children succeed and, in our enthusiasm, forgotten that success is only success if one has to work for it. By helping kids pass classes by minimizing their failed test scores, we are handing them a shallow "success" that exists in name only.

Does Special Ed Law REALLY Do Damage?

2009-02-23T16:31:00.000-08:00

In response to a previous post reviewing a book critical of the ADA, a reader asked this question:

It seems like the disability acts do more harm than good, but I'm curious how much good they do in your case.

This is a good question, because it allows me to share my own personal experience and frustration with the follies of IDEA (Individuals with Disabilities in Educaiton Act).

The reader quated above recounts an episode of the TV show "Family Guy" where a school principal "enticed" average students to do poorly so that they can get into special educaiton, all in attempts to boost the school's test scores (special ed students' scores didn't count against the school.)

My situaiton in Baltimore County is slightly different, but the gist is there. All high-school students must pass the HSA (High School Assessment) tests. If students do not pass, they do not graduate, and the number of students who pass (as a percentage of the student body) affects the schools' ratings.

Well, special education students have to take the HSA's and their scores count towards the total. But, students who do poorly enough on the tests, and who have IEP's (which means they are in special ed), get to take the Mod-HSA,or, what some call the "HSA lite." This is a test that has three, rather than four, answer choices per question, has a lower required reading level, and is generally easier in content. But - get this - the Mod-HSA scores count AS IF THEY WERE HSA SCORES.

This may seem like a good idea to enable the students not at HSA level to graduate, but there is a hidden negative consequence: the school has active incentive to get as many people to take the Mod-HSA as possible. As the Mod-HSA is easier than the HSA, but is worth the same amount to the school's ranking, it is in the school's interest to ensure that as many students as possible take the easier test so that they can pass with higher numbers.

And if THAT isn't enough, students who fail the HSA more than twice - whether they are special ed or not - are allowed to do a project called the "Bridge Plan" in place of the HSA. While the Bridge Plan DOES NOT count towards the schools' scores - thus providing an incentive NOT to have students take the Bridge Plan - this also has a hidden negative consequence: students fail to take the HSA seriously because they now know that if they fail twice, they can just take the easier Bridge Plan. (Whether it is easier is debatable, as it is a thick and cumbersome project, although one need not study for it, as all the information needed is in the provided booklet.)

Another bad consequence, at least to me, is that all of these non-HSA options take away the whole rationale for the HSA. While I am not a fan of the HSA, and I do not like the idea that a student might not graduate because they failed to pass one test, I believe in sticking to rules. If we decide that the HSA will be a prerequisite for graduation, then it simply sends kids mixed signals to allow alternative (easier) avenues towards graduattion. (It is like telling a student that they need a "c" to pass the class, but then telling them that they can get an "f" as long as they do x project at the end of the year. By that point, the "c" rule ceases to be a rule.)

While the Bridge Plan is open to regular and special ed kids, its primary motivation was from the department of special education, who continually lowers the bar so that kids might pass. As the mindset goes, it is easier to lower the bar than to raise the kid. And this is precisely what I dislike about special education. It is world where "standards" exist in name only (and often evocation of them provoke cries of unfairness). It is a world where it is best to have the test read to Johny, rather than to lower Johny's self-esteem by holding him back until he can read the test himself. It is a world that spends most of its time "getting kids through" rather than "getting kids better."

So, to answer the reader's question, this is how it works where I teach: we pretend to hold kids accountable but give our special education students multiple routes (easier routes) so as to keep numbers up. This allows the schools to look like they are 'standards based' while hiding the fact that the standards are so flexible as to not be standards at alll.

That's special ed for you.

Does Anyone Else See the Contradiction? Obama Follies, Part 1

2009-02-23T13:23:00.000-08:00

This afternoon, I came across the following headline. It is actually quite funny until you think about the fact that politicians (that probably think they are smart) are the ones coming up with these half-witted schemes. The headline reads:

Obama urges spending curbs, hands out $15 billion

Do you see the contradiction? How can a government that has just dropped $787 BILLION dollars of free government handouts also urge that we cut government spending?!? It would be like a parent urging her daughter not to smoke after buying her cigarettes, or a CEO telling her company the need to be thrifty while collecting a several million dollar salary. CUTTING SPENDING AFTER PASSING THE SINGLE MOST EXPENSIVE BILL IN HISTORY DOESN'T MAKE SENSE!

According to the article, Obama plans on cutting the deficit by "scaling back Iraq war spending, raising taxes on the wealthiest and streamlining government." The first of these will doubtless find little objection, and the second will find objection with libertarians like myself. (Why not cut spending to reduce deficits rather than raise taxes?!)

But the third - streamlining government - is a pipe dream, or a shift piece of rhetoric (probably the latter). How can government be streamlined when it just passed a $787 billion handout to companies? And how can we talk about streamlining government when, as the article notes, the administration is "attempt[ing] to bolster the severely weakened banking system without nationalizing any institutions"? In government language, "bolster" is always synonymous with "pass more regulations for," and "give government more control of." Does that sound like "streamlining" the government? I think not.

And here is a final doozy. In a direct quote, Obama shows that he is a true politician by coming up with something exactly THIS stupid:

"We cannot simply spend as we please and defer the consequences to the next budget, the next administration or the next generation."

So, tell us, boy genius: where is the $787 billion coming from, if not from the "next budget"? And how is spending $787 billion dollars to help out banks and auto workers not "spend[ing] as we please?"

So try to figure it out if you can (especially those of you who like the really hard riddles): How exactly can one go about tightening government spending and streamlining government a week or so after spending $787 billion for government handouts?

Review of Greg Perry's "Disabling America"

2009-02-21T14:01:00.001-08:00

Below is a review I wrote recently for Greg Perry's "Disabling America," a libertarian-ish critique of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In it, Perry takes the position that, like much other recent legislatkkion made on behalf of minorities, the ADA goes beyond putting the disabled on equal ground as the non-disabled, but makes them a quite privileged group by doling out entitlements galore.

As a special educator, I encounter disability law every day (IDEA), and see that while it was put in place with intent to help disabled students recieve a quality education, it just as often makes and keeps kids disabled. It does these things by granting "accomodatiosn" to children who may be doing nothing more than performing below expectations ("James is struggling in math. He must be learning disabled. Jane has trouble paying attention to the teachers' lecture. She must have ADHD.")

My real beef with IDEA is that many of the "accommodations" it gives do little more than reward kids for failure by expecting less and less from them the worse they do. I have been in many IEP (Individualized Education Plan) meetings where we discussed reducing the amount of work expected of x because x is failing certain classes. Thus, the less he does, the less he learns, the less he will be expected to learn in the future!

Enough! I offer you this review in hopes that you will read Greg Perry's timely book.
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Are Some More Equal Than Others? (a special educator's take)

The Americans With Disabilities Act is a sacred cow. Rarely do I hear anyone publicly say anything against it, and generally those who would like to (myself included) run the risk of being considered anti-disabled (or maybe "disabledphobic?"). This is what makes Greg Perry and his book such an asset. Perry, born with one leg and three fingers, has written a smashing critique of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and as a disabled man, probably has more latitude to do so than most of us "normals."

From the outset, I will warn you that this book is highly anecdotal and, to my mind, this is no flaw (as some will allege). We hear stories of cases involving employees who "discover" a disability (like alcohol addiciton, "chronic" back pain, or depression), so that they might sue the pants off their employers. We hear stories of disabled lawyers who sue hundreds of stores at a time (that they have been to all of the stores is often in question).

These, and other, stories will outrage, and this is by design. The subtitle of the book is "the unintended consequences of the government protection of the handicapped," and this is what Perry shows. The ADA, like other government legislation such as the USA PATRIOT act, and No Child Left Behind, doubtless started with good intentions. But like these other Acts, the ADA is rife for abuse and ends up hurting those it intends to help. As Perry notes, the ADA is rife with abuse in large part because the vagueness of what constitutes a disability; everything from drug addiction to affliction with the AIDS virus to situational depression can be called a disability under ADA, and once one is "disabled," the ADA gives wide latitude to sue and make cumbersome demands on everyone from one's employer to one's favorite mom-and-pop store. And why is the ADA counterproductive? It makes people afraid to hire and deal with disabled people by seeing them not as persons but potential liabilities and lawsuits. (It also, like affirmative action, sends people the message that an entire group of people is so bad off that they couldn't make it without hefty government assistance.)

Am a special educator, I particularly enjoyed the chapter on the ADA in education (which is actually governed by a sister law, IDEA). IDEA mandates that every disabled child - and the term is flexible enough to include practically anyone performing below grade level - be provided with an Individualized Education Plan and "accommodations" that often act as wheelchair used by a child who needs to learn to walk; in other words, much of the "help" given to students with disabilities - use of a calculator on all math work, being read to (even in high school) - do more to ensure that a child will stay disabled than learn to overcome their disability. I do not have anywhere near the malice that Perry does for IDEA - and think that in some cases, the law does some good when used well - but the chapter is eye-opening for those who've never thought much on the subject.

My biggest criticism is that Perry's book is highly emotionally charged and rhetorical. There are also times when Perry argues more out of emotion than thought. (He suggests, for instance, that most stores would become "handicapped accessible" on their own, but does not explain why, if this is so, the ADA was ever felt necessary. Nor does he see that many stores simply wouldn't bother to go through the expense in areas where, like most places, the disabled are a small demographic). The book is also quite repetitive, and I found myself skimming, rather than reading, the last two chapters. As a book designed to incense a lay audience, this book is heavy on rhetoric and anecdote, and light on statistics.

Overall, though, Perry's arguments will hold much sway with those of a conservative/libertarian bent. The ADA makes "some more equal than others" by singling some out for very special treatment while leaving others with the expense (handicapped parking seems always to be at the front of the store; the rest of us must park further away, as one small example).

Want to see a sacred cow butchered? Read Disabling America (at your own risk).

I am to be a PhD student!!

2009-02-20T20:05:00.000-08:00

I just got news this evening that a journey that started around a year and a half ago is ending in my favor. After a long process of looking at PhD programs in education, I just recieved word that I was accepted for admissions by my first choice: the University of Delaware!

UD has one of the top 10 education programs in the country and I am very excited (I anticipate accepting the offer, contingent on financial considerations). I am to study under Dr. David Blacker, who specializes in the philosophy of education (and jurisprudence).

Of course, as in any good drama, there is good news and bad news. The bad news is that in these economic times, UD is unable to garauntee funding to all entering grad students, and I will not hear about whether I will be supported for a while (I have no idea how long that is). I don't anticipate a big problem here, but one never knows.

It has been a long and passionate process - from looking at schools and narrowing down choices to filling out the arduous applications - but I feel like it is finally coming to fruition.

I am to be a PhD student in education. This is truly awesome.

What is Moral Subjectivism?

2009-02-19T14:24:00.000-08:00

On another website, a reader asked: ""Still can anyone here give a decent and concise version of sophisticated moral subjectivism to be addressed?"

This was my best response:

am not sure how "sophisticated" it is, but let me try.

I see moral subjectivism the way JL Mackie did: it is the negation of moral objectivism. Morals are not properties of the "out there" world and, as such, they are properties of the subject's mental world.

Put further, we may feel or think certain things to be right and good, but we are in error if we think there is any objective reason compelling others to see it the same way. No matter how knock down or drag out our argument is for the rightness of a particlar thing, that argument will always be our opinion of the mattter, not objective fact.

Subjectivists are not, as David seems to be getting at, nihilists. We have as strong ideas about moral oughts as anyone else, and we judge others and ourselves by standards. We also try to convince others to see things morally as we do.

What subjectivists can't do, though, is to think that any moral system - even our own - has necessary import beyond our own subjective minds. We may wish it were different, but in the absence of any great suggestion on how to detect the moral properties that some allege exist in the world, we see morality as a product of individual subjects making individual judgments.

_______________________________________________________

People have a big problem with subjectivism. How, we think, can our strong convictions that pedophilia, murder, homosexuality, bestaility, theft, etc, are simply subjective opinion statements? They feel like more; we want them to be more. We want them to be truths binding on all and all alike, and we want those who disagree with us not simply to be of differing opinion, but to be WRONG.

Heck, even I - a subjectivist - would rather subjectivism be false. Subjectivism is boring, as subjectivism has nothing positive to say in ethics or morals. The only benefit to being a subjectivist is that it allows me to be a pluralist and avoid dogmaatism. But still, I would rather believe that there were definitive rights and wrongs that transcended individual subjective judgment.

The problem is that there is really no evidence for objective morality. As JL Mackie wrote, we do not have any reason to believe that "goodness" is a property in the world and do not even know what such a property would be like (do we see it, smell it, hear it, feel it, or taste it?) Nor does it make sense to say that "good," "bad," "right" and "wrong" are objective terms, in the face of so much disgareement about (a) what they mean, and (b) concrete moral quesitons (is abortion good?).

Further, we know that "good" and "bad" are valuative terms much like "hot" and "cold." Like "hot" and "cold" (or "beautiful" or "ugly") these terms are vaguely descriptive. (We all know what is meant when we say that a song was ugly or say that the beverage is hot.) But we also know that there is no objective standard for what is "hot" or "cold" (my "hot" may be your "lukewarm" and her "cold" with none of us being objectively right or wrong.)

Subjective morality is this kind of view. Even if we all kind of know what is meant by saying things like "Johny did something very bad," or "Jenny is a good human being," there seemingly exists no objective standard - true for all - by which to judge what is good and bad. (And like terms dealing with termpurature, subjectivists see moral terms as often having fuzzy borders).

So, while being a moral subjectivist may confine me to never having the satisfaction of knowing that I am objectively right in my moral judgments, until I hear some good arguments as to where we can find moral qualities in the "out there" universe, I have to remain a subjectivist.

Problem With Utilitarianism

2009-02-18T14:21:00.000-08:00

If someone asked me what my moral views are, I would probably call myself a rule utilitarian. To quote from Wikipedia's concise definition, I believe that "that moral actions are those which conform to the rules which lead to the greatest good, or that "the rightness or wrongness of a particular action is a function of the correctness of the rule of which it is an instance."

Even though I take a utilitarian view myself, I have a problem with utilitarianism, even of "rule utilitarianism," - at some point, utilitarians, who believe that moral actions are those that tend to maximize x )(happiness, fulfillment of desires, etc), will be asked to justify the utilitarianism itself. ("Why should we want to maximize x rather than y or z?") At that point, the utilitarian will either (a) have to justify their utilitarianism with some moral argument not itself utilitarian; (b) justify their utilitarianism with utililtarian reasoning; or (c) suggest that utilitarianism cannot justify maximizing x over y or z. (a) and (c) would render utilitarianism too flimsy by admitting that utilltarianism itself is not sufficient to account for all of the moral universe (which is important because once this is acknowledged, we have to question whether "the good" can be defined as "that which maximizes x" as there must now exist something "good (x) which does not derive its goodness from "its ability to maximize x." (b) would make utilitarianism troublingly circular, as justifying x by suggesting that "it effectively maximizes x" does nothing to answer the question "why justify x."

As I feel like the preceeding chapter contained too much philosophical jibberish, let me illustrate the point by rehashing a recent discussion on the atheist ethicist blog.

Its author, Alonzo Fyfe, is an advocate of desire utilitarianism, where moral action is defined as "that action which tends to fulfill desires." In his words, " A good desire is desire that tends to fulfill other desires." Conversely, a desire is not good when it tends to thwart other desires.

The desire utilitarian does not measure utility exclusively in terms of pleasure, happiness, well being, or preference satisfaction. Desire utilitarians say that the good is found in all of the things that we desire. It is found in happiness to the degree that we desire happiness, and it is found in pleasure to the degree that we desire pleasure. It is found in the company of family to the degree that we desire the company of family. All value exists in the form of desire fulfillment.

Aside from some problems I have with this style of utilitarianism (it is impossibly vague, malleable, and, at root, way more subjective and psychologistic than it aspires to be), it is question begging (as all forms of utilitarianism are). "Why is fulfilling desires considered "good"?"
Desire utilitarians could go for strategy (a), (b) or (c) above.

(a) "Fulfilling desires is "good" because fulfilling desires is what makes people happy and what makes people happy is good."

This is no good, because it tacitly admits that "good" is not defined by "ability to fulfill other desires. Therefore, it negates the desire utilitarians' claims "good" is defined in utilitarian terms.

(b) Fulfilling desires is "good" because fulfilling desires leads to fulfilling desires, which is "good."

While this option is the only one that stays "in bounds" of desire utilitarianism, the above answer is nonsensical because it is whoppingly circular. Further, it does not answer the question of why fulfilling desires is good (but only pushes the problem back a step.)

(c) Utilitarianism lacks the abillity to justify fulfilling desire (over some other variable) as the ultimate good on its own terms.

This seems to me the most honest answer. Utilitarianism always suggests that "good" is synonymous with "that which maximizes x" but cannot justify this as an ultimate valule on utilitarian grounds without being meaninglessly circular.

So why would I consider myself a rule utilitarian? I think that that moral actions are those which, if everyone acted the same way, would maximize liberty to pursuse their own happiness (within non-coercive bounds). But how can I justify my desire to see liberty to pursue happiness maximized?

I certainly cannot do it on utilitarian grounds (as liberty does nothing to maximize others' liberty). Like liberal pluralist William Galston, I throw up my hands and suggest that liberty is to be valued as a good simply becuase, if I had to guess, I would suppose that most people value liberty and would want to avoid coercion as much as possible.

Put differently, I am a rule utilitarian because I think that the best way to explain the morality of not stealing from others, helping others, and obeying traffic laws is that, the more people who do these things, the more liberty we and others will get to enjoy. While we sometimes have to do things (follow traffic laws, refrain from killing our bosses), the best reason to do these things - what makse them "good" - is that living in a world where there are traffic laws and rules against murdering bosses is more conducive to liberty than ones that are not.

Still, utilitarianism's fundamental flaw is that it, by itself, will always be incapable of justifying its particlar vision of what to maximize ("the good is what maximises fulfillment of desires,"). It will always have to resort to some extra-utilitarian justification somewhere along the way, lest it become viciously circular.

A Nasty Nexus: The Unsavory Mix Between Public Ed and Private Motivational Speakers

2009-02-17T16:22:00.001-08:00

I have recently been doing some scattered research on possible dissertation topics, and one subject that has always interested me is the phenomenon of public school districts sinking millions of dollars into "programs" pushed by educational "consultants" (read: motivational speakers). It is a troubling trend to me because these companies, whose goal and expertise is the "hard sell" of educational ideas, are like vultures that happen to prey on under-critical schoolboards that have no monetary accountability (as they are spending the tax payers' money).

One such speaker is Flip Flippen. I first heard of Flippen when working for the Carroll County (MD) public schools. The previous year, the district had bought whole hog into Flippen's "Capturing Kids' Hearts" program. (Thankfully, the school where I worked refused to sign on, despite huge pressure from the district.)

Like most "education consultants" (motivational speakers) Flippen is not, and has never been, an educator. His claim to fame is in speaking to businesses (for a good fee). In typical motivational speaker fashion, Flippen's new book, The Flip Side bears jacket endorsements from NFL greats like Terry Bradshaw to MLB greats like Nolan Ryan (neither of which, I think, are known as extraordinary business men).

What is significant about all of this is that two years after the Carroll County School System sunk millions into Flippen's program, they quietly dropped it. (Flippen's frenzy-starting book "Capturing Kids' Hearts" also appears to be out of print according to amazon.com.) A colleague at the time described a Flippen workshop he had attended recently as a "come to Jesus" revival of sorts. It was quite systemically designed to make the participant feel good and excited (Flippen's got an enigmatic speaking style similar to Tony Robbins). My colleague, I think accurately, suspected that Flippen was able to exdrcise his charisma on some very gullible school-board members who, unlike business persons, don't have to scruitinize what they spend money on, as the money is not hard earned.

Anyhow, what made me want to write about this trend - and it does not stop with Flippen! - is a blog-entry I came across, bearing an eerily familiar description of Flippen's education seminars:

I went to the workshop in August, and Capturing Kids Hearts was far worse than I expected. I have written letters to both my state senator, and representative asking them to investigate this group and pass a law giving teachers protection from some of the tactics used in the workshop...

I had jokingly referred to co-workers having “drunk the kool-aid” because of their devotion to “Capturing Kids Hearts”. It wasn’t too far off the mark. The tactics used by the presenter reminded me greatly of cult recruiters or Amway/timeshare sales people. Their leader is the savior of schools...

This is the second time in 5 years a workshop did this the other was required this was strongly recommended.

As an educator, I have had to endure many motivational speakers pontificate on the strength of their system - the latest was Brian Mendler - and I am simply shocked at how gullible these school systems are. For-profit folks like Flippen and Mendler can make a hell of a lot of money pushing their product to school districts, who giddily sink millions into books (every teacher at the Mendler seminar was provided with two of his books, paid for by the county, who has better things to spend money on).

It is simply a shame that there is such an admixture of profit-seeking motivational speakers with financially unconcerned and unconstrained (and fad-loving) educational bureaucrats.

The Tyranny of Undertesting: Why Underreliance on Tests Helps Kids Fail

2009-02-17T14:58:00.000-08:00

The grading policy for Baltimore County High Schools goes like this:

Classwork - 60%
Homework - 15%
Tests/Quizzes - 25%

For those who don't see the problem with this, let me explain. Under this schema, it is entirely possible that a student can pass a class with a 70% C having done all classwork, some homework, and have gotten 0%s on assessments. As most teachers' policies is to grade classworks and homeworks (primarily) on completion rather than accuracy, this means that it becomes possible for students to pass a class without having demonstrated any real mastery of the material.

What made me think about this today was a meeting I sat in about a student who recently got placed into a less intense math class than the one he previously in. While the student passed algebra I last year with a C, the guidance counselor explained to me that she and the math teacher feel that he did not at all master the Algebra concepts, and thus, they could not keep him in Algebra II. We wondered - briefly - how it was possible that he passed Algebra I with a C and it did not take long to spot the reason.

As an educator, I see it all too often: students "skirt" by with C's and D's under a system where this grade ignores whether they mastered content, and only attests that they have done the majority of the work put in front of them (correctly or incorrectly). Thus, students are passed on without any obligation to really learn the material, and as a result, are ill-equipped for the next grade.

If it were my decision, I would place test/quiz grades at about 40% of the grade, so that a student who may not be a good test taker can pass without brilliant scores, but to eliminate the overly large possibility of students passing classes without demonstrating mastery of the content.

Critics would certainly tell me that this simply raises stakes too high, and that classworks and homeworks can do the job of assessments in testing students knowledge of the material while not penalizing poor test-takers or boiling the class down to one's ability to regurgitate facts. My response: first, ability to regurgitate facts is not per se a bad thing (unless that is ALL that is measured); second, homeworks/classworks cannot fully do the job of assessing student knowledge because they are more often graded on completion (and generally done when students have access to books/internet/peers.

I am fully aware of the dangers of TOO MUCH emphasis being put on tests, but I am not sure others are aware of the dangers of TOO LITTLE emphasis on tests. (Most of my graduate special education professors talk of the 'tyranny of testing' but never talk of the 'tyranny of undertesting.') As a result of Baltimore County's thoroughly misguided grading policy (where tests/quizzes count for 25% while classwork/homework counts for 75%), we are failing students by allowing them to pass into classes without having demonstrated adequate mastery of the subject. In other words, not making tests a bigger part of the grade ensures that they can dig themselves into bigger and bigger holes the further through school they get.

My Ambivalent Feelings Toward Philosophy

2009-02-14T04:17:00.001-08:00

At one point in my life, I wanted to be a philosopher. There was nothing I enjoyed more than sitting down with a book of philosophy, read through it, turn its ideas over in my head, and develop, or redevelop, my own thoughts.I still love to do all of that, but have given up on the idea of being a philosopher. If I can be blunt, philosophy has become to me like stamp collecting is to its enthusiasts: something that pleases me immensely, but not something I see enough point in to see a career in it.

Unfortunately, I think philosophy began to lose its esteem for me in graduate school. I was a political science major, but I always gravitated towards philosophic areas: philosophy of jurisprudence, moral philosophy, philosophic attempts to justify a liberal state, etc. Reading books in sociology, political science, and politics could be interesting, none of them seemed to grapple with the truly interesting and challenging questions tdhat - as philosophy does - steps beyond the facts of the matter, and gets to the ideas behind them. Yes, political economists could weight capitalism versus socialism economically, but Isaiah Berlin, Robert Nozick, and Richard Rorty could grapple with the moral issues behind these two set-ups.

While I loved philosophy dearly, and cherished spending time with it after classes were over, I only realized much later that I was slowly becoming frustrated with it. I was coming to a realization - one I still keep to this day - that philosophy's inability to solve so many problems left me doubting that its banter was ever going to lead to anywhere concrete. Further, I started to question the entire enterprise's goal of coming up with logically cogent and consistent systems to explain x, y, and z as a valid enterprise; what reason was there to suppose that x, y, and z are reducible to a logically cogent and consistent system at all? (It is not obvious that the world "designed" itself to fit into a system, yet that was the necessary presupposition undergirding much philosophy.)

To make this latter point more concrete, one of the areas I began to question the validity of was my much beloved moral philosophy. The goal of the moral philosophers - defenders of categorical imperatives, utilitarianism, consequentialism, natural law, etc - was to develop a system that could, if properly used, help us reach the right decision in moral cases. The articles and books outlining and defending these thought-up systems would be followed by critiques aiming to show that the defended system is flawed because the results it would get in a certain situation do not accord with our intuitions of the good, and so on. ("X theory, if properly used, would lead to result y, which does not accord with our intuitions. Therefore, it is back to the drawing board."

As this went on indefinitely - new systems developed and refuted, which led to new systems... - I began to wonder why it never seemed to occur to anyone that perhaps moral intuitions are not reducible to a neat system. I relayed this concerns to some of my philosophy professors and friends with a typical reaction: a grudging admittance of its possibility followed by a quick change of subject back to moral system.

I became more and more dissatisfied with this situation. While I never stopped reading philosophy, I began to take it less seriously. (One of my professors had a specialty in the philosophy of science fiction, and I recall several discussions with him where he tried, in vain, to convince me why "possible worlds" speculating was not a waste o time.)

It was fortuitous, then, that at the exact time my doubt in the efficacy of philosophy for anything was at an apex, I came across an essay by Stanley Fish, called "Truth and Toilets." Fish is something of a "postmodernist" (though he never called himself that), who acquired a nasty reputation amongst philosophers for denying that "abstract principles" had any meaning that was not wholly non-subjective meaning, or had any real use outside of communicative shorthand. ("Justice" means "the stuff the utterer thinks are just," and no more.)

In "Truth and Toilets," Fish takes a very cynical view of philosophy, seeing it as rhetoric that has little import on the act of living life. One of my favorite quotes is:

When the dream of finding invariant meaning underwritten by God or the structure of rationality is exploded, what remains is not dust and ashes, but the plasticity of the world human beings continually make and remake.

In short, in the wake of formalism's failure - the failure of the search for neutral principles - everything remains as it was. (Fish, Stanley. The Trouble With Principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2001 (294)

What I take Fish to be saying here is that there is nothing about life that stands or falls with philosophy. Whether we can find a cogent and consistent moral system is of no real consequence to morality as it is actually practiced in life. (None but philosophers stop and think about whether their moral acts are consistent with a particular system of morality.) Whether we can find a solution to the problem of free-will is absolutely immaterial to how we live (we will always live as if we have free will, even if "free will" does seem contradictory and queer to philosophers.) Under this view, philosophy may be interesting, intellectually stimulating, and even personally gratifying. But it is also impotent to affect much of anything (aside from the person who chooses to be engaged in it.)

This is the most sensical philosophy I have heard to date. My ambivalence about philosophy comes from the push and pull between seeing philosophy as largely useless to actual life, and still having a large passion and craving for it. I love the intellectual exercise of philosophy and find that my life is thinner without it. (I tried for about two years to wean myself from it, focusing on the day-to-day of career and leisure, but to no avail; I came back.)

This ambivalence is no trivial matter for me. While I love to read books, for instance, arguing a particular moral or political order on philosophic grounds, I simply have lost the ability to take seriously that philosophy is capable of doing anything outside of presenting fresh rhetoric for one person's opinion. I can no longer see the difference between the sunday morning "talking head" shows and political philosophy (they are both people giving their opinions, with the exception that the latter may use bigger language and contain more sustained rhetoric.) So while I suspect that I will always love philosophy, I also suspect that I will always hate it just a tad (because I wish so badly that, when reading it, I could say that I was doing something productive). My relationship with philosophy, then, is like the summer fling: you are attracted to her, but also resent the fact that the relationship could never really be a serious one.

Why Are We So Stuck on Progressive Education?

2009-02-12T13:00:00.000-08:00

Here is an interesting indictment of progressive education from a parental point of view. Written in 2005. the article is written by an education consultant who happened to be a parent of children attedning a public school steeped in many progressive ideas about education.

What were these "progressive" ideas with which this parent disapproved? Ideas like "whole language educaiton," dislike of worksheets and anything that smacked of "instruct and drill" - all of these things start from a common premise of "progressive ed:" learning by listening to the teacher instruct is synthetic and "inauthentic," while learning by self-discovery of the student is natural and "authentic." The best example of this idea that learning shold be self-discovery, rather than knowledge acquisition from an external souce, is best seen in the author's discription of whole language educaiton.

Whole language is progressive education’s belief system applied to reading. Its theorists believe learning to read is as natural as learning to speak, and therefore it isn’t necessary (and indeed it could be harmful) to directly and systematically teach and drill children on the sound-letter relationships, called phonemes.

They believe learning to read is primarily an exercise in recognizing whole words..

The same trend of replacing "instruct and drill" educaiton with more natural "self-discovery" method can be seen in the author's discription of the way his children's school taught math.

The NCTM standards document openly disdains “paper and pencil practice” of basic arithmetic computational skills, and it demands that calculators be used even in kindergarten. It emphasizes how math should be taught (through hands-on activities and problem solving rather than teacher-led instruction and practice)...

Teaching language by ignoring instruction in phonics and expecting students to start with reading sentences, and teaching math by ignoring instruction on basic mathematical operations and expecting students to engage in conceptual problem solving. Both of these techniques make the mistake of seeing operations like reading and math as something basic that children can figure out themselves if just "guided" the right way. Of course, it is quite absurd to believe that children will discover on their own how to sound out new words - "gauche" or "bivouac" - if they do not learn basic and more complex phonics, and equally as absurd to think that a child will discover how to divide 25.86 by 7 unless taught division FACTS.

As predicted, whole langauge education went bust about a decade ago, as did the idea that students can learn math without learning math FACTS. The problem, though, is that progressive ideas never really seem to die, but rather simply change shape and tact. As a high school special educator, I can certainly attest that progressivism is alive and well at my high school. While we (grudgingly) accept the fact that lecture must occur, we still have not lost our progressive disdain for worksheets, drills, fact learning, and textbook work. In my graudate courses, we still talk of Dewey (and Vygotsky!!) as if they rule the day, constructivism as the only way to properly educate, and the tyranny of testing students recall of facts (in favor of "holistic" and "authentic" assessment.)

But here is the killer question. Why has progressivism stuck around for so long, even though it has failed, time after time, to produce the results it claimed it could? Our author paints the situaiton well:

But the overwhelming body of empirical research is basically an indictment of the progressive education model. And it’s not just recent research—educators have had experimental research evidence for decades that unequivocally conclude that current progressive theories don’t work—evidence that large numbers of educators have chosen to ignore

That such evidence exists against progressive education may be denied by some, but any read-through of Project Follow Through, Maureen Sout's "Feel Good Curriculum," or any work by ED Hirsch should suffice to demonstrate that it does.

Thus, the question remains: if the desired results continue not to be produced, then why has progressive pedagogy (in various incarnations from "progressivism" to "constructivism" to today's "brain based learning,") continue to flourish?

I suspect that the primary reason progressivism's approach remains en vogue despite its failures is because educators like children and we dislike to disappoint or upset them. Progressive education feeds off of this desire by giving us a way to "toss" the "instruct and drill" method that students dislike, in favor of more friendly activities, like playing math games with blocks, and letting kids design their own project specifications.

That educators have an emotional connection to progressivism (the softer approach) can be seen by their constant caricature of the "old way" of education as draconian, authoritarian, and dry. Progressive education, by contrast, is often accompanied by pretty phrases like "educating the whole child" (as opposed to educating only part of the child?!), "authentic education" (rather than fraudulent education?!), and "child-centered education (was there ever an education that did not have the child as its aim?!). If the old education is the authoritarian father, then progressivism is the nurturing mother (this, in a field with far more mothers than fathers in its employ).

This emotional pull is, I feel, the force that keeps progressivism kicking after all of these failed years. As the author says, the fact that we keep going back to "more of the same" (first progressivism, then constructivism, now "brain-based ways of learning" - the same ideas dressed differently), despite repeated failures to make gains defies logic. And I am not sure logic was involved. My guess is that the stubborn persistence of progresivism in education has more to do with the emotional sway it has over educators lost in its nurturing language.

Is Tenure for School Teachers Necessary or Productive? (No.)

2009-02-11T13:49:00.000-08:00

When we think of tenure, we think of academic freedom - the liberty of teachers to delve into controversial ideas without fear of losing their jobs. We think of professors like Bertrand Russell who was denied various teaching positions due to some controversial writings he produced (as a professor). Tenure's rationale, then, seems to be a desire to leave professors free to engage in research without having to think about whether their choice of subject or position will affect their employment status.

This concern of academic freedom, though, doesn't seem to have the same import at the primary and secondary school level. Unlike professors, teachers do not engage in research and publishing in addition to teaching duties, do not often have complete freedom to write curriculum, and, even if they do, are strongly advised not to engage in teaching that could be considered controversial or edgy. Because of this, it is tough to see why primary/secondary school teachers need tenure to protect them.

One of the most universal criticism of tenure - at any level of education - is that it makes it difficult, bordering on impossible, to fire incompetent teachers. Once a teacher/professor has tenure, she is stripped of the market pressure to perform that exists in any job where fear of termination could be a motivator. In a recent blog entry, Stanley Fish writes of a professor who, up until now, has been protected by tenure (and even now, it will be extremely hard for the University to terminate him). This professor - Denis Rancourt - is supposed to teach physics, but tells his students that he will teach whatever he feels like teaching (often political activism).

While tenure protects incompetents like Rancourt, many feel that, at the college level, the cost is worth the benefit of ensuring that academics are free to pursue their scholarly interests without fear of termination. The University of Delaware's Linda Gottfredson, , who does controversial research on the relationship of IQ to factors such as race, health, etc, produces very scholarly important research that, without tenure, she may not engage in for fear of termination. Even if tenure protects some bad professors, it is often argued that without its guarantee, professors like Gottfredson would let the topics of their research be motivated by economic concerns, rather than the pursuit of truth.

We know that the same cost of tenure - the insulation of incompetents from firing - exist at the primary/secondary school level, but do the benefits? No. As mentioned, primary and secondary teachers do not have the research responsibilities that do college professors. Thus, the only "controversial" stances they could take would be in the classroom, which has always been ill-advised (witness the sad examples of James Keegstra and Jay Bennish as unfotunate examples of teaching "controversially" to high school students).

I am quite at a loss to find any benefit in primary and secondary school teachers recieving tenure. If academic freedom is the rationale for tenure, then the only question left is whether primary or secondary school teachers have such academic freedom concerns that they should be granted the freedom to pursue ideas that might otherwise get them fired. I simply cannot see that teachers of 5, 12, and 17 year olds would ever need that kind of freedom (and would be concerned if teachers, like Keegstra, took positions in their classes that could conceivably result in termination).

According to this article the push for tenure amongst primary and secondary school teachers:

The start of the tenure movement paralleled similar labor struggles during the late 19th century. Just as steel and auto workers fought against unsafe working conditions and unlivable wages, teachers too demanded protection from parents and administrators who would try to dictate lesson plans or exclude controversial materials like Huck Finn from reading lists.

This, too, is a rationale that is antiquated. Rarely do teachers control whether Huck Finn should be required reading, and rarely would a teacher be fired over their lesson plans. Whether Huck Finn is part of the curriculum has become an administrative issue, and the lesson plans that (public school) teachers teach are heavily dictated by the demands of a curriculum that they didn't write. (Whether this should be so is debatable, but I think this decision is correct for public schools.)

Again, the rationale for tenure amongst primary and secondary school teachers seems to be antiquated and unnecessary. One of the only articles I have found to argue for the justice of tenure for primary/secondary school teachers has the following abstract:

This speech responds to arguments for reform or abolition of teacher tenure acts. The author argues that, inadequate as tenure laws may be, they provide in many States the most practical safeguard against managerial caprice in the educational establishment. Court cases that uphold or prove the value of teacher tenure laws are presented.

Teh large problem with this argument is that "manegerial caprice" is not exclusive to the education industry, and protection against it is hardly a reason to argue that schools are unique in needing protection from it. One can certainly argue that, without tenure, good teachers might be fired simply because they are not liked by peers or superiors, but this could just as easily happen at a bank, a restaurant, or a law firm. It is unclear why schools are unusual in needing protection from "managerial caprice." If it is argued that schools are particularly susceptible to such political decision-making, then this seems more like a "childishness" problem, rather than a problem warranting exceptional "tenure" protection.

A Gallup Poll report suggests more of the same:

Those in favor, including teacher unions and state school board associations, have long held that tenure is necessary to protect teachers from dismissals based on unpopular opinions, arbitrary administrations, or simply the ebb and flow of cultural tides. "I'm in favor of job security for all types of work, including teaching," says Todd, a 45-year-old respondent from Maine who is "somewhat familiar" with tenure and likes what he sees. "Teachers put in a lot of time and they deserve to know their job will always be there."

As we have discussed, dismissal because of unpopular opinion is much more likely with college professors, and "arbitrary...ebb and flow of cultural tides," is not a factor that is exclusive to schools.

But a new argument is that since teachers works so hard, they deserve job security for life. I am a teacher, and can attest that we do work hard. But I can also attest that (a) good teachers (the ones the quote focuses on) wouldn't need tenure to be able to keep their jobs; and (b) there aer plenty of other professions with people that would "deserve" job security if the criteria is how hard the work is.

Anyway we slice it, justifying tenure for primary/secondary teachers is a stretch. Unlike college professors, we don't have much occasion (or is it advisable) to hold opinions in the classroom that would warrant tenure protection. Second, we do not, by in large, control the curricula and, therefore, do not need "academic freedom" for curricular purposes. "Job protection from arbitrary administrations" is a weak argument, as there are many other professions that could fire based on unsound reasons. And, lastly, arguing that teachers deserve tenure because they work so hard ignores all of the other professions that work as hard or harder, yet do not need tenure and do not argue for it.

What Would You Do? A Teacher Faces a Moral Dilemma

2009-02-10T14:37:00.000-08:00

The kid almost had tears in his eyes and, while I hate to say it, I contributed to that situation. Earlier in the day, I had called this particular student - off task at the time - out in front of the class. I told him to stop wasting his and my time and to start doing his work, and threatened to send him out if he did not straighten up. Later in the day, his biology teacher - my co-teacher - sent him out of the room, and when the student begged to be let back in class, I told him no and shut the door.

Here is where the dilemma comes. When I told this student's counselor that he might want to talk with the student, the counselor shook his head and said: "Poor _____. Just another thing wrong in his life." When I inquired as to what the counselor meant, he said, "Well, ______ is basically the man of the house. He works a job, and is failing in school."

Every teacher - at least, I think every teacher - goes through something like this. We are hard on a student only to find out that the student's "story" is one which tugs at our heartstrings. (I had this happen a few years ago, when I found out that a failing student was, in fact, homeless.) So, what do we do? Do we give the student a possible "break," and ease up a tad, or do we stick to the hard-and-fast rules while ignoring the student's particular story?

In talking with teachers old and new, I find that teachers' newness correlates positively with their tendency to let students' backstories affect how they deal with the student. The more of a veteran you are, the "harder heart" you develop.

Is this a case of teachers becoming desensitized to student backstories? I suppose there is a bit of that, but my guess is that, with experience, teachers become less idealistic and more utilitarian and pragmatic after a while. Let me explain. As any veteran teacher will tell you, one of the keys to success in the classroom is that rules have to not only be established, but enforced and enforced consistently. As with the law, rules need to be administered and applied without respect to persons or context. When exceptions to rules are made, two things result: (a) hordes of students will test the limits of these exceptions; and (b) students will quickly see that rules are negotiable.

While I am familiar with no study done on the subject, I am willing to wager that the trajectory of most teachers careers have them start of as contextualists and end up as absolutists with respect to rules. There is nowhere better than a classroom to learn the lesson that unless rules are rules (without respect to persons or contexts), then they become movable guidelines to be taken advantage of by anyone with a sad story (real or fabricated).

I do feel bad about what happened with the student whom I called out in class. I can imagine his situation and the stress he must be under, being the man of the house while failing his classes. I can even see in his face that he wants to give up very badly. It pains me. But, like a good judge, a good teacher cannot let their feelings get in the way of objectively and fairly enforcing rules. When classwork is assigned, it applies to all and all alike. If we put slack in our rules depending on whether students' circumstances move us, it is as unfair and, I suggest, unethical.

Are the SAT's Discriminatory? Yes, and...?

2009-02-09T14:01:00.000-08:00

Many educators and education professors have suggested that the SAT is a faulty test because it unfairly discriminates in favor of those who grow up in affluent, book-laden, and educationally rich environments. Against this, John McWhorter has written a recent article arguing, in essence, that throwing out the SAT is " throwing a baby out with the bathwater."

I cannot expand much on the content of McWhorter's wonderful article, but I do want to clarify his argument a little. What McWhorter is really saying, and I agree, is that even if the SAT discriminates in favor of students who know fancy words like "lugubrious" and can do advanced algebra, there is absolutely nothing wrong with this fact. In fact, discriminating between students based on who can handle the material being tested better is basically what tests should do.

The major line of argument against the SAT is that the test discriminates against those who may never have had occasion to learn "college words" or learn advanced math (even if the lack of opportunity was due to no fault of their own). Of course, this begs a question: are students who do not know how to do these things the students who are capable of being in college? As McWhorter points out, "as most of us would suspect[,] mastery of advanced vocabulary is vital to understanding the texts presented to a college student." If a student can't perform to a certain standard on the SAT vocabulary test, then regardless of whether their lack of ability to do so is environmental or not, this student may well not have the requisite knowledge that college demands.

What is unfair about that? It is sometimes argued that penalizing a student with a college-inhibiting low score on the SAT for something that may not have been the student's fault is unfairly discriminatory. (Why deny a student the opportunity at college simply because their parents could not afford private school, books, or tutors?) This is best answered as a question: Are the purpose of college admissions tests (a) tests designed to filter applicants based on their ability to demonstrate desired skills; (b) instruments for administering social justice?

For those who might actually have answered (b), here is a thought experiment. Before becoming a lawyer, every student must take their state's bar exam, testing their readiness to practice law (the same way that every medical student must pass a series of exams before practicing medicine.) As law is highly specialized, the purpose of such tests are to "weed out" the prepared from the unprepared. It would be a catastrophe if we argued - as we do about the SAT - that the tests are unfair because they discriminate against those who might not have had the money to go to a top 100 law school. Even though the tests might discriminate thus, the fact is that the "weeding out" process of the tests is necessary to ensure that only those who are prepared to practice law actually practice law.

The same logic should be applied to the SAT tests. The question is not whether they discriminate (they do), but whether the things it tests are actually those things that are prerequisite for a successful college career. We need to get past the idea that the SAT's are wrong because they discriminate against students (who may have gotten higher scores had they lived in more affluent or academically rich environments). Until that sad day where we make college admissions a tool of social justice, and suggest that mathematic and vocabulary ability is unimportant to predicting college success, then I agree with McWhorter: Long Live the SAT.

Academic Underachievement in Black America: A Personal Analysis

2009-02-09T13:05:00.000-08:00

We can beat around the bush all we want. We can talk about discrimination all we want. We can talk about overt and covert racism all we want. But the fact is that black students of all social backgrounds are lagging far behind. What follows is my view of what's happening.

I teach at a smack-dab middle-class 98% black school. The kids who attend attend with ipods, cell phones, nice clothes, new sneakers, and often come to school sipping on Starbucks. It is no exaggeration to say that the black middle class students I teach were the goal of the civil rights movement... in all but one respect; the kids I teach are, by in large, "just getting by." We hear a lot of talk (from them and their parents) about "passing," rather than "excelling," and "getting through" rather than "getting ahead."

This is a problem that is not just about the high school at which I teach. It is a problem nation wide; the "achievement gap" between black students and their white and Asian counterparts has been widespread news for years now.

The problem is that when we "talk" about it, we tend to press for external explanations and places to lay blame: it is due, we hear, to covert racism, to internalized low expectations by teachers, to the low self-esteem that comes with being black, etc, etc. What we do not talk about - Bill Cosby tried it - is the responsibility black parents and black students have for this situation.

As an educator, what is appalling to me is not simply that the widespread trend of students not studying for tests or doing homework (what student WANTS to study or do homework?!), but the fact that I hardly ever hear a parent voice concern. What I do hear from parents are defensive queries about why I gave their child - who did no homework for my class - a failing grade, why we took away his ipod, and what we, the school, will do to make sure that neither of these things happen again. When students get in trouble, the parents invariably defend their children. What I do see is students who are failing one class while getting D's in all the others being allowed by their parents to play extra-curricular sports (and I have heard students tell their peers that the only way they would get grounded is if they brought home two or more failing grades).

Now that I've written about what I do see, here is what I don't see. I don't see very many students working part time jobs (which, oddly, I saw all the time when I taught in a very affluent mostly white school). What I don't see is students caring whether or not a bad report goes home to their parents. What I do not see is students coming into school with a respect for the enterprise of education (if your parents respect education, their children will respect it either out of love or fear).

I cannot speak about "minority schools" outside of my own purview, but these are the things I have seen taking place (and not taking place) in my school. And from those I've talked to in similar predicaments, my experiences are quite typical. Even as a white man, it makes me concerned - concerned that the hard-earned black middle class will become a memory as quickly as it became a reality.

When I came to teach at this school, I was excited at the shiny facilities and the thought that I would be teaching the neglected black middle class. I was excited about the hope that existed there, and the thought that I might be teaching the group that could prove any racists that still existed wrong. Now, two years later, I am ready to leave - my optimism collapsed into cynicism, and my enthusiasm no longer in tact. I can no longer take the disappointment of seeing a group that, by all accounts, should be doing well, doing poorly and not being bothered by that fact.

We can talk about covert racism, victimization, and inequality all we want (and I fear that we will talk about them longer than we want, for fear of having to deal with the hard truths). At my school, and many others, the "achievement gap" is not about racism or poverty, and the only oppressors these students have are themselves. The achievement gap is largely about a widespread undervaluing of education by parents and students alike.

I agree with Dr. Cosby that it boils down to this: the crisis in black America is a crisis brought on by a lack of responsibility-taking and an excess of excuse-making and blame-throwing. For black America to work, "responsibility" is the key.

Bertrand Russell on What it Takes to Be a Good Teacher

2009-02-08T08:37:00.001-08:00

Like my previous post, this post talks about comments made in Bertrand Russell's essay, "Education and Discipline.". Particularly, Russell talks about some characteristics he thinks good teachers must have.

Late in Russell's essay, he writes about the value in seeing children as ends in themselves versus seeing them as potential adults.

If you have the sort of liking for children that many people have for horses or dogs, they will be apt to respond to your suggestions, and to accept prohibitions, perhaps with some good-humoured grumbling, but without resentment. It is no use to have the sort of liking that consists in regarding them as a field for valuable social endeavour, or what amounts to the same thingÑas [sic.] an outlet for power-impulses.

In other words, Russell suggests that the successful teacher enjoys children as children, rather than children as potential adults, and enjoys "being with" rather than "molding" children.

I disagree with Russell here. While teachers would lose their sanity if they did not in any way enjoy the presence of students, if this were their primary joy, my fear is that they would not get around to teaching much. As the whole rationale for teaching is to impart information to students, and the whole rationale for doing that is to make them better off then they were before, teaching requires that one not only enjoy being in the presence of students, but that one stay focused on the goal of shaping students.

To put it a bit more directly, teaching requires that one see students as potential adults and see themselves as instruments to bring students closer to that goal. While Russell's above quote suggests that it "does little good" to regard children as "field for valuable social endeavor," I am hard pressed to see what the rationale for teaching would be if one did not.

Russell goes on to say that, "[t]he desirable sort of interest is that which consists in spontaneous pleasure in the presence of children, without any ulterior purpose."

At the risk of sounding crass, I can only read the words "ulterior purpose" as a synonym for "teaching." At the risk of sounding more crass, if a person solely takes joy in "spontaneous pleasure in the presence of children," then one is best to be a counselor or buddy, rather than a teacher. That is because teaching cannot take place - and would be superfluous - if the teacher did not believe that they could impart something onto the child that the child should have - in other words, seeing the necessity to steer the child in a certain direction they might not naturally go toward.

I have of en thought privately about how many teachers - particularly those in early-years education - seem to love kids more than to love teaching kids. There is a big difference, one that I think Russell overlooks. Loving kids is simply to enjoy being in their company. Loving to teach kids is to enjoy equipping students - sometimes it will be against their will - with tools that (at least the teacher thinks) they need. Contra Russell, good teaching means not just enjoying students, but enjoying the ability to help mold them into something greater than they are now. This means, to some degree, viewing students as an incomplete means, and not as a complete end.

To tie this to my personal experience as a teacher, the teachers I know (myself included) to like being around students (to a degree). What we enjoy infinitely more than this, though, is the feeling that a child learned something from us and the experience of school, for which we know they will be better off. If we simply enjoyed kids, we'd work in day care or volunteer for Big Brother/Big Sister. Teaching is more than this: it is the willingness to see students as potentialities that we can play a part in actualizing.

An Interesting Balance: Bertrand Russell's View of Authority v. Freedom in the Education of Children

2009-02-07T09:57:00.000-08:00

Over the past week, I have had occasion to read and re-read Bertrand Russell's brief essay, "Education and Discipline". While I often regard Bertrand Russell's social essays (as seen in such books as In Praise of Idleness) as flighty and ill-thought-out, this essay highlights an interesting dichotomy that has been present in the philosophy of education for the last many hundreds of years: the tension between liberty v. authority in education.

In fact, I think that Russell rightly recognizes this issue as the key issue in the philosophy of how to educate children. Do we follow Rousseau and Montessori in the belief that education of children sh old involve a minimum of (or any) coercion - education as spontaneous discovery by the child - or the more "classical" idea that education should involve an instructor coercing the child to submit to their authority.

Russell, quite rightly, sees the danger in both. About the former idea of non-coercive education, he writes:

The belief that liberty will ensure moral perfection is a relic of Rousseauism, and would not survive a study of animals and babies. Those who hold this belief think that education should have no positive purpose, but should merely offer an environment suitable for spontaneous development. I cannot agree with this school, which seems to me too individualistic, and unduly indifferent to the importance of knowledge.

About the idea that education is about molding the child to submit to the authority of educators, Russell writes that:

Thus an unduly authoritative education turns the pupils into timid tyrants, incapable of either claiming or tolerating originality in word or deed

Too much authoritarianism in education, Russell notes, leads either to over-submissive and timid children or to rebels who become so disillusioned with authority that they "suppose that opposition to authority is essentially meritorious and that unconventional opinions are bound to be correct." Being a rebel for the sake of rebellion is equally as unwise as being too timid to challenge authority.

Thus, there is danger in both extremes. Leave children too free and children will never learn how to live in a world with others (peers and authority figures). Be too authoritarian towards children and one is bound to create children who do not know how to deal with freedom (who will either be afraid of it or rebel against it out of spite). In Russell's words,

What is wanted is neither submissiveness nor rebellion, but good nature, and general friendliness both to people and to new ideas.

By developing children with "good nature," Russell means that we are trying to raise students who can be well-adjusted and content in later life, which requires a balance between cultivating the child's individuality and preparing her to be a social being.

Of course, these two ends of education - individuality and socialization - are necessarily in conflict, and it is rare to hear philosophers of education recognize this conflict. Dewey overemphasized socialization as much as Montessori overemphasized individualization. To be sure, though, while these two ideas are diametrically opposed - the more individualized you are, the less socialized, and vice versa - they are not mutually exclusive; it is quite easy to recognize that both elements - individuality and sociality - can peacefully coexist in the same individual.

So the struggle of educational theorists, philosophers, and policy-makers is to juggle these two ideals - figure out how to teach children to be independent but also carry the wisdom to know how to do this as a social creature. If the job of education is to sew in each child the ability to become a well-functioning adult, we must recognize that being a well-functioning adult entails both individual authenticity and an ability to function in society.

Russell's appraisal? "I do not think that educators have yet solved the problem of combining the desirable forms of freedom with the necessary minimum of moral training." For me, the problem is that Russell writes as if this is a "solvable" problem - that the question of how much individuality and how much sociability to instill in students is a problem with a definite, universal, and identifiable solution.

Contra this, I believe that individuality and sociability, as terms necessarily in tension, will never yield to a once-and-for-all resolution. I believe that educators and theorists will always have to re-examine and re-answer the question of how to "healthily" (a subjective term) balance the one with the other. As long as we live in"communities of individuals" we will have to struggle with how to teach just enough respect for community with just enough individuality, but I simply can't see how this will not always bee a most delicate balancing act.

I do admire Russell's essay, though, for highlighting this duality, as very few in the philosophy of education seem to. If there is any wisdom to be spoken of on this topic, I think Russell had it right: any education that unqualifiedly sees coercion and authority as absolute goods or evils can absolutely be called unwise.

Brain Breaks: Where's the Evidence?

2009-02-07T07:57:00.000-08:00

Early this week, my "mentor teacher" and I were talking about some particularly off-task students in my classroom. She mentioned the idea of giving students "brain breaks." As she is familiar with my skeptical ways, she abruptly followed her recommendation with an assurance that the need for "brain breaks" is thoroughly evidence-based, based on the latest brain research ("brain-based learning" is another fairly recent fad in education). Unfortunately, I decided to find out for myself, and what I found - typical of the education world - is that "evidence based" often, in educator slang, means "cited in an article which was cited in an article which was...." You get the idea.

Now, the idea that students require brief "brain breaks" for every twenty-or-so minutes of real learning has strong intuitive appeal. When we introspect and, especially when we look at students, it is hard to quarrel with this idea. 90 minute periods are long, students get restless, and the idea that students require breaks for every x number of minutes "just makes sense."

But "just makes sense" is different than "has an evidentiary basis." So, when my mentor teacher suggested that brain breaks did have a strong evidentiary basis, I asked her where I might be able to find such evidence. She pulled out three books outlining the idea of brain breaks. Out of those, two did not cite any research (even though both suggested that validating research existed), and one dropped the name of an educational theorist - not a researcher - who postulated that breaks may be good things for kids.

I spent some time online as well, figuring that as there exist tons of websites extolling the virtues of brain breaks, I could certainly find references to the research that validates them. I must have gone through 30+ websites, all to no avail. I chased down any articles that were cited, only to find that articles which were cited as evidence of brain breaks were articles that themselves cited other articles, which in turn, cited other articles. I have not yet found the "holy grail" articles that vitiate this circle by outlining original evidence (rather than citing articles that cite articles). Those websites or articles that did not cite other articles simply and blithely said things like "research shows that..." without going into what that research is. This gives the impression that once one says that research exists on something (whether it does or not) enough times, people just start to assume the truth of the statement.

I am not saying that such articles do not exist, but I suspect that if there is really that much scientific research validating "brain breaks" (as adherents are quick to suggest), then articles doing so would not be so hard to find citations for. This is not just a problem with the idea of brain breaks, but with so much in education (the virtually unquestioned theory of Multiple Intelligences for instance, which has gained credence primarily by "intuitive appeal," anecdotes, and a few very poorly designed studies.) In the world of education, "evidence-based" is not a very trustworthy descriptor.

So, I will probably try out brain breaks in my classes, and I suspect that they will work, at least in their ability to better keep students focused and alleviate the drudgery of 90 minute periods. (I do not expect that they will raise academic scores, but this is a prediction only.) But I will not suggest that they are evidence-based until I can find, or someone can show me, the evidence (not an article that cites and article) of their efficacy.

Review of Rand-Influenced Book on Education

2009-02-04T04:37:00.001-08:00

Today, I reviewed Jerry Kirpatrick's book "Montessori, Dewey, and Capitalism." It is a book that defends (a) a free-market capitalistic model of educaiton; and (b) the appropriateness of Dewey's and Montessori's methods of education in that framework.

I gave the book 2 out of 5 stars.

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First off, Jerry Kirkpatrick has written one of only a few books that defend education in an environment of the free market. For that, he deseves some praise. While I find fault with much that he says, I am in agreement with Kirkpatrick that schools need to be opened up to the competitive forces of the market.

Kirkpatrick is concerned to defend a particlar type of education - that utilizing the insights of progressive educators John Dewey and Maria Montessori - as the only proper plan of education in a capitalistic society. He suggests that in a capitalistic society, the "old way of educaiton" that teaches students to submit to the school's authority would be in contradiction with capitalism's anti-authoritarian structure.

My first objection is that, despite Kirkpatrick's argument, I do not see how any social structure REQUIRES a certain type of education. I do not see how a mixed economy or socialist country could not just as easily have a "lecture" style of education as it could a Montessori style. To suggest that a philosophy of educaiton and a philosophy of social organizaiton must be alligned is like saying that that a nation's philosphy of science must be alligned with its philosophy of social organization.

Secondly, Kirkpatrick takes it as unquestioned that Montessori's anti-authority method of education meshes well with capitalism's anti-authority structure. I do not see this as correct. When students move past high school, they will experience many "authoritarian" relationships, like that between them and employers and that between them and moneylenders. (I have even heard it argued elsewhere that an "anti-authoritarian" style of education leaves kids ill-preared to function in a capitalistic system, which involves learning to obey rules, laws, and mores.)

While I am not against the Montessori method of educaiton, I suspect that Kirkpatrick's confidence in it is exhuberant. Many well-argued books have been written outlining the dangers of current schools' infatuation with "progressive education" ideas ("whole child" education, "whole language" education, education as self-discovery rather than subject-discovery). The interested might read Stout's "Feel Good Curriculum" and Hirsch's "The Schools We Need and Why We Don't Have Them," as starting points.

In brief, Kirkpatrick makes a big mistakes, probably related to his belief in Ayn Rand's philosophy. First, he is very much against coercion, extremizing this view into the idea that coercing children is an unqualified wrong. It is interesting to note, though, that even in a capitalistic society, the need to coerce children is recognized in an almost universal agreement that kids below a certain age need to be restricted in certain ways, as they lack the executive functioning skills to self-regulate. Kirkpatrick recognizes that students need freedom, but does not recgnize that students also need a good amount of structure. Before one can be self-disciplined, one needs to be taught discipline. (One cannot just "discover" how to be disciplined.)

Kirkpatrick goes on to describe what an educaiton system in a free market would look like. I think the discusison is a bit facile to be honest. Kirkpatrick is confident that a free-market system would do away with grades, rankings, standardized tests, degrees, and certificates. I see this as a very hasty and wrong judgment that misinterprets a key role of schools: to signify to future employers, colleges, etc, that the child has mastered a certain content and acquired certain skills. Without diplomas, grades, and tests, the very term "graduation" loses all meaning. (How would we know when a chlld is graduated? How would we know when to pass a child on to the next level? How would future employers know how their perspective employees did in school?)

Kirkpatrick also sees rankings, letter grades, and degrees as very bad things. Of course, as an educator, I can attest that the grading system is what often keeps kids motivated to work harder, and without it, students would find it very hard to know where they need improvement and how much improvement they need. If there were no such things as "exit requirements" I question whether many people would see any point to education at all (aside from those who learn solely for the enjoyment of it).

Quite simply, I think Kirkpatrick's book could benefit from a lot of rethinking. Particularly, he discusses his own ideas, but not once discusses existant or possible criticisms (as for his championing of Montessori and Dewey, there are many, many critics he could have dealt with. He chose not to.) As for his facile confidence that a free-market would gravitate towards a Montessori appraoch, he did not bring up the fact that the large majority of private schools in existence are non-Montessori schools with more "authoritarian" structure. (Is there a reason to suppose that this trend would reverse? We don't know; Kirkpatrick doesn't bring it up!) There are also many critics of a free-market approach to education that not once do we hear Kirkpatrick grapple with.

I give this book two stars. One star is for being one of the handful of books discussing education in a free market framework. The second was for Kirkpatrick's very learned, but skewed, history of the transition from "classical" to "progressive" education.

The Implacable Allure of Sports

2009-02-01T12:33:00.000-08:00

Today is a unique day in the sports world; quite literally, two of the highest watched sporting events are being played today. First, there was the men's final of the Australian Open tennis (one of the most watched events worldwide and in Austrailia). Then, the Superbowl (THE most watched sporting event in the United States).

A few do not like sports at all. Others are completely indifferent to sports - take 'em or leave 'em. Some are postively fanatical about sports. Personally, I am indifferent to many sports like basketball, cycling, cricket, and (to my fiancee's chagrin) volleyball. I do, however, love to watch football and follow men's (and to a lesser degree, women's) tennis with a passion.

So what is so exciting about sports? Why do I gladly sit for five hours at a stretch just to watch 2 competitors hit a ball back and forth across a court? In an obvious sense, different people like, or love, sports for different reason. Some, generally athletes or the athletically inclined, like watching sports to admire the physical excellence that it entails. This is why many tennis fans love watching the excellent Roger Federer glide a backhand winner, and why football fans thrill to see Troy Polumalu make dazzling defensive plays. Like admierers of a musician's technical proficiency, some sports fans enjoyment comes from being able to marvel at athletes' abilities.

Of course, while some listen to music to admire its technical beauty, others listen to admire its emotional beauty. That is why I, a non-athlete for sure, watch sports. LIke any good reality show, sports provide unscripted drama. A close tennis match has an incomparable power to make my heart pound and keep me glued to the television (no matter how much work I really should be doing instead).

Pick a person or team to root for, though, and the intensity increases. I can certainly be entertained by a football game with teams I care nothing about, but it is nothing compared to the excited feeling of watching a New England Patriots or Baltimore Ravens game. (While I will watch the Superbowl this year, it will be nowhere near as exciting as when the Patriots were in last year's.)

The other thrill that sports provides but regular television does not (with the exception of reality shows) is the thrill of watching a yet-to-be-determined game become determined. Once we have a team or player to root for, the excitement comes from the very idea that their win is not assured, but can only be made (or lost) moment-by-moment. Every sports fan knkows that it is simply no real fun to watch a match/game the outcome of which is already known. How many times have we heard the horror story of the football fan who taped the game in his absence, made it home to watch the game, only to accidentally see the final score on the news. He can still watch the game - and it is the same game whether he knows the outcome or not - but the excitement of doing so will be all but dead.

Another often ignored reason that some watch sports is that it provides a non-burdensome outlet to channel aggression. I had to explain this last night when explaining to my fiancee why I sometimes like to watch the Ultimate Fighting Championships . While one can pretend that the reason we (guys WAY more than girls) watch "violent" sports is because of its artistry or technical excellence, these two things can just as easily be seen in ice-skating and freestyle gymnastics. We really watch UFC, boxing, kickboxing, and Australian-rules football for the thrill of watching guys get pummelled, bloodied, and beaten into submisison; we watch these because it gives a release to aggression (Wililam James's "Moral Equivalent to War" maybe?)

Whyever we watch sports, sports have been a part of our human nature, seemingly, since as far back as recorded history will go. For my sake and for the sake of millions of other sports lovers, I hope this trend continues.

Thoughts About Memes, or Memes About Thoughts

2009-01-31T11:47:00.001-08:00

I just wanted to share an interesting e-mail exchange that I am currently having with a fellow amazon.com reviewer. It is on the topic of memes (the thought that just as genes are the building block of phenotypes, the meme is the basic unit of our mental life).

This was the e-mail sent to me:

I really liked your review [of Denis Dutton's "Art Instinct"] and it was so convincing I decided not to buy the book, even as I was poised to do so. However the book's title alone sparked a cascade of useful thoughts.

Since you're familiar with Stephen Pinker and ideas about evolution, I guess you must also be familiar with Richard Dawkins. But maybe you don't know about a wonderful book inspired by Dawkins: "The Meme Machine" by Susan Blackmore, with an introduction by Dawkins. Dr. Blackmore takes Dawkins' meme concept and runs with it. I found it to be a novel and delightfully argued theory of how ideas (including commercial jingles, fashion styles, catch phrases and religions) spread and evolve in a Darwinian manner. There are other books and articles about the meme concept, but hers is the only one I found convincing and revelatory.

Here was my response:

Thanks very much for the very kind words about my review. In honesty, it is an interesting book even though I find its ideas a bit rough. While I don't reccomend its ideas, the book is quite an interesting read.

Yes, I am definitely familiar with Pinker, Dawkins and Blackmore. To be honest, I am not very attracted to the idea of the meme (or the meme of the meme?). The reason is that it doesn't "explain" much of anything. Anything that the invocation of a meme can explain - why songs are catchy, why we can't stop thinking about that movie line, etc - can be juust as easily, and less problematically, explained by invoking the concept of "ideas." Yes, the meme is much more materialistic and therefore scientific seeming, but it doesn't expain much at all.

I am not sure we know nearly enough about neuroscience to explain ideas, their origin, and why sometimes they "pop up" without us wanting them to, but my suspicion is that we will find that the reality is much more pedestrian than the meme: ideas occur because of certain combinations of neurons firing between synapses, and sometimes, these firings occur without conscious will on our part.

My biggest problem with the idea of "memes" is that they do not make sense in several ways. (a) They don't really account for creativity and novelty; (b) they don't make sense given our strong intutions that we control our thoughts (rather than thoughts just "happening" to our passive brains; and (c) for such a physicalistic theory, the meme does not appear to have any physical nature as a thing (like the gene).

I am always amazed that the idea of memes has any credence at all. It seems that the only thing it really has going for it is that it is materialistic in nature (thus appealing to very hardcore materialists), and that it makes sense out of the phenomenon we sometimes have about thoughts "popping into" our heads without us willing them to.

When discussing memes with others, I am always amazed that defenders of memetics naturally assume that I am not a materialist, and must be a mind/body dualist, because of my rejection of memes. It just seeems quite natural to me that while the material brain gives rise to our inner life, it does not need "mind viruses" to infect it from the outside, but creates thoughts solely from the inside.

I guess time will tell if this idea has any staying power. My guess is that it will be gone within a decade as neuroscience gets a bit older.

Special Ed Students Immune From Failure?

2009-01-31T11:17:00.000-08:00

Yesteday, I took part in an IEP (Individualized Education Program) meeting for an autistic student on my case load. The goal of the meeting was to evaluate whether the student is progressing academically with the strategies we have put in place for him.

And, out of the blue, there it was. One participant, a "resource teacher" specializing in autism, said, "Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing."

I worked hard to keep my jaw from dropping. A few months ago, I would have said something to follow up such a comment - something to the effect of, "Special education students can fail, if they are not doing the work required desipte our best efforts." I would have said something like this but have learned to keep my mouth shut so as to avoid an "everyone against Kevin," scenario. Sadly, the view that kids recieving special ed services should not fail is commonplace.

To clarify, I do not accuse those holding this view of suggesting that students should pass simply because they recieve special education services. Their view is more nuanced: if a student receiving special education services is failing, then it must be because their work is not appropriately tailored to suit their abilities or strengths. This was what the participant at Friday's meeting was saying: as the student is failing classes, it must be because we special and general educators are not meeting his/her needs.

IF there is one over-arching problem with special education as administered in public schools (particularly high schools), it is this: special education inadvertently ends up shielding students from accountability. Special educators will pay lip-services to the idea that students must "meet teachers halfway," but these words collapse each time we introduce new services for a child in proportion to how badly they are failing. The worst part is that, by high school, students often know this and use it to their advantage. (I can't tell you how many times, for instance, I have seen kids recieve new services only to become lazier, thereby recieving new services, etc.)

The situation gets particularly delicate when we realize that, fairly often, a student is placed into special education because they are coming in far below the grade level required of the actual grade they are in (10th graders reading on a 3rd grade level, for instance.) Thus, when we talk about what "modificaitons" we need to make to their work, it often consists of reading things for them, scaling down the reading level of readings we give them, and, in a nutshell, making "10th grade english" into "3rd grade english that carries a 10th grade credit." This obliterates the entire idea of a "standards based" education by allowing some students to pass the same class as their peers, while having to master far less content in order to do so.

"Well, the child is recieving special ed services. There is no reason he should be failing." There has simply got to be a better way.

Progressive Education: A Bridge Too Far,

2009-01-31T08:19:00.000-08:00

On another blog, there is an intersting post questioning America's over-reliance on standardized test scores, and test scores in general. As an educator, I share the blogger's concern that American schools are cranking out students that are ill-able to think well.

The problem is that much of this criticism of the current educational approach comes from the vantege point of (what is loosely termed) progressive education. Influenced by in large by John Dewey, Maria Montessori, Edward Thorndike, etc, these educators tend to take the approach of "whole child education" where schools focus less on instilling disciplinary knowledge and more on educating students to participate in social democracy. Less about reading and math, and more about "critical thinking" and social-mindedness.

In this blogger's post, was the example of the Eight Year Study, which allegedly found that progressive schools turn out more "well rounded" and competent students than do "traditional" schools.

What bothers me about the study is not that it shows progresssive schools to turn out more self- and socially-attuned individuals (this is of little suprise considering that progressive schools offer explicit instruction in these areas). My big problem is the ASSUMPTION made in the study that the proper school is one that teachers particular social values.

Here is an example from the study of some objectives of things the study's progressive schools wish to instill in students:

The development of effective methods of thinking
The cultivation of useful work habits and study skills
The inculcation of social attitudes
The acquisition of a wide range of significant interests
The development of increased appreciation of music, art, literature, and other aesthetic experiences
The development of social sensitivity
The development of better personal-social adjustment
he acquisition of important information
The development of physical health
The development of a consistent philosophy of life

While siome of these - cultivation of work habits and study skills, acquisition of important information - are relatively uncontroversial, some cause me concern: to see schools as "inculcat[ors] of social attitudes," or facilitators in the development of "consistent philosoph[ies] of life," skirt dangerously close to the idea of schools as value-pushers and teachers as opiners.

It seems to me that schools in any kind of pluralistic society should stay as neutral towards any non-academic value as possible, and seeing teachers' role as helping students develop philosophies of life open the floodgates for value-pushing. Teaching english is not value pushing (and is necessasry for academic function). Teaching a philosophy of life is, if anything, the job of parent, pastor, community, or anyone except a public school teacher.

Second, schools have enough on their plates in teaching academic subjects, which we do not do well anyway. Why place a role onto schools which can be best achieved by private entitites like churches, clubs, families, and communities? If focusing on one job is proving to be difficult, why add the additional job of curing social ills as well?

The two foremost problems with "whole child education" is that (a) it forces schoools to play a role that are better played by families, pastors, community, and parties more interested than the school board; and (b) it opens up the potentially dangerous idea that schools become value-pushers, people-molders, and anything but academic-knowledge-conveyers.

While there are many other flaws in the progressive education vision (abolishing letter grades in favor of more "holistic" grades, lack of academic rigor) the two I mentione in the paragraph above are the most concerning to me. I do not want to see a day when schools devote a piece of each school day to "inculcat[ing] social attitudes," and helping students "develop... a philosophy of life."

If we are having enough truouble teaching facts, then why open schools up to teach values?

Libertarianism and Why It is Superior to Randian Objectivism

2009-01-31T03:56:00.000-08:00

By almost coincidence, I have been thinking about the philosophy of Ayn Rand lately. Not only is one of the blogs I've been following been having some interesting discussions on the merits of Rand as philosopher, but I am reading a book about education using Rand's principles of free market capitalism. In addition, I have received several comments on my posts from Atlas Fan, a blogger with Objecitivst sympathies. All of this has put Ayn Rand's philosophy back into the forefront of my brain. As will be clear, I am not very sympathetic with it.

Before going on to a look at why libertarianism is superior to Objectivist justifications for a minimal state, I want to briefly outline my history with objectivism. In the years 2000 and 2001, I was an objectivist of the ARI variety. I was very convinced that Rand's Objectivism was a viable, fully developed, closed system of philosophy. Gradually, I noticed what I thought were some serious flaws in some of Rand's argument - her ethical philosophy was insufficiently thin, her view of what constituted "reason" was too monolithic, etc. - and fell out of love with Objectivism.

Since then, the one sympathy I truly share with Rand is a belief in liberty, a minimal state, and the use of coercive force as suspect. That said, I think libertarian belief without Randian justification is much stronger than it is with.

First, one of Objectivists key complaints against non-Randian libertarianism is that "Although some call libertarianism a "philosophy," in fact it is just a relatively broad political position..." whereas Rand's defense of freedom "is a systematic philosophy: it starts with a theory of reality and a theory of knowledge, then develops a moral view using conclusions from the previous two fields, and all those conclusions provide the basis for its politics. (1)

Guilty as charged! There is a plurality of possible justifications for libertarianism: thinkers have argued that libertarianism is justified on utilitarian grounds, via natural rights, on religious grounds, or in a plurality of other ways. If libertarianism is to leave people free, though, I could not see that a "one justification system fits all," (like Rand's) as fitting a libertarian community.

In fact, if one suggests that there is only one very specific way to justify liberty (as Rand does) then you run a serious risk of restricting yourself into a minority view. As Rand views hers as a deductive system (it is actually inductive, but that is no matter), then she is saying, "If you don't share my views on epistemology or metaphysics, you can not possibly be a true defender of liberty. Check your premises!" With this very restrictive view, you will win only a handful of adherents (as witnessed by the relatively small number of people who actually consider themselves objectivists).

I have long been an advocate of having a plurality of justifications for any moral or political action. The more ways you can justify x (x is justified on utilitarian, natural rights, pragmatic, grounds) then the more chance you have of being able to justify x to a wide variety of audiences. As I take it a free society will likely have a variety of moral codes for people to subscribe to, it seems obvious that the more traditions one can appeal to in justification of a moral act, the better one will be. Rand's "one size fits all" practice of making a proper defense of liberty contingent on literal adherence to a very particular philosophic code means that you are dooming yourself to appealing to the few, rather than to the many.

More troubling still, whenever I read Rand (or an Objectivist's) denunciation of libertarianism, I can't help but think that they are not defending freedom so much as "freedom to be an Objectivist." In other words, Objectivists' insistence that "rational" people will agree on just about everything (i.e., they will follow Rand to the letter) reminds me of the type of "free society" that exists in Mormon Utan, where everyone is free to act as they choose (with the understanding that if one makes a wrong move, one will be excommunicated or cackled into submission.)

Take the following invective from Peter Schwartz:

"Subjectivism, amoralism and anarchism are not merely present in certain “wings” of the Libertarian movement; they are integral to it. In the absence of any intellectual framework, the zealous advocacy of “liberty” can represent only the mindless quest to eliminate all restraints on human behavior—political, moral, metaphysical." (2)

First, this is a bad oversimplification. No libertarian that I have ever been in contact with has ever advocated an "eliminat[tion of] all restraints on human behavior." Libertarians certainly draw the line at the Millian (yes, it was around before Rand) "no harm" principle - the principle that, while certain acts are permissible, government is justified in "stepping in" as soon as one person or ground engages in coercive harm to another. In other words, libertarians are far from the hedonists Schwartz describes, but agree fully with Rand (and Locke) that the purpose of government is to protect the individual.

To libertarians, it seems obvious that no free society would endorse one moral system - particularly a horribly restrictive one - as Schwartz seems to want for his "free society" (Galt's gulch, perhaps, where everyone is completely like-minded?). To libertarians, it is obvious that when you leave people RELATIVELY free to live their own lives, a plurality of value systems and ways of life will emerge; people don't think the same, and generally, a society of people that thinks the same is indicative of coercion.) If Galt's gulch or an Objectivist village is teh model of a free society, then it is either indicative that coercion or threat is involved, or is a "membership only" society that restricts membership to those subscribing to a certain view. Neither is consistent with any real libertarianism.

Would an Randian "free society" look like the Ayn Rand Society, where those championing liberty exercise banishment from their group at fast rates? (The David Kelley incident is instructive here, as it led to several 'banishments' from the club, holding no idea of academic freedom. Another great example of such childish and collectivistic behavior can be seen here.)

Objectivists like Schwartz and Peikoff hold an interesting admixture of zeal for individual rights but absolute scorn for those who would exercise it in any way of which they disapprove. Of course, intolerant individuals can certainly function within a free society, and a free society is one in which they would not be barred or coerced unless they did real harm to others. But I shudder to think of how quickly a free society consisting only of those individuals would erect into a statist one where the state monitors behavior to ensure that it is compatible with "reason." Or such a society of like-minded intolerant individuals may quickly become "free" in the way Mormons are in Utah: individuals are free to act in accord with the restrictive ethical code that binds them under threat of banishment or ostricization.

What really concerns me, though, is Objectivism's negativity towrads objectivism's inability to provide strong moral sanction:

Anyone from a gay-rights activist to a criminal counterfeiter to an overt anarchist can declare that he is merely asserting his “liberty” (3)

Why is Schwartz concerned that libertarianism cannot stop the "gay-rights activist" or "overt anarchist" from exercising his liberties? (Surely, libertarians are justified in penalizing the criminal, via the "no harm" principle). My fear is that, in Schwartz's "free society," the gay-rights activist would be censored or censured for doing nothing other than adcovating for the rights of gays to have relationships and marry. (Rand is incapable of justifying, on Objectivist principles, why gays should not be able to marry.) Schwartz also seems desirous of being able to stop "overt anarchists" from expressing their obviously non-Objectivist views.

Schwartz really does seem to want a society where all views other than Objectivism meet with strong reprobation. This is not defense of freedom, but defense of freedom to follow a restrictive code or be censured (a Mormon-esque freedom with Uncle Warren's role being replaced by Aunt Ayn).

This is why I think libertarianism of a plural variety (and with plural justificaitons) leads to a safer liberty than Rand's very restrictive Objectivist view of freedom. It is more inclusive by allowing for a plurality of justifications (appealing to a wider and more diverse audience), and it is certainly more free in that it would allow various groups with various beliefs and codes to live with the maximum freedom possible (as consistent with a "no harm" or similar principle.

(For anyone curious, the libertarianism that I am in favor of looks much like that written about in the works of William Galston, particularly the book Liberal Pluralism..)

Review of Stout's "Feel Good Curriculum"

2009-01-28T14:01:00.000-08:00

Here is a review I recently wrote about another highly reccomended book, Maureen Stout's "Feel-Good Curriculum." It is a very good indictment of an overly progressive education, a la ED Hirsch

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Maureen Stout's book, "The Feel-Good Curriculum," would make a good companion to the works of ED Hirsch, author of "The Knowledge Deficit." These two authors' theses are much the same: over the past forty-or-so years, the "progressive" changes in American education have led to the decline of academic standards, the over-valuing of (a misguided view of) self-esteem, and and the turning out of students ill-prepared for the disciplined nature of the "real world."

Stout is a professor of education at UC Berkley, and like her philosophical kin Hirsch, is interested not only in demonstrating these saddening trends but in exploring their ideational roots. While the usual suspects (Dewey, Thorndike), she also links non-educators like psychologist Carl Rogers and Erik Ericksson with the "child-centered," whole child," and "self-actualization" movements in education.

These movements changed virtually everything about schooling. Instead of teaching students basic academics, their primary goals were not wo help the child reach self-actualizaiton (whatever THAT means!). Instead of seeing discipline as necessary for an ordered school, it was now seen as an antiquated stifler of student enthusiasm.

...And, as Stout points out, the movement kept on going, becoming more and more extreme despite yielding worse and worse reults. As an educator, I found myself oscillating between chuckling and containing anger as I read about current trends in educaiton - Vygotskyan cooperative learning, social (rather than standards-based) promotion, educators as facilitators rather than instructors - that I sadly recognize all too well. And as an educator, I can attest that these are trends that need to be rethought and revamped, but never seem to be; Stout hits these problems right on the head in writing about these problems, not only identifying THAT, but WHY, they are problems.

Stout ends with a section on how we can turn some of these effects around (and her suggestions sound much like those of ED Hirsch). She does not advocate a return to the dark ages where students memorize rote passages and are paddled for misbehavior. She advocates a return to standards-based, rather than "outcome-based" educaiton, readjust our views on the value of discipine, and maybe get rid of the "progressive" idea of self-esteem that equates it with "feeling good for no good reason" rather than an earned feeling of accomplishment.

This is a very, very good book. Those who read it will either be challenged to re-examine cherished views or be further outraged by problems they know too well. Either way, it is not a book to be missed.

Ayn Rand, Tibor Machan, and Their Mistaken Defense of Objective Morality

2009-01-28T10:50:00.001-08:00

Like many others, I first got hooked on philosophy by reading Ayn Rand. Also, like many, there came a time when I started reading other phiosophers. Therefore - again, like many - there was a time when I realized that Rand got just about everything wrong in her philosophizing. In particular, Rand had a habit of claiming that she had solved a vexing philosophic problem generally by vastly oversimplifying, if not getting wrong, a problem only to "solve" something different than the actual problem.

Recently, I have been reading essays in a colleciton called The Promise of Liberty by a follower of Rand's, Tibor Machan. In reading his first essay, which defends Rand's defense of ethical objectivism, I have re-realized how wrong her solution is, and how, as usual, she even got the question wrong.

As PoL is still in press, I am not going to quote from it, but rather from Rand's own essay "The Objectivist Ethics". machan does not really add to or expand to Rand's unfortunate defense, but only restates it with the intention of clarifying it.

In short, Rand and Machan's argument is that ethics are objective because ethical judgments are made with the aid of facts. Once one chooses to live ones life, certain values inexorably follow from that: we ought to seek food, shelter, that which will promote our flourishing, etc.

An organism’s life depends on two factors: the material or fuel which it needs from the outside, from its physical background, and the action of its own body, the action of using that fuel properly. What standard determines what is proper in this context? The standard is the organism’s life, or: that which is required for the organism’s survival.

Al;ready, though, Rand has misunderstood the dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Quite honestly, what is at dispute is not whether values and moral judgments are (or should be) made in reference to facts, but what the nature of moral norms are. Subjectivists argue that moral norms are come to by subjects, not by some quality inherent in objects. The echo famous subjectivist JL Mackie, for morality to be objective requires that morals have some subject-independent existence in the world.

In fact, Rand's view is completely comapatible with a subjectivist account of morality. Subjectivists can easily, and without contradiction, suggest that moral judgments should - or must! - be made in the face of actual subject-independent facts, so long as the judgments being made are made by individual subjects. All that is required for subjectivism is the acknowledgement that judgments are made by the subjects and are not a pre-existing imperative that we happen to "come across" existing in the world independent of our minds.

The next question is whether Rand or Machan have done enough to show that an objective morality is possible. Life may be the "ultimate value" that undergirds all other values, but is that one value enough to give us any obvious answers to any but the most pedestrian moral questions?

Since reason is man’s basic means of survival, that which is proper to the life of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys it is the evil.

Before going on, I want the reader to pause and notice the subtle "no true scotsman" fallacy going on here. "[t]hat which is proper to the life of a RATIONAL being is good..." By framing it this way, Rand can easily say that x is an objective value. When one point out that more people choose y than x (a possible reason to suppose that x is not an objective value), Rand can simply dismiss them all by saying that they are not rational, and if they were, they'd choose x. Like the "no true scotsman" fallacy, one cannot win with this set up becuase Rand's caveat - "rational" - has rigged the game!

Beyond that, though, Rand once again demonstrates obliviousness to philosophers and ideas that she full well should have known about: in this case, GE Moore, author of Principia Ethica. If she had been aware of Moore's work - what ethical philosopher wasn't?! - she would have realized the need to show how this "equation" was not a violation of the naturalistic fallacy.

Moore's idea was simple; efforts to equate the terms "good" or "bad" with any demarcatioin principle - utility, survival, pleasure - was invalid and we can see this by realizing that our intuitions understand that "good" and x (pick any criteria) are two different things. "Good" is not a direct synonym for happiness (there are good things that don't make us happy), or, in Rand's case, survival (there are many things that don't enhance our survival that accord with our intuition of what is good).

By way of example, Machan's article mentions more than once a moral obligation to be generous. He mentions is as if to imply that choosing to live inexorably entails this obligation to be generous. He does not explain how this is, and I have serious doubts that any attempts to do so would not be very, very erroneous. I am all for generosity, but it is easy to think of a dozen examples of sceanrios where my survival is impeded or harmed by generosity. More straightforward, A person could certainly argue that being generous has social utility and CAN be personally beneficial (via game theory, say) but such argujments would tend to be utilitarian (or rule-utillitarian) in nature, and I am left mystified as to any plausible argumenst that the choice to live necessarily entails an obligation towards generosity (particularly for egoists like Rand and Machan).

Another example of this blunder can be seen when Rand tries to justify the objective (not subjective) value of productiveness.

The virtue of Productiveness is the recognition of the fact that productive work is the process by which man’s mind sustains his life, the process that sets man free of the necessity to adjust himself to his background, as all animals do, and gives him the power to adjust his background to himself.

To Rand, this value is objective in the sense that it is the "central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values." To choose non-productiveness is, in essence, to act against the ultimate value of life and thus the objectively wrong choice.

To be honest, this is the type of rhetoric that I and many others got hooked on when we got hooked on Rand. Now, when I read those words, it is hard to see how, because as stirring as they are, they are wrong. While one can argue that produciveness is a life-sustaining virtue, it is certainly not objectively the only choice. One can - and many have - sustained their lives by freeloading off of people. Also, productiveness is no guarantor of sustaining one's life. Eithe way, to argue that productiveness is an objective value by reference to its utility in sustaining life is hollow, as it is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for sustaining life.

Like all of the other values that Rand defeds - egoism, capitalism, generosity, rationality, etc. - productiveness is a contingent and subjective value choice. One can choose it, but there is nothing compelling us to do so. Rand and Machan would object that the facts of life comepel values like productiveness and generosity, but any anthropologist or sociologist can easily demonstrate that there are a plurality of ways to answer moral questions consistent with sustaining, and flourishing in, life.

There are many other points that could be brought up, but I think I have done enough to show that Rand came nowhere close to solving the problem of moral objectivism v. subjectivism. The fact that she was so confident that she did, and that Machan is confident enough not to heavily modify and reconfigure her arguments, is testimony of the insularity that has and does plague the objectivist "movement."

Positives and Negatives

2009-01-27T12:38:00.000-08:00

One of the favorite educational ideas in the past twenty-or-so years has been the all-encompassing power of positive reinforcement. Rather than punish, scold, or take away privleges from a child, it is best to cajole, praise and rewward your child. Far be it form me to suggest that one should not reward and praise children/students when they deserve it, and I would never argue that punishment is the only effective discipline tool. Like so many shortcomings of the "self-esteem movement," the problem does not lie with the method presented, but with the "all or nothing" way it is held. Parents and teachers need to get back to being comfortable with the idea that positive reinforcement goes only so far, and negative reinfofcement is also necessary.

I recently began thinking about this issue when talking with the behavior interventionist at the school. On several occasions, we have talked about what to do with certain out-of-control students that refuse to follow rules, defy authority, and display inappropriate behaviors. The behavior interventionist always reaches the same conclusion: create a positive incentive plan whereby a certain number of x (days without incident, hours on task, completed homeworks) results in a postive reward (everything from "video game time" to free food in the cafeteria).

I always end up arguing with the behavior interventionist over this method. I ask him questions like, "why are we going to reward this student for doing what other students are expected to do?" and "Why can't we try penalties instead of rewards (as they are often more cost-effective and fair than giving bad students rewards for being adequate). The response I get, in so many words, is that "students are motivated best by working for what they want."

I have heard this platitutde many times, and it has been ingrained in us for so long that many think it is the end of the story. Of course, people are motivated by want of reward, but this misses the other half of the coin: people are also motivated by fear of negative cosnequences. To see this duality of motivations, we need only look at why peolpe hold jobs. We work because we need to have income to live and while we are positively reinfoced by our paychecks, we also work because we fear the negative consequences of failing to do so. (If a benefactor immunized us from the possible negative consequences of doing a poor job, many of us would secretly begin slacking, no matter howm much we were "positively rewarded" by high pay.)

There are two main reasons, though, that I dislike positive reinforcement: first, it is not fair to reward some to do what is expected naturally of most; second, it does not reflect how the post-school world works.

As mentioned in a previous post, the special educaiton world has a bizarre notion of what "equal" means. There, "equal" does not mean that rules are applied to all and all alike, but rather, that rules are appplied in proportion to a stduent's abilities and needs. Where some students are expected to do problems 1-12, others wil only be expected to do 1-7 (for the same grade). While some students have 45 minutes to take the test, others get 90 minutes.

Sometimes, these rules can be justified (the second could be justified for students with documented processing delays, for instance). Other times, it is not (even as a special educator, I cringe the "reduced number of problems" rule). Point-sheets offering misbehaving students the chance to earn prizes for following school rules that others are expected to follow simply translates to rewarding those who behave badly. It gets students used to the idea that kids who follow rules are unrewarded, whille those who don't follow rules earn the chance to win free stuff and benefits.

Not only do misbehaving students see this, but the students who behave also see it. Like the child that acts out because his parents only notice bad behavior, these well-performing students see that it may be in their interest to act up, so that they too might earn a shot at being rewarded for doing what has been hitherto unrewareded.

The second reason I dislike overuse of positive reinfocement is that it gives kids the false idea that this is how the world works. Yes, the world rewards us, but it only rewards us for doing well and going above what is expected. Contra the way point-sheets work, the world does not reward us when we only do what is expected. We might get a positive bonus when we do well at our job, but when we merely show up and do some work, the boss will likely threaten our termination. Students raised on point-sheets and incentive plans will likely not adjust to this very inverse reality, because they were taught that the mere act of sitting in their seat and paying attention could earn them a prize. ("You can't fire me. I've showed up at work every day this week and didn't cuss anyone out!")

I am simply worried bcause for twenty + years, education's zeal to promote "good" self-esteem has made it so that we see positive reinforcement as the only option, rather than one of two options. If we are to train students to adjust well to the post-high-school world, we cannot send them off with the idea that doing only what is expected will be rewarded. We cannot send our children off with the message that an exasperated world will bribe them to do basic things, just because it is the only way to get them to be civil. If we expect them to go to college and/or hold jobs, we need to instill in them that doing good work will get you rewarded, but doing the minimum will get you terminated. (Or should we just give the students' employers point sheets?!)

Governor Blagojevich, the moral philosopher?!

2009-01-27T08:49:00.000-08:00

Here is an interesting article pertaining to the Illinois Governor, Rod Blagojevich. This week, the governor chose not to attend his impeachment trial, where he is accused of conspiring to sell Illinois senate seat left vacant by Barack Obama, and instead, go on a media blitz. The governor went on the View, Larry King Live, Good Morning America (but curiously, avoided America's Most Wanted and World's Dumbest Criminals - must be a strategic move).

Now, it is bad enough that Bagojevich loosely comapred his self-inflicted travails to "Mandela, Dr. King, [and] Gandhi, for which he is now being deservedly lampooned in a musical called Rod Blagojevich Superstar.

Yes, that is bad enough. But the governor, as senseless as he is incredulous, has now become a moral philosopher. On Larry King Live, that is, the governor was called on his repeated assertions that the wire-tap tapes that find him intimating his plans to sell a senate seat were "taken out of context." When asked about what context would justify the statements he made about selling the senate seat, our dear moral philosopher said this:

"If you do an exchange of one for the other, that's wrong," he told ABC's "Nightline." "But if you have discussions about the future and down the road and what you might want to do once you're no longer governor in a few years, what's wrong with that?"

While I am sure that Blagojevich had a good time in law school, I am guessing that he never payed attention in any criminal law classes, and surely never took or understood clases in moral philosophy. Of course, what Blagojevich is trying to do here is distinguish between a criminal act and thoughts about a potential criminal act. The former, for sure, is illegal - he seems to have a firm grasp of that fact - but the latter is perfectly legal so long as it does not lead to a criminal act.

Right? Kind of. One will certainly go to prison if one murders. One will not go to prison, though, if one thinks or fantasizes about murder. What the governor is leaving out though is that one commits a criminal offense when one talks about, and plans, a murder, even if the murder never comes to fruition. As long as there is strong evidence, which apparently the tapes provide, that the governor was talking with seriousness about a plan to sell a senate seat, then it is an offense.

That is from a purely legal standpoint; the governor may not be as guilty as he would be if he actually sold the senate seat, but he is still quite guilty.

Not only does the governor make a poor criminal lawyer, but he makes a bad moral philosopher. To say that one gets a moral free pass because they did not commit a crime, even though one thought and talked seriously about comitting the crime is to ignore the value of intent in blameworthiness. (If I thought about robbing the governor's house and talked seriously about it with others about doing it in "the future and down the road," but got caught before I could do it, would the governor be right - using his "logic" - to say that I am morally in-the-clear? I think he would, rightly, acknowledge that the act of thinking about, and talking about, a crime is itself worthy of moral condemnation.

Before we are through with the governor, he also says something rather revealing in the above-quoted snippet. He makes an unjustified distinction between selling a sensate seat as governor and selling a senate seat as (?!) a private citizen. The latter, he implies, would be not a crime at all. ("...[W] hat's wrong with... discussions about...what you might want to do once you're no longer governor?) Apparently there is nothing wrong with selling a senate seat "when you are no longer governor."

Needless to say, I hope this beast is impeached and goes to jail for a good long time. Clearly, he has jumped off the deep end and I hold no hope, nor desire, for his rehabilitation. The very fact that he was elected to office should make anyone who voted for him question their fitness to vote.

Some Thoughts on What Intelligence Is

2009-01-26T15:30:00.001-08:00

To me as an educator, one of the more interesting, and challenging, questions is: what is intelligence? Further, we can ask how many "intelligences" are there and how do we recognize intelligence? For what it is worth, here are some of my thoughts on these questions:

What Is Intelligence

The word "intelligence" has proven quite resistant to any single definition (or discovery of any necessary or sufficient conditions). I think this has a large amount to do with its function as an abstract noun, a noun that doesn't refer to an existant so much as an abstract generalization. As with a term like "justice," we all might have our own ideas as to what we think intelligence is, but there is no "thing" that we can point to to prove or disprove any competing conception. (If we suggested that a dog must have x condition, we can point to dogs that may not have x condition in order to disprove the assertion, but we cannot do the same with abstract nouns, as there are no concretes to point to.)

on the online dictionaries, a most common definition goes like this: intelligence is the "ability to comprehend, or, to acquire and use information." I have yet to find fault with this definition except to say that if we use it as our guide, there must be as many "intelligences" as there are things to be "intelligent" about. (I will get to that in the proceeding section.)

But ultimately, I do think that the "abstract noun" problem faces a very Wittgensteinian dilemma in that it seems to prove incapable of any obviously correct definition in the same way concrete nouns are. Further, attempts at defining words like "intelligence" seem like exercises in circularity; in order to define "intelligence," we must think about examples of intelligence we know of, and abstract their common traits. But doing this presupposes a working definition (or way to recognize) what counts as intelligence. This, in a circular way, defining a term like "intelligence" requires a pre-existing idea of what intelligence is (as we define by abstracting from concrete examples).

In short, I don't hold out any real hope of any once-and-for-all correct definition of intelligence, nor am I worried about it. Like other ab tract nouns - beauty, justice, evil - we as often as not rely on the "Potter Stewart" definition: we know it when we see it.

How many intelligences are there?

As mentioned above, If we use the above definition - intelligence is the "ability to comprehend, or, to acquire and use information," it seems quite obvious that there are as many intelligences as there are things to be intelligent about.

First, I do stress the contingency of the above sentence: there is no a priori reason to use that definition over others, other than the fact that it is nondescript enough to accord with most intuitions I think we have about intelligence.

There is one big problem with this definition, though. For some, it will be too broad and for others, too narrow. This mostly hinges on whether people want to see things that we might otherwise call "talents" be labeled as "intelligences." To see this, take the example of the songwriter. Some want to narrow the definition of "intelligence" to disallow the "talent" of songwriting from being an "intelligence." Others, though, want to see songwriting included as an intelligence. (As mentioned, we often circularly define words like "intelligence" based on what we want that definition to allow for.)

The problem here seems to be that most people debating this issue seem to talk about different disciplines as "either/or" scenarios; either it an example of intelligence, or talent. Songwriting, they say, is a talent; math is an intelligence. What they often don't see is that both activities involve admixtures of both "talent" ( the "natural" and unteachable predilection) and intelligence (for now, the ability to acquire and use information). Math, generally thought of as an intelligence, requires both of these as much as songwriting does (just in different proportions). Just like songwriting seems to be more a talent than an intelligence because you can't really teach it - either you have it or you don't - we can easily see math in the same way; some have the intuitive number sense and those who don't have immense difficulty learning it.

I do think that those taking a more restrictive view of intelligence, and wish to preclude art, music, sports, etc. - from being called "intelligence" take an unusually strict view because they fail to see that just because one has a talent for something does not negate the fact that they also can develop those talents in ways deserving of the "intelligence" categorization. To take a favorite example of tennis player Roger Federer, one might be tempted to suggest that tennis playing is a talent rather than an intelligence. One could only do this, of course, if they neglect the amount of skill and learning involved in the enterprise. Like any other genius, Roger Federer's ability to acquire and use knowledge about his craft surpasses, in sensitivity in breadth, what most will achieve. Talent? In part. But talent only goes so far, and it is HERE where I think it becomes a crime not to call Roger Federer's tennis ability an intelligence.

I am hard pressed to come up with examples of things that qualify all the way as talents or all the way as intelligence. It seems that just about every constructive human activity requires both some sort of natural predilection (talent) and an ability to acquire and use information (intelligence). That is why I think that under our dictionary definition of intelligence there are as many intelligences as things to be intelligent about.

How do we recognize intelligence?

Much of the dispute over what to call an intelligence and what not to has to do with whether the proposed activity can be measured? It is uncontroversial that ma thematic ability and spatial reasoning should be called intelligences because we can objectively measure them. It is, however, controversial to say that creative writing ability should be called an intelligence and the reason is because it cannot be objectively measured (it can, of course, be subjectively measured, as any lover of writing will tell us.)

This, I think, is a mistake. We should not base whether x intelligence exists by deciding whether it can be measured. We do not, for instance, say that talent for acting does not exist because it cannot be measured. What we do say is that while there is such a thing as talent for acting, such a thing cannot be objectively determined or measured, but is a matter of subjective judgment. We should say the same when it comes to "intelligences" that cannot be objectively measured. We should not say that they simply don't exist because htey can't be measured. Rather, we can recognize that a thing like "social intelligence" is recognizable, even if it cannot be objectively measured.

I am as big a fan of measurement as the next, and I think that IQ is a valid measure of a person's scholastic aptitude. What I don't think is that IQ exhausts the possibility of what can qualify as an intelligence simply because other "intelligences" cannot be objectively measured. (The only persons who would object are psychometricians, and this is no sup rise, because their profession only allows them to target those capacities that can be measured, even if they realize that other capacities exist in the same way a lawyer's profession demands that she recognizes only codified law but can acknowledge that uncodified morality exists.)

To conclude, I see no reason to suppose that "intelligence" will ever yield to any once-and-for-all agreed-upon definition, nor would I expect it to (as an abstract noun). Partly because of this, I think it is folly to suggest any narrow definition of intelligence and support a more pluralistic view: intelligence exists wherever there is a recognized ability to acquire and use information to inform one's actions. In holding this view, I see it as backwards to suggest that intelligences exist only when they can be objectively measured. To hold this is to put the cart before the horse.

Against "practicing without a license"

2009-01-22T17:36:00.000-08:00

Below is a review of Stanley Fish's recent book "Save the World on Your Own Time," where he takes the college world to task for getting away from instruction and instilling knowledge and, instead, preaching and instilling preferred values.

I cannot say enough great things about the book and professor Fish's thesis. I am very much in agreement with all but a few minor details. I strongly urge anyone concerned with the proper role of educators to read it.

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In "Save the World on Your Own Time," former professor and dean Stanley Fish is quite clear on what he wants: "I want a university infected by no one's politics, but by the nitty-gritty obligations of teaching and research." (p. 16) Fish draws on his own experience in academia, as well as the usual highly publicized examples a la Ward Churchill, to argue that the academy is focusing less on teaching and more on preaching. And unlike those like David Horowitz and Dinesh D'Souza, Fish does not simply want to make political discourse by university faculty more "balanced," but to remove it all together. As Fish writes repeatedly, teaching political ideas (how to think about them, the history of them, etc) is different from preaching political ideas.

That the latter is happening on a pretty large scale is not much in dispute. From Ward Churchill being removed from the U of Colorado for comments made after 9/11, to universities taking collective stands on policy issues, to the "speech codes" that several universities have experimented with over the past decade, Fish documents this trend quite well.

But what to do about it? Fish wants us to "return" to the "proper" job of universities: to teach students how to think, rather than what to think. Teach about ideas, rather than endorse ideas. Let's avoid the rhetoric, contra Derek Bok and Martha Nussbaum, about the universities' responsibility to promkote tolerance, democracy, pluralism, or any other value and accept the fact that universities are not in the "making good citizens" business, but in the "making educated citizens" business.

Does this mean that universities should not talk about values, politics, literary ideas, etc? No. "You can probe [a] policy's history,...explore its philosophical lineage... [and] examine its implicaitons... but you can't urge it on your students." (p. 24) Will this make the university stale or self-censorious? Fish offers persuasive reasons to suggest that self-censoring can lead to more excitement. Anyone can offer and talk about their opinioins; it is quite more exciting to show students how to analyze and talk about ideas then it is to opine about them.

Some of Fish's other ideas will doubtless rub some the wrong way. For instance, many people take it as a given that the goal of a university is to promote social justice, democracy, pluralism, multiculturalism, or some other such value (other than the pursuit of truth and knowledge). Fish says no! This is the job of the counselor, clergyman, television pundit, and politician; for an academic to preach values other than pursuit of truth and knowledge is to, in effect, "practice without a license."

Fish even gets into a juicy discussion on the "intelligent design" movement, and argues quite persuasively that the very subordination of pursuing truth to pursuing "democratic pluralistic debate" is what gave rise to this fiasco. Some may think it is a stretch, but Fish is quite convincing in his suggestion that our infatuation with keeping debates as pluralistic as possible has gotten in the way of our asking whether a certain position is true or the opposition worthy. (ID exploits this by focusing less on the "theory's" scientific merits and more on the value of "democratic dialogue.")

My only real complaint about this book is that I was hoping to hear Fish's take on the dilemma caused by professors at once having to take positions in publications (particularly humanities publications) while expecting not to let students find out their biases. (The Ward Churchill incident is a good example, where Churchill seemed very neutral and fair in his classes, but was fired becuase his writings rubbed people the wrong way.) Should we not expect professors to take iconoclastic positions in print for fear that their students might find out? Or is taking strong positions okay, so long as one keeps their research and teaching seperate? I think I know where Fish would come out here, but I was hoping to hear him discuss this very vexing and pertinent topic.

All in all, though, the book was well argued, economically written (176 pp.) and is bound to stir up an academy that needs stirring up.

A Sad Incongruity

2009-01-20T16:19:00.000-08:00

It is a unique experience to have witnessed the inauguration of the first black president of the United States at a majority black school. Today, during our third period class, my high school showed students the inauguration, and it was exciting to see the look of pride on many of their faces during the event.

In the same day, though, occurred an event seemingly at odds with this inspiring event. today, as the first black president was taking his oath, another black student dropped out of high school. While one man was achieving a zenith opportunity, one boy was putting an end to many future opportunities.

I knew this boy fairly well. He was in one of the classes that I co-teach, and while he was sometimes considered the "terror of the school," he was quite intelligent. On his good days, he was a stand-out in the class, raising his hand astutely answering questions. On his bad days, it was all teachers and administrators could do to control him.I do not know for sure, but I have heard, and strongly suspect, that the student was "thuggin'" and had a gang affiliation. Several teachers, including myself, gave it a mighty effort but in the end, he couldn't be reached.

Some teachers may be glad to see this student go and, to be honest, there is a small part of me that saw the futility of forcing an education on a so-often unwilling, if not defiant, participant. There is another part of me that is just plain sick of seeing young people, especially black boys and girls, drop out of school. Some have been lost to pregnancy. Others have succumbed to the gang life. Some have dropped out for no apparent reason other than dislike for school minus parental pressures to get an education. However it happens, as a teacher, it is never a good feeling.

I can't help but see the irony in the fact that on the same day as a Harvard Law degreed black man takes the oath to the highest office in the land, another black boy resigns the chance of having a respectable future. I hope that Barack Obama might represent, to some other black students, the realm of possibilities for smart black youths. In his speech today, Barack Obama said:

This is the meaning of our liberty and our creed, why men and women and children of every race and every faith can join in celebration across this magnificent mall. And why a man whose father less than 60 years ago might not have been served at a local restaurant can now stand before you to take a most sacred oath.

My fear is that if too many more black students - students in general, really - forfeit the right of educaiton that was fought so hard for 60 years ago, the above vision may be more rhetoric than reality.